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I. Introduction and Background to the Conference 
From November 17th through the 20th of 1980 a Senior 
Management Workshop of CACTCOM was held at Georgetown, 
Guyana. The planning and preparation of this effort involved 
many individuals, institutions and organizations some of 
which merit mention in this introduction. 
The genesis of this workshop grew out of meeting in 
March of 1980 in Jamaica among the Executive Committee of 
CACTCOM (consisting of Ian Whittaker of the Jamaica Develop-
ment Bank; Audley Coulton of the Agricultural Credit Board 
of Jamaica; Ian Chandler of the Barbados National Bank 
and John Yates of the Guyana Cooperative Agricultural and 
Industrial Development Bank), ably assisted by Richard 
Roberts of the FAO in Rome and also Compton Bourne of the 
University of the West Indies and D.H. Graham of Ohio State 
University. 
The concern grew that a senior workshop was now 
appropriate to complement CACTCOM's more usual activity of 
designing training sessions and short courses for middle 
level technicians and staff in agricultural lending insti-
tutions and programs. It was felt that there were broader 
policy issues that merited discussion among the more senior 
management of these same institutions. In part this concern 
grew out of the difficulties encountered by many agricultural 
1 
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credit institutions and programs in the region during the 
mid to late 1970's. Some of these institutions were experi-
encing growing delinquencies and defaults; an erosion of the 
real value of their portfolio through inflation; rising 
lending costs; a decline in the possibility of continued 
international funding and increased pressure from hard 
pressed local governments to cut back on costs to economize 
on budgetary support. In the light of these concerns it 
is not surprising that the theme of the conference was 
.focused on the current viability of these institutions and 
programs in the Caribbean. 
The staff at Ohio State University was called upon to 
organize the papers to be presented in this area since OSU 
has been engaged in analyses of rural financial markets 
for over a decade. To gain a broader perspective on 
these issues material was presented on experiences in other 
lesser developed countries such as Peru and Costa Rica. 
Specialists were drawn in from India (B.M. Desai), the Univer-
sity of the West Indies (Compton Bourne) and other universi-
ties in the U.S. (Syracuse) as well as Ohio State. All had 
worked together with OSU staff on previous occasions and 
thus a fairly consistent treatment of the issues was possible 
despite the diverse background of the resource people involved. 
Next came the issue of funding the conference. This 
represented a challenge given the large number of individuals 
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and institutions within CACTCOM and the legitimate concern 
that as many of these members as possible should participate. 
Fo r tunat e ly the Regional Development Office of the USAID 
Mission in Barbados was sympathetic and supportive. William 
Baucom and Thomas King among others were responsible for 
arranging support for the resource people and covering the 
costs for a large majority of the CACTCOM members to attend. 
The vision and encouragement of USAID for this effort is 
gratefully appreciated by all parties concerned. 
Finally, the task of hosting this effort fell on the 
shoulders of John Yates and his staff at the Guyana Coopera-
tive Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank. This 
proved to be a fortunate choice. The facilities for the 
meeting were outstanding; the various field trips to gain 
insights into Guyanese agricultural development were 
unusually informative and the efforts made to resolve the 
numerous practical problems of arrivals, departures and 
refreshing social activities met the highest standards of 
efficiency of support. At the same time the participan ts 
at the conference were honored in having the Guyanese 
Minister of Finance, F.E. Hope, address the conference in 
its opening session. Frequent visits at Guyanese inst i tutions 
and discussions with key Guyanese officials were widely 
appreciated by all. 
In closing it is appropriate to set the stage for the 
papers and discussions that follow. As mentioned at the 
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conference's closing session the OSU colleagues and associates 
gained immeasurably from the fruitful dialogue that followed 
their presentations. There is no simple formula or strategy 
to resolve many of the questions raised at the confe rence. 
Nevertheless it is hoped that the issues raised, the insights 
gained and the recommendations considered shed more l ight 
on these problems than may have existed before. 
Important here are such questions as: (1) the role of 
general economic policies in penalizing agriculture , compro-
mising the rate of return to farming and affecting t he 
viability of agricultural portfolios i n rural lending 
institutions; (2) strategies to improve the performance of 
lending institutions through more flexible interest rate 
policies, improved informational systems to de t ect arrears 
more quickly and record lending costs in a more anal ytical l y 
useful framework; (3) the possibility of lowering l ending 
costs through group loans and othe r innovations and the 
crucial issue of designing strategies t o mobilize domestic 
savings to make up for declining international funding and ; 
(4) better interaction between internat ional lenders and local 
institutions and programs to remove inflexible or inappro-
priate guidelines that increase the vulnerability of local 
programs. 
In the end the OSU group felt that effective financial 
intermediation can play a positive role in economic development 
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and rural development in particular. Still, while healthy 
rural financial markets might be necessary, this may not be 
both necessary and sufficient to guarantee progress in rural 
development. Complementary efforts in the real sector to 
lessen the penalization of agricultural activity and improve 
the rate of return to farming are called for. We hope that 
the dialogue that emerged within the conference clarified 
these issues and that this effort will lead to continued 
discussion an~where appropriate, to policy action to deal 
with these problems more effectively. 
Douglas H. Graham 
The Ohio State University 
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ECONOMY-WIDE INFLUENCES ON RURAL FINANCIAL 
MARKET PERFORMANCE 
By 
· Compton: Bourne 
University of the West Indies 
The viability of rural credit institutions and programs is an 
important item on the policy agenda of Caribbean governments, regional 
agencies, and the credit institutions themselves. Among many decision-
makers there is genuine concern about the performance of rural credit 
programs. Financial advisers have been provided for some struggling 
institutions i n the East Caribbean Common Market. Programs have been 
redesigned in others. In Jamaica there is even an active movement towards 
the merger of several public sector programs and institutions. 
These policy concerns and related initiatives are commendable. 
Nonetheless, t hey reveal one serious policy limitation, namely that 
problem diagnoses and solutions are almost always entirely within the 
context of the credit programs themselves. This paper advances the thesis 
that developments in the wider economy have a major influence on the 
viability of rural credit institutions and programs. Correspondingl y, 
appropriate policy approaches should be less narrow in scope, encompassing 
the real sector and not confined to the financial sector or parts thereof. 
The remainder of the paper elaborates on the importance of the wider 
policy approach, outlines the main channels of economy-wide i nfluences, and 
by reference to Jamaica comments on their likely significance in the 
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Commonwealth Caribbean. Because public sector institutions and programs 
are not the only or even the largest creditors in the rural financial 
markets, the ensuing discussion is formulated in te:rma of rural financial 
market8 to allow treatment of matters more germane to private financial 
institutions. 
Why Consider Economy-Wide Influences 
Financial markets are expected to contribute to rural development by 
improving the quantity and quality of rural savings, and by the provision 
of credit in amounts and forms that enhance productive capacity and rural 
equity. Evidence for a few countries leads tb the conclusion that rural 
financial markets are not fulfilling these expectations in the CARICOM 
countries (see for Example Bourne 1976, Graham, Bourne and Begashaw 1978, 
Bourne and Graham 1980, Graham and Bourne 1980, and Weir et al 1980). 
Financial savings have not grown significantly in constant prices. Poor 
loan repayment performance and problems of funding have also prevent ed the 
sustained growth of rural credit. In several countries, such as Montserrat, 
St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Vincent, Dominica, and Jamaica, rural financial 
markets are in a state of acute depression. 
Among the various approaches that might be taken to diagnose 
problems in the viability and performance of rural financial markets are 
indepth analyses of specific programs and institutions. Such studies 
invariably highlight the weakness of program design and managerial skills, 
poor coordination with other policies, ill-defined or inconsistent 
objectives, and too rapid changes in the size and composition of credit 
programs in the context of limited managerial skills and resources . Policy 
measures which emerge from intra project evaluations emphasize the need 
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for innovations in deposit facilities and savings mobilisation (Adams 
1978, Bourne and Graham 1980), better credit delivery systems (Adams and 
Ladman 1979), improved credit appraisal and more effective loan 
monitoring and recovery procedures (Bourne 1976, Graham, Bourne, Begashaw 
1978, Graham and Bourne 1980). The need to institute more flexible 
interest rate policies, in .order to reduce the wide gap between low 
lending rates and high lending costs is frequently advised {Adams 1979, 
Datey 1978, ~raham. and Bourne 1980, Bourne 1980). Together, these intra-
project reforms are expected to guarantee a viable, self-sustaining set of 
financial programs. 
For the most part these policy recoDDDendations are based on sound 
diagnoses. However, there usually is not sufficient recognition of the 
influence of the overall economic environment on rural financial market 
performance and on the efficacy of financial market reforms. A rural 
financial market is not an isolated set of institutions, transactors, 
and financial activities. It is a component of the total financial sector 
which is itself one of several sectors in the economy. Though functional 
and institutional fragmentation of the. financial sector is characteristic 
of Caribbean economies, there are strong linkages between constituent 
elements of the financial sector and the rest of the economy. These links 
ensure that developments in rural financial markets both condition and 
are conditioned by developments in the wider economy. More usually, the 
influence of the latter is stronger and decisive. 
An appreciation of interconnections is necessary for effective 
policy formulation at both the national economic and the financial 
institution levels. National and sectoral planners need to keep in mind 
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the economic interrelatedness if the risks of policy inconsistencies and 
unintended consequences are to be minimised. Top decision-makers in 
financinl institutions need to convey the sectoral and market incidence 
of macroeconomic policy to macro-planners who think primarily in global 
terms. 
How Economy•Wide Factors Affect Rural Financial Markets 
The continued viability of rural financial institutions is an 
essential requirement for the achievement of the socio-economic objectives 
usually set for rural financial markets. Institutional survival and 
growth is necessary for the maintenance and expansion of financial 
programs. Accordingly, viability and growth are crucial indicators of 
rural financial market performance. Therefore, the influence of economy-
wide factors can be examined in terms of their consequences for institu-
tional viability and growth. 
The crucial financial market variables are lending resources and the 
realized operating margin of rural lenders. These variables crystallize 
the outcome of more basic forces operating on both sides of the financial 
markets. Lending resources are increased by equity, debt and depos it 
liabilities, and decreased by the diversion of these capital inflows to 
operating expenditures. Realized operating margins are affected by 
interest and non-interest operating costs, by loan defaults, and by interest 
and other operating income. Savings and debt transactions constitute the 
link between these variables and rural non-financial enterprises. Savings 
and debt repayments contribute to loanable resources, while dis-savings 
and debt default have the opposite effect. Likewise, loan delinquency and 
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default increases lending costs andreducesnet revenue. The channels of 
influence of economy-wide variables on these financial market operations 
will be discussed now. Five broad sets of economy-wide factors are 
considered: the general price level, product price policies, trade and 
foreign exchange policies, interest rate policies, and non-price credit 
restraint policies. Each is discussed in turn though they might operate 
simultaneously. 
The General Price Level 
The general price level can exert an influence on rural financial 
markets through the cost and revenue (or prof it) functions of market 
transactors. If factor prices are indexed to the general price level, 
then changes in domestic .Price inflation will cause changes i n wages and 
other factor costs of financial institutions and non-financial enterprises. 
However, these changes will most likely be asymmetric: domest ic price 
inflation spilling over into cost increases for financial market transactors, 
but domestic price deflation unaccompanied by cost reductions . Unless 
the financial market transactors increase their product prices (i.e. loan 
charges and commodity prices) and/or improve total factor productivity, 
operating margins will be reduced by domestic price inflation. A profits 
squeeze may exert further depressing effects on financial institutions by 
reducing the capacity and willingness of non-financial enterprises and 
individuals to save and to repay debt. Resources inflows may thus be 
adversely affected and loan deli nquency problems arise. 
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The strength and direction of the link between the domestic price 
level and factor costs are critical. Labour in the formal financial 
markets of the Commonwealth Caribbean is highly unionized. Aggressive 
unionism ensures that labour costs adjust fairly rapidly to general price 
increases. Further, despite the overall weaker degree of unionization in 
rural commodity sub~sectors, some segments of the labour market, e.g. 
plantation agriculture, are no less highly unionised than urban centered 
industries. Wages-spread and spillover mechanisms link wage rates in the 
two 'strongly unionized' and the non-unionized segments so that the 
unionized wage rate pulls up the non-unionized wage rate. The other factor 
markets tend to be oligopolistic or monopolistic, with suppliers of 
capital and intermediate inputs seeming to adjust their own product ptices 
rapidly to priee level increases in accordance with a full-cost prici~g 
rule. 
The role of real income in financial savings decisions is also 
important. The Caribbean consensus is that real income is the single most 
significant influence on domestic savings. Price level effects via changes 
in real income can therefore be expected to strongly influence the flow of 
loanable funds in rural financial institutions. 
Product Prices 
For generalised inflation to exert a prof its squeeze on rural financial 
markets, the prices of credit and commodities must rise less rapidly than 
factor costs. There are several reasons for expecting such an outcome. 
The loan charges of public sector credit institutions are subject to 
governmental directives andare often specified in contracts with external 
funding agencies. Loan rates of interest and fees are usually not only low 
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but rigid. Even under mild inflations, the rate of general price increases 
(and therefore cost increases) tend to exceed interest rate increases in 
public sector financial instituti ons. Private financial institutions 
mainly commercial· banks, are not so severely affected through this channel 
since in most Commonwealth Caribbean countries they are free to increase 
loan rates of interest. However , the interest elasticity of l oan demand 
plaees a market limit on the degree of upward interest rate revisions. As a 
consequence, private financial institutions also experience a cost squeeze 
under rapid inflation •. 
·, 
I The main limitation on commodity price increases \ grows out of official 
price control policies. In pursuit of cheap food objectives, price controls 
\ 
are imposed on domestic farm produets and on competing imported\ foodstuf! s. 
Where the price of the domestic product is uncontrolled, but t he price of 
the imported competitive commodit y is set substantially below the price 
of the local farm commodity, a profits squeeze may still resul t. The 
'cheaper' import either displaces the local product and has a quantity 
effect on gross revenues, or forces lower prices and has a pri ce effect 
on the gross revenues of the domestic producer. Even where price controls 
are revised upwards to take account of increases in production costs, 
adjustment is usually not full and moreover is protracted. I n such 
circumstances, some profits depression still occurs. 
Interest Rates 
Financial markets in the Commonwealth Caribbean are subj ect to 
interest rate regulation as already noted in the case of loan rates of 
interest. There is no need to repeat the discussion on loan r ates. I nstead, 
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attention is directed to interest rate policies as they affect other assets 
and liabilities. 
A financial institution is a multiproduct firm, providing a mix of 
financial credits at several prices. Its overall rate of return depends on 
the output of each credit-product and the price thereon. Commercial banks 
lend to non-rural enterprises and to government (either by direct loan or 
purchase of government debt instruments). Accordingly their overall income 
is affected by the rates of interest prevailing on these non-rural credits. 
Similarly, public sector credit agencies mainly for liquidity and capital 
purposes maintain a portfolio of market investment assets, essentially 
connnercial bank deposits and government debt instruments. 
Official policies have tended to keep the interest costs of 
government debt at a low level. Legal reserve requirements generate a 
compulsory demand for government debt among commercial banks. Moral 
suasion serves the same purpose among public sector credit institutions. 
Partly because interest rates on savings instruments have been 
depressed for so long at such low levels, there is virtually no conclusive 
evidence on the likely effect of interest rate increases on savings in the 
Connnonwealth Caribbean. The most that can be said is that thus far savings 
have not diminished significantly in response to the prevailing negative 
rates of interest. But this fact does not imply the converse, namely that 
substantial interest rate increases would not induce a substantially larger 
volume of savings. If savings are interest-sensitive, then the overall 
trend in savings rates of interest will influence the volume of funds 
mobilised locally by the commercial banks and other institutions that accept 
deposits. It remains to be said, also, that higher interest rates on deposits 
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imply higher l ending costs for rural financial institutions. The savings 
rate of interest thus exerts its influence thr ough the cost functions of 
rural financial institutions as well as through their lending capacity. 
These sources of influence are not particularly germane f or publ ic 
sector credit agencies which obtain their loanable resources pr imarily 
from external donor agencies, local governments, and quasi-governmental 
institutions, though they are affected to the extent that they borrow from 
private financial institutions which accept local deposits. Pr ivate 
financial institutions are the ones most affected by the national 
behaviour of rates of interest on savings instruments. 
Credit Restrictions 
Quantitative credit restrictions are frequently imposed i n pursuit 
of sectoral and global economic planning objectives. They tend to have 
an uneven impact on financial institutions within the financial sector as 
a whole as well as within the rural financial sub-sector. Publ ic sector 
institutions are usually not subject to credit restraints. In contrast, 
private financial institutions may have to observe ceilings on their 
lending in total and to specific borrowing categories or economic sectors. 
More usually the restricted categories are among the more lucrative assets. 
One effect of these restraints therefore is to reduce the earning potential 
of the overall financial asset portfolio. Because of the rigidities in 
cost structures arising from the contractuaL nature of time deposits, 
these institutions will experience short run reductions in earni ngs 
relative to costs unless loan rates of interest are sufficientl y 
increased. 
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0n the borrowers' side of the market, global credit restraint may 
impart a liquidity squeeze, depending on the degree to which borrowing 
enterprises are reliant on banks for their working capital. The 
liquidity squeeze would be even greater if the credit contraction 
coincides with downward pressures on current profits and savings. These 
liquidity problems may easily spill over to lending institutions in the 
form of loan delinquency and, in extreme cases, in loan default. 
Trade and Foreign Exchange 
Foreign trade and foreign exchange developments influence rural 
financial market performance through their effects on the cost, production 
and revenue functions of financial and non-financial enterprises, and 
their effects on debt costs. 
Import prices are an important component of factor costs in highly 
open economies. Import prices generate increases in the prices of raw 
materials and capital goods, and also in wage rates via changes in the 
cost of living. Changes in import prices (in domestic currency) are 
determined partly by changes in the exchange rate, and partly by changes 
in foreign export prices. For some Caribbean countries, e.g. Jamaica, 
exchange rate changes have been dominant in recent years. To the extent 
that rural product prices and financial product prices do not keep pace 
with factor cost increases induced by import prices, the net revenue 
functions of rural lenders and borrowers are adversely affected. 
Quantitative imp0rt restrictions can also affect profitability and 
gross revenues at the enterprise level. Depending on the import-
coefficient of production and on the scope for substituting local inputs, 
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restraints on imports of producer goods reduce production levels and 
efficiency with obvious consequences for gross and net revenues. 
The debt cost consequences of exchange rate changes stem from the 
fact that· some proportion of rural financial market liabilities are 
denominated in foreign currencies. Therefore, the local currency capital 
value equivalent of these debts varies directly with the direction and 
magnitude of change in the exchange rate. Devaluation increases the 
capital value of the debt in local currency while revaluation does the 
opposite. Increases in the capital values of the credit agencies' 
liabilities will lead either to increases in loan charges if prof it 
margins are to be protected, or to some institutional decapitalization 
if profit margins are allowed to fall. A negative influence on institu-
tional performance is also possible through the repercussions of 
devaluation on non-financial debtor behaviour. If debtors respond to the 
discontinuous increase in debt costs by loan delinquency and/or default, 
lending costs will rise to the detriment of the lending agency. 
Economy-Wide Factors in .Rural Financial Market Depression: 
A Jamaican Case Study 
The Jamaican economy can be used to illustrate some of the mechanisms 
identified in the preceding section. The economy collapsed from a 
situation of positive growth of real gross domestic product averaging 
5 percent per annum between 1965 and 1972 to an uninterrupted succession 
of negative annual growth rates ranging from 1 to 8 percent between 1974 
and 1978. 
Prolonged balance of payments problems, manifested by a movement from 
net foreign reserves of J$132 million in 1971 to minus J$196 mi llion in 1977, 
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resulted in increasingly severe corrective policies of quantitative 
restrictions on imports, exchange rate devaluations totalling 54 per cent 
between 1970 and 1978, and domestic credit restraint. The economy is 
heavily reliant on imports for its supply of consumer and producer goods, 
with imports averaging 41 per cent of gross national expenditure over the 
period. Consequently, domestic prices are highly responsive to changes in 
import prices. The rate of inflation has risen sharply, averaging 15 percent 
during the 1970s, and was as high as 27 percent in 1978. Labor is highly 
unionized in all productive sectors, excluding domestic agriculture. Wage 
rates have generally kept pace with domestic price inflation. 
The poor performance of the real sector was accompanied by serious 
problems within the financial sector, including the rural financial market. 
The rural financial market will now be briefly described, and its 
depression indexed. 
The institutional complex that comprises the Jamaican rural financial 
market includes eight commercial banks operating a country-wide network 
of branches, and two specialized government-owned credit agencies, namely 
the Jamaica Development Bank and the Agricultural Credit Board. Commercial 
banks are the largest single source of credit as well as the main savings 
institutions. The Agricultural Credit Board is a non-deposit taking 
institution established solely for the purpose of making direct loans to 
large farmers and institutional loans to the national network of People's 
Cooperative Banks, which in turn make small loans to small farmers. The 
People's Cooperative Banks also mobilize rural savings but on a very small 
scale. The Jamaica Development Bank, established in 1969, is funded 
mainly through capital subscriptions and loans from the Jamaica Government 
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and from loans from foreign aid agencies. The Jamaica Development Bank 
operates a commercial loan window for medium to large farmers and, through 
an affiliated agency i.e. the Self-Supporting Farmers Development Program, 
maintains a loan facility for small to medium sized farmers. The Ministry 
of Agriculture provides rural credit services under several ad hoc programs, 
the most recent and important being the Crop Lien Program launched in 1977 
to provide production loans to domestic foodcrop producers. Other 
financial institutions, such as building societies and life insurance 
companies, and informal groups such as rotating credit associations and 
credit unions complete the institutional .structure of the rural financial 
market in Jamaica. While the rural savings and credit activities of the 
latter set of transactors cannot be precisely quantified, it does appear 
that most rural savings and credit are channelled through the commercial 
banks and specialized government programs. The ensuing discussion of 
rural financial market depression is focused on the commercial banks, the 
Jamaica Development Bank and the Self-Supporting Farmers Development 
Program. 
In keeping with the emphasis on institutional viability and growth, 
four pertinent indicators of financial market performance are the behaviour 
of savings, credit, loan repayments, and profitability. Time series 
estimates of rural savings in Jamaica are not available. However, the 
behaviour of commercial bank total savings and time deposits provides 
some insight into the trends in rural savings mobilization. Real savings 
and time deposits after rising from J$223 million in 1970 to J $298 million 
in 1972, declined by 18 percent over the next two years, recovered slightly 
in 1975 and 1976, only to decline by roughly 7 percent in 1977. Overall, 
real savings at commercial banks stagnated from 1973 to 1978. Therefore, 
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it can be inferred that the savings side of the Jamaican rural financial 
market did not perform well during this period. 
Rural credit, having expanded rapidly early in the 1970s, tended 
to decline after 1974. Real credit balances totalled $29 million in 1970, 
$35 m. in 1974, and $43 m. in 1978. The annual growth rate of credi t 
(measured in constant 1970 prices) fell, negative growth being experienced 
in 1974 and dramatically so in 1978. The ratio of rural credit to 
agricultural gross domestic product at factor cost exhibits the same 
pattern as the dollar values of rural credit, i.e. a rise and then a 
aecline. 
Loan repayment data is not available for a sufficient number of years 
to permit similar trend analyses for loan repayment performance. However, 
the available information reveals a very unsatisfactory situation in 1977 
and 1978 (Graham, Bourne, Begashaw). The ratio of arrears to payments 
due to Jamaica Development Bank commercial window loans reached system 
collapse levels of 81 and 83 percent in 1977 and 1978 respectively. The 
arrears ratio for the Self Supporting Farmers Development Program was as 
high as 38 percent in 1978. The commercial banks, largely because qf their 
more stringent loan appraisal and recovery practices and their early write-
off policy for bad debt, managed to keep their arrears ratio down to 
4 percent in 1978. However, commercial banks did experience serious 
repayment problems. Their allowances for losses and bad debts as a 
proportion of total current operating expenses rose from an average of 
4 percent between 1970 to 1975 to 6 percent between 1976 and 1977, and 
even higher to 11 percent in 1978. While these statistics on commercial 
bank performance do not pertain to agricultural loans exclusively, one may 
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infer from these data that connnercial banks, like the public s ector credit 
agencies, were experiencing difficulties in recovering rural l oans. 
There is no question that the prof its performance of rural credit 
institutions deteriorated during the period analysed. The Jamaica 
Development Bank's ratio of operating income to total expenses tended 
towards 1.0 between 1'71 and 1975, but decreased drastically to 0.3 by 
1977. The connnercial banks' ratio declined from 1.18 in 1970 to 0.98 in 
1978. 
The evidence on these financial indicators leads inescapably to the 
conclusion that Jamaican rural financial markets were very depressed in 
the 1970s, particularly in the latter half of the decade. Graham, Bourne 
and Begashaw have demonstrated that weaknesses in the design, implementation, 
and monitoring of rural credit programs explain much of this poor performance. 
However, these factors operating on the supply side, i.e. financial 
institutional side, do not fully account for the dismal experi ence. Events 
within the overall economy seriously contributed to the difficulties 
experienced within the rural financial sector. The importance of these 
more general influences will now be demonstrated. 
The price behaviour of the economy contributed to the debt repayment 
problems experienced by Jamaican farmers. Domestic price inflation was 
rapid, averaging between 15 and 17 percent per annum during the decade. 
On the basis of the wage-price relationship prevailing in thi s economy, 
one could infer that agricultural wage rates along with other wage rates 
rose rapidly in response to the inflation of consumer prices . Annual wage 
settlements for all sectors of the economy during the period 1971 to 1976 
ranged between 18 and 45 percent. Economy-wide labor incomes per worker 
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increased annually by an average of 10 percent. Agricultural incomes kept 
pace with the economy-wide trends. While no details are available on 
agricultural wage rates specifically, per worker compensation of employees 
in the agricultural sector rose by an average of 18 percent over the 
period, exceeding the national rate of increase of income per worker in 
1975 and 1978. 
The price of capital services also increased significantly over the 
peri~d. The import price index rose by an average of 23 percent per annum. 
The annual increases were particularly large in 1973, 1974, 1977 and 1978. 
Substantial exchange rate devaluations occurred in the first and last two 
of these four years, while in 1974 OPEC raised petroleum prices substantially. 
Further, more direct support for the contention that the price of capital 
services increased greatly is provided by the data on unit prices of 
imported chemical fertilizers. The annual increases averaged 28 percent, 
and in 1974 more than doubled, again largely as a result of OPEC's impact 
on the price of petroleum and petroleum-based products. It can be concluded, 
therefore, that the price of capital services depressed gross agricultural 
profits. 
These factor price trends do not appear to have been off set by 
increases in farm productivity. In the export sector, the index of tons 
of cane harvested per acre declined almost continuously from 100 in 1970 
to 85 in 1977. Productivity per acre in domestic agriculture remained 
roughly the same from 1971 to 1976, but seems to have risen significa~tly 
in 1977 and 1978. 
Quantitative restrictions also reduced farm profits. Import 
licensing became increasingly widespread and severe, with consequent 
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reductions in the availability of producer goods. For example, the 
quantity index of fertilizer imports declined by 11 percent in 1974, and 
then again by 6 percent ·in 1976 and 22 percent in 1977. The smaller 
supplies of improved inputs must have adversely affected product ion and 
productivity~ and thereby farm revenues. The index of domestic food crop 
production declined slightly from 149 in 1972 and did not regain that 
level again until 1977 and 1978 when the massive governmental cr edit 
and physical support under the Emergency Production Plan succeeded in 
raising the index to 180 and 228 respectively. During this peri od, output 
decreased for the m-a.jor agricultural export commodities, i.e. sugar and 
bananas by between 33 and 42 percent, and for quantitatively mi nor export 
commodities such as coffee. 
Given these adverse trends in factor prices, output, and productivity, 
it is necessary to review the behaviour of agricultural commodi ty prices. 
It can be deduced that export prices rose on average more slowl y than factor 
prices, adjusted for productivity declines. For instance, aver age annual 
percentage increases in the export prices of sugar and bananas , the two 
main export crops, were 20 and 18 percent respectively compared to an 
average annual price increase of 28 percent for fertilizers. Domestic 
agriculture seems to have fared no better, since there was only an average 
annual percentage increase of 20 percent for domestic farm-gate prices. 
It should be noted that farm-gate prices actually declined in 1978. 
The preceding analysis leads to the conciusi on that the i ncreases 
in product prices di~ not totally offset increases in factor pr ices, nor 
production and productivity declines. Consequently gross profits were 
seriously squeezed. Direct evidence on profits reinforces this conclusion. 
-25-
The National Income and Product Accounts provide data on a reasonable proxy 
for profits, namely real operating surplus defined as value added minus 
net labor, tax, and capital consumption expenditures. The real operating 
surplus of the agricultural sector declined by 5 percent in 1974, 4 percent 
in 1975 and 8 percent in 1978. Altogether agricultural gross profits fell 
by an average of 3 percent per annum between 1970 and 1978. 
The lower levels of gross income flows occurred at times when price 
trends in the economy increased the money value of farm household purchases. 
Unless farmers were willing to accept substantially lower real levels of 
consumption, the rapid rate of consumer price inflation would result in 
larger money allocations to farm household consumption. No data is 
presently available on farm consumption expenditures specifically. 
However, the National Accounts data reveal that aggregate real private 
consumption expenditures did not fall until 1977 and 1978 when decreases 
of 4 and 10 percent were recorded. Most likely, farm families shared that 
experience. 
Though it is not possible to be categorical about factor . cost 
developments among the lending agencies, the evidence does suggest that 
these costs rose in response to the general inflationary trends in the 
economy. Labour costs in the commercial banking industry quintupled 
between 1970 and 1978, as did non-interest expenses of the Jamaica 
Development Bank. 
The earnings performance of the connnercial banks was significantly 
affected by official financial policies. Legal reserve requirements were 
frequently revised upwards, moving from 15 percent in 1969 to 29.5 percent 
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in 1977. Government direct borrowing from the commercial banks also 
increased. As a consequenc~, total commercial bank lending to government 
increased from 11 percent of bank assets in 1970 to 33 percent i n 1977. 
At the same time, quantitative restrictions were placed on commercial bank 
lending to the private sector, particularly for consumption and import 
trade. Since the interest rate on government debt instruments and on 
direct debt were substantially lower than that on private debt, the income 
earning potential of commercial banks was continuously being undermined 
by these credit market policies. The negative tendencies were r einforced 
by the reduced demand for bank loans caused by the foreign exchange 
restrictions on import demand. Extensive foreign exchange rat i oning 
severely contracted the demand for bank credit among distributors and 
consumers. 
It has been argued so far that changes in product and fac tor prices, 
output, and productivity contributed to rural financial market depression 
by substantially reducing the capacity of farmers to save, make profitable 
investments, and to repay debt. The influence of credit polici es and 
trade policies on credit agencies was also dealt with. It will now be 
shown that debt service and amortization requirements also incr eased. 
Commercial banks increased their loan rates of interest i n an 
attempt to moderate the decline in net earnings caused by lower volumes 
of lending. On average, their nominal loan rates during 1974 to 1978 
were three index points higher than rates in the 1970 to 1974 period 
(Bank of Jamaica Annual Reports). Loan charges of public sector credit 
agencies remained the same (Graham, Bourne, Begashaw). However, given the 
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large share of commercial banks in rural credit, overall rural loan rates 
I 
of interest were pulled upwards. 
f urthermore, frequent exchange rate devaluations, totalling 54 percent 
between 1970 and 1978, increased the local currency value of debt financed 
from foreign funds. Farmers are required to maintain the foreign currency 
values of such loans made by the Jamaica Development Bank. Consequently, 
exchange rate devaluation abruptly increases the local currency costs of 
these debts. Foreign funds comprised between 33 and 67 percent of loans 
extended by the Jamaica Development Bank during the period 1970 to 1978. 
Farm credit extended by other institutions are not based on foreign funds and 
consequently have been unaffected by the recent devaluations. Nonetheless, 
given the share of the Jamaica Development Bank program in the total supply 
of rural credit, a substantial proportion of farm debt must have been 
adversely affected. 
Conclusion 
This paper has dealt with the influence of economy-wide factors on 
rural financial market performance. The main channels of influence running 
from the general price level, product prices, credit market variables, and 
the foreign sector to the lending position and viability of rural credit 
institutions were outlined. The explanation of Jamaican rural financial 
market depression in these terms emphasizes the importance of the overall 
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1st Session: Rapporteur's Report and Discussion 
Economy-Wide Influences on Rural Financial 
Market Performance 
The author emphasised the limitations of partial reforms 
within Development Finance Corporations (D.F.C. 's) to resolve 
the problem of their viability. Importance was attached to 
the impact of general economic conditions and policies 
affecting rates of return to farming such as product price 
policies, trade and exchange rate policies, interest rate 
policies, inflation, credit regulation policies, etc. 
The author used Jamaican experience in the 1970's to argue 
that the negative impact of these conditions and policies 
on farming contributed to loan delinquency and adversely 
affected D.F.C. viability. 
The discussant (Dr. Whittaker) felt points made in the 
paper were a useful balance to the traditional discussions 
of D.F.C. viability. He pointed out that D.F.C. 's might do 
well to have a current account system for borrowers so as 
to permit ongoing monitoring of financial transactions and 
performance of their clients. Second he was pessimistic 
about the wisdom of raising interest rates too much for fear 
of cutting off loan demand in an environment of risk and 
uncertainty. This would limit the ability to disburse funds. 
There is no way to avoid some element of subsidy to D.F.C. 's 
if we are determined to have them service long run investment 
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needs of farmers with all the elements of risk invol ved in 
this at our stage of development. Furthermore he noted that 
farmers in difficult circumstances first stop paying public 
sector debts to cover other debts and family obligat ions. 
D.F.C. 's cannot engage in wholesale foreclosures. I t is 
politically difficult and economically D.F.C. 's gain little 
in acquiring real estate (i.e. farms) that they can ' t sell 
easily in a depressed economy. Finally the exchange rate 
risk of passing on devaluation costs to farmer is t oo 
onerous. The Government must assume much of this burden. 
Mr. D. Clarke agreed with many of Dr. Whittaker 's 
comments but added that international donors won't s ubsidize 
D.F.C. portfolios indefinitely. Hence some action t o deal 
with viability is needed. Also he pointed out that no 
one has dealt with the issue of the demand for credi t since 
low interest rates per se are not the only important factor 
determining loan demand. They probably represent a minor 
part of total investment or operational costs. 
Other commentators pointed out the following: 
a) Discussing the need for D.F.C. 's subsidies does not 
get at the heart of the problem which is t he existence 
of a set of economic policies penalizing a griculture 
in general. 
b) An example of inappropriate pricing can be seen in 
Jamaica where devaluations in the late 1970's 
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increased the cost of imported inputs to sugar 
farmers by two hundred percent, while their product 
price controlled by a commodity board, changed 
considerably less than the input price. 
c) D.F.C. 's cannot shift into safer portfolios as can 
commercial banks in times of trouble. 
d) Interest rate spread between what D.F.C. pays to 
get funds and the ongoing lending rate to farmers 
is just as important an issue as the appropriate 
interest rate to farmers. 
e) Must make more explicit the distinction between 
the criteria of financial credit and social credit. 
Subsidies frequently may be only a means of mis-
directing resources. 
Professor Bourne's final remarks were as follows: 
a) He added that there is a need for closer interaction 
between the management of D.F.C. 's and national 
economic planners to harmonize price policies, trade 
policies, interest rate policies and credit policies 
so as to minimize the explicit and implicit penali-
zation o f agriculture and protect the D. F.C. 's 
customers chances for a profitable use of loans and 
effective loan recoveries. 
b) He stressed the need for D.F.C. 's to consider 
mobilizing domestic savings and broadening their 
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portfolio loan base to include short and long term 
loans and other multiple loans in order to gain 
more independence and autonomy from single source 
financing, diversification economies and informational 
economies (on their clients). Also offering a 
wider range of financial services to clients improves 
the quality of the line of credit and induces the 
customer to repay his loans to maintain this connection. 
Loan recoveries will improve and delinquencies decline. 
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Interaction of Price and Credit Policies in Costa Rican Agriculture 
by 
Donald W. Larson and Robert C. Vogel* 
I. Introduction 
The stagnation of Costa Rican agriculture in the latter part of the 1970s 
has become a subject of considerable concern. A leading Costa Ri can 
economist, Eduardo Lizana, has documented this stagnation in his recent book, 
Agricultura y Desarrollo Economica which shows that the growth ra t e of value 
added in agriculture failed to average even one percent annually in the 
1973-77 period while the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) averaged 
more than 5 percent per year over the same period • .!/ Furthermore, this growth 
rate for the agricultural sector is substantially below the 5-6 percent annual 
growth rate achieved in earlier periods, such as 1968-72, when agricultural 
growth was only slightly less than the growth rate of GDP. An i mportant 
characteristic of this stagnation, as Lizana points out, is that it is not 
concentrated in one or two products but rather tends to be spread throughout 
the agricultural sector. 
In his search for the possible causes of this stagnation, Lizana proposes 
and then dismisses a variety of natural factors such as droughts, floods, 
1/ See Chapter II. 
* Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics at The Ohio State 
University and Professor of Economics at Syracuse University and Visiting 
Professor of Agricultural Economics at The Ohio State University, 
respectively. 
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diseases and insect infestations. He also examines the availability of land 
and labor resources and concludes that , changes in these factors cannot explain 
the stagnation of agriculture. After a brief discussion of prices and 
markets, Lizano dismisses these factors as a main cause of the stagnation, and 
he also finds no causal relationship between agricultural production and cre-
dit from the national banking system. Lizano concludes that the causes of the 
stagnation cannot be identified without further study, but that research and 
extension together with improvements in managerial capacity should receive top 
priority in the search for a solution to agricultural stagnation. 
The purpose of the present paper is to examine the impact of price, 
exchange rate and credit policies on the aggregate performance of Costa Rican 
agriculture during the 1970s. It will be argued that Costa Rica, not unlike 
many other developing countries, has pursued price, exchange rate and credit 
policies which have adversely affected the performance of the agricultural 
sector. The failure of Lizano's study to find a role for prices is due to the 
failure to use ''real" prices (that is, to adjust nominal prices for inflation) 
and the failure to compare domestic prices with international prices. 
Agricultural price policy in developing countries is often based on a compro-
mise between forces that argue for domestic self-sufficiency and hence high 
prices and those that argue for low prices to stimulate industrial processing 
of raw materials and to provide low cost food for urban, industrial workers. 
Such a compromise of ten tends to emphasize the level of nominal prices rather 
than real prices, and this becomes particularly serious in an inflationary 
setting where prices are adjusted with a lag. Moreover, domestic prices are 
rarely compared to international prices, and when such comparisons are made, 
the appropriateness of the exchange rate is seldom considered. Government 
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credit policies for the agricultural sector typ i cally focus on preferential 
low interest rates and fail to recognize that credit is fungible and cannot 
easily be tied to particular activities. Moreoever, in an inflationary 
setting such interest rate policies discourage banks from maintaining the real 
volume of agricultural lending while providing substantial income transfers to 
a relatively few credit recipients. 
The analysis in the present paper focuses on the behavior during the 
1970s of twelve of Costa Rica's principal agricultural products: rice, corn, 
beans, sorghum, coffee, bananas, cocoa, sugarcane, beef, milk, hogs and 
broilers. The following section relates the ou t put performance for these 
products to their real (deflated) prices after discussing the various Costa 
Rican governmental institutions which control agricultural prices. The next 
section compares the prices of these products to international prices, that 
is, the prices of these products in the United States. International price 
comparisons are made at the official exchange rate and at a more appropriate 
exchange rate which takes into account the substantial over-valuation of the 
official rate. The next to the last section relates output to the real volume 
of bank credit for each of these products and then explains why the rela-
tionship between credit and output is so weak. Government interest rate 
policies, both before and after the financial reform of late 1978, are 
examined with respect to their implications for the allocation of credit to 
the agricultural sector. The final section summarizes the main conclusions of 
the analysis for government price and interest rate policies. 
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II. Production and Real Domestic Prices 
Basic Grains and Beans 
Two government institutions play a major role in determining prices of 
basic grains. The Consejo Nacional de Produccion (CNP), established in 1943, 
has considerable authority to intervene in the marketing of food products. 
According to the Organic Law which created the CNP, it has the responsibility 
to: promote agricultural and industrial production; stabilize prices of food 
and industrial raw materials; pursue a fair equilibrium between the interests 
of producers and consumers; and seek the improvement of living conditions of 
Costa Rican people ... ~/ Even though it has wide discretion with respect to the 
number and kind of agricultural products subject to its market intervention 
policies, the CNP has chosen to concentrate on those grains which represent a 
substantial proportion of the value of agricultural output (rice, beans, corn 
and sorghum).1/ The key feature of CNP market intervention policies are the 
price support program which guarantees minimum purchase prices to farmers for 
these basic grains and the monopoly control which the CNP has over imports and 
exports which effectively protects the domestic market from the international 
market. To implement the price support program, the CNP has a series of 
purchasing agencies located in the main producing areas as well as storage and 
processing facilities. In addition to the CNP, the Ministerio de Economia, 
Industria y Commercio (MEIC) has an important role in controlling the retail 
2/ Organic Law of the Consejo Nacional de Produccion, Chapter I, 
Article 4. 
3/ The CNP also administers the state-owned monopoly of liquor manufac-
tured in Costa Rica, owns a network of retail sales outlets distributed 
throughout the country in which it sells staple goods to consumers, and deter-
mines the export quota for beef which will be discussed later in this section. 
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prices for basic grains, the marketing margins for these products, and in 
coordinating its price control policy with the CNP's price support policy. 
A level of prices high enough to stimulate production yet one which 
guarantees consumers an abundant, low-cost supply of food is usually the focus 
of much controversy in institutions which have price control responsibility 
such as the CNP and MEIC. Price setting becomes a more complicated issue in 
an inflationary economy where the level of nominal or current prices may be 
quite different from ''real" prices, that is, nominal prices adjusted for 
inflation by some deflator such as that for Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Although the attention of policy makers is usually focused on nominal prices, 
these prices are useless as indicators of price incentives in an inflationary 
economy where a high nominal price may, after a time without adjustment, become 
a low real price which no longer provides any incentive to increase production. 
For these reasons, this section of the paper will analyze trends in production 
compared to the deflated farm price of the selected products. 
The production-consumption balance for the basic grains is such that Costa 
Rica is self sufficient in rice, which has even been exported in some recent 
years, and deficit in the others. Corn production is equal to approximately 
90 percent of consumption, while sorghum and bean production are sufficient 
for about half of the domestic consumption of these products. (Since Costa 
Rica does not produce wheat, it must import all the wheat for domestic 
consumption.) 
As can be seen in Table 1, even though the production of rice in Costa 
Rica is quite variable from year to year, it has increased significantly from 
55.6 thousand metric tons in 1970 to 134.9 thousand metric tons in 1979 (an 18 
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Table 1: Production and Prices of Basic Grains, 1970-1979 
C 0 M M 0 D I T Y 
R I C E C 0 R N B E A N S S 0 R G H U M 
Deflated Deflated Deflated 
Calender Pro due- Farm I Produc- Farm / Produc- Farm a/ Produc-p . a P . a Year tion rices- tion rice- tion Prices- tion 
Metric Colones Metric Colones Metric Colones Metric 
Tons per ton Tons per ton Tons per ton Tons 
1970 55,621 981 71,294 452 12,024 1017 7,278 
1971 68,723 840 70,073 488 8,925 1196 11,887 
1972 62' 719 878 75,910 466 14,203 1148 13,806 
1973 81,640 896 65,476 458 11,031 1790 16,419 
1974 62,230 1095 60,519 593 13,750 1944 14,129 
1975 112,132 1060 67,767 659 14,625 2003 19,780 
1976 105,860 843 114,010 511 16,212 1736 30,885 
1977 109,964 761 84,703 399 14,059 1477 40,986 
1978 123,640 735 62,284 393 14,010 1385 52,565 
197<#-' 134,907 685 67,657 396 8,639 1244 59,000 
.~/Prices are deflated with the GDP deflator using a 1966 base year • 
. ~/Preliminary estimates. 
N.A. is data not available 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica. 
Deflated 














percent annual rate of increase in production). This strong out put perfor-
mance has been associated with a decrease in the deflated farm price of rice 
(nominal price divided by the GDP deflator) of 20-25 percent fr om the early 
1970s to the late 1970s. Even though real rice prices have decreased, produc-
tion has increased because of changes in technology and a highly subsidized 
crop insurance scheme. Yields have increased because of the introduction of 
improved varieties while the location of rice prodution has shifted from the 
Pacific North to the Pacific South which has a more favorable distribution of 
rainfall. A second factor contributing to increased rice production has been 
t ne introduction of a highly subsidized crop insurance scheme which primarily 
benefits rice producers. A recent study by Vargas et al. shows t hat the crop 
insurance program of the National Insurance Inst i tute has incurred large defi-
cits throughout most of the 1970s as premiums paid were equal to slightly over 
20 percent of the damages paid for crop failures, and most of these damages 
were paid to a limited number (about 400) of rice producers.if 
Sorghum production has increased from about 9,000 metric tons in the 
early 1970s to over 50,000 tons in the late 1970s, an average annual rate of 
increase of 30 percent, which is higher than that of any other gr ain. The 
deflated farm price for sorghum at the end of the 1970s was slightly higher 
than that at the beginning of the decade, but below the level whi ch prevailed 
in the mid 1970s (Table 1). On the other hand, the stagnation of corn pro-
duction appears to be related to less favorable deflated farm pr i ces even 
though nominal prices were increasing. In response to increasing deflated 
4/ See Vargas et al. [1979], for a complete analysis of the crop 
insurance program and its impact on rice production. 
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farm prices, corn production increased during the mid 1970s and reached a peak 
of 114,000 metric tons in 1976, after which corn production declined while the 
deflated farm price was also declining. 
Bean production reached the lowest level of the decade in 1979, slightly 
over half the 16,212 metric tons produced in 1976. The large bean crop of 
1976 occurred just after the deflated farm price of beans reached a peak in 
1975 which was double the deflated farm price of beans in 1970. From 1975 to 
1979 the deflated farm price of beans declined by over 35 percent while pro-
duction declined slowly through 1978 and then decreased dramatically in 1979. 
One of the difficulties in analyzing bean price and production relationships 
is that data on bean production are quite unreliable because of the widely 
dispersed, small scale nature of the production system. In addition, some 
Costa Rican bean production may actually be illegal imports from neighbori ng 
countries such as Nicaragua, and these have decreased dramatically in 1979 
because of the political unrest in that country. 
Export Crops 
Domestic prices for the main export crops (coffee, bananas, cocoa and 
sugarcane) are determined by a combination of world market trends for these 
products and Costa Rican government policy which is carried out through 
various quasi-governmental organizations. The deflated farm price of coffee 
and coffee production fluctuated mildly from 1970 through 1975 (Table 2). 
Then coffee prices nearly tripled from 1975 to 1977 and production increased 
rapidly in 1977 and 1978. On the other hand, banana production reached peaks 
of more than 1.2 million metric tons in 1973 and 1975 and has declined 
somewhat to a little more than 1.1 million metric tons annually since that 
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Table 2: Production and Prices of Export Crops, 1970-1979 
c 0 M M 0 D I T y 
C 0 F F E E B AN AN A s c 0 c 0 A 
Deflated Deflated Deflated 
Calendar Farm Farm Farm I 
Year Production Pric~/ Production Pric~/ Production Pric~ 
Metric Col ones Metric Colones Metric Col ones 
Tons per ton Tons per ton Tons per ton 
1970 80,590 4423 958,689 403 4,174 3373 
1971 87,715 3803 1,027,648 354 4,422 2453 
1972 88,792 3495 1,186,093 371 7,055 2541 
1973 92,646 4192 1,289,401 330 5,618 4169 
1974 91,238 4244 1,151,277 391 5,919 5953 
1975 85,259 3437 1,220,690 458 6,609 4008 
1976 81,784 5453 1,187,147 416 5,855 5352 
1977 87,183 8987 1,124,691 380 7,694 8595 
1978 96,034 7092 1,149,117 357 10,072 6999 
197#1 N.A. N.A. 1,114,494 N.A. 5,000 N.A. 
a/ 
- Prices are deflated with the GDP deflater using a 1966 base year. 
b/ 
- Preliminary estimate. 
N.A. is data not available. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica 
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time. The deflated farm price of bananas reached a peak in 1975 and has 
declined by about 22 percent since that time which may explain the stagnation 
in banana production in the late 1970s. Cocoa production and deflated farm 
prices have varied widely during the 1970s; however, both production and 
prices began to increase in the mid 1970s. Deflated cocoa prices reached a 
record level in 1977 and cocoa production reached a record one year later in 
1978 which indicates that cocoa production has also responded to changes in 
deflated farm prices. 
Sugar output has increased from 159 thousand metric tons in the 1970-71 
harvest to almost 195 thousand metric tons in the 1978-79 harvest, which is 
an annual rate of increase in output of about 2.4 percent (Table 3).]./ This 
rate of growth in production has not kept pace with the strong demand for 
sugar in both the domestic market and the export market. As can be seen from 
Table 3, exports of sugar have decreased by approximately 14,000 metric tons 
and exports as a percent of production have decreased from slightly over half 
of production at the beginning of the decade to about 35 percent of production 
at the end of the decade. An important reason for this decline of sugar 
exports has been the rapid growth of domestic demand which increased from about 
43 kilograms per person in 1970 to nearly 60 kilograms per person in 1979. 
Based on t hese consumption figures, domestic demand has increased at an annual 
rate of about 4.2 percent or nearly double the annual rate of increase in 
production •. ~/ 
5/ The actual rate of increase in output could be somewhat different 
because the production data may not have captured all the production on farms 
that is processed and sold as crude sugar rather than being sold to a sugar 
mill. 
6/ The extent to which Costa Rican consumers have substituted refined 
sugar for crude sugar may have biased upward the actual rate of increase in 
consumption. 
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Table 3: Production, Exports and Domestic Consumption of Sugar , 1970-71 to 1978-
Exports a s 
Agricultural Sugar Sugar A Percent of Domestic 
Yeara/ Production Exports Production Consumptior 
- - - - - Metric Tons - - - - - Percent Kilos / ca pit 
1970-71 159,559 82,822 51. 9 43.5 
1971-72 181,441 97,715 53.9 46.2 
1972-73 176,208 84,963 48.2 48.9 
1:)73-74 166,331 _68,644 41.3 52.2 
1974-75 178,499 69,285 38.8 54.3 
1975-76 172,846 75,366 43.6 54.3 
1976-77 194,809 67,842 34.8 56.0 
1977-78 191,339 70,530 36.9 57.6 
1978-79 194,582 68,412 35.2 59.9 
~/The agricultural year is from October 1 to September 30. 
Source: Liga Agricola Industrial de la Cana de Azucar 
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Sugarcane price policy in Costa Rica consists of a completely adminis-
tered price system. The Liga de la Cana, a quasi-governmental organization, 
controls the marketing and prices of sugarcane production and processed 
products in Costa Rica. The Liga sets the prices which sugar mills must pay 
producers, assigns production quotas to each and directs the sale of sugar 
production to the domestic or export market according to projected demands. 
Prices for sugar at all levels in the marketing system are controlled by MEIC. 
As can be seen in Table 4, the deflated domestic wholesale price for unrefined 
sugar was below the deflated FOB (free on board) export price of unrefined 
sugar until 1977-78. The fact that the deflated domestic wholesale prices 
have exceeded the export price in the last two years may indicate that the 
government is attempting to improve prices to farmers in real terms by using 
higher domestic prices to off set the decline in world prices which continued 
through 1978-79. 
The lack of production incentives in the form of adequate prices appears 
to be one of the factors which explains the stagnation of sugar production. 
The deflated farm price for sugar in 1977-78 and 1978-79 was about equal to 
the deflated price for sugar in 1970-71 and 1971-72 (Table 4). However, the 
deflated farm price of sugar increased by over 50 percent from 1970-71 to 
1974-75 before falling to the level prevailing at the beginning of the decade. 
Sugar production also increased rapidly because of more favorable farm prices 
and worldwide prices for sugar in that period. 
Livestock Products 
Total slaughter of beef cattle has increased at the relatively slow rate 
of about 1 percent annually during the decade of the 1970s. As can be seen in 
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Table 4: A Comparison of Export, Wholesale and Farm Prices 
of Unrefined Sugar, 1970-71 to 1978-79 
Deflated FOB Price Defla ted Farm 
of Unrefined Sugar Deflated Wholesale Price Equivalent 
Agricultural Exported from a/ Price of Unrefinedb/ of Unrefinedc/ 
Year Costa Rican Ports- Sugar in San Jose- Sugar Price-
Colones per metric ton - -
1970-71 877 894 433 
1971-72 998 841 441 
1972-73 1043 732 427 
1973-74 1639 594 556 
1974-75 3204 608 719 
1975-76 1267 591 479 
1976-77 839 617 468 
1977-78 649 725 460 
1978-79 355 762 437 
a/ 
- Converted to colones at the official exchange rate for each year and deflated 
with the GDP deflator using a 1966 base year. 
bf Prices are for the calender year 1970 through 1978 and are deflated wi th the 
GDP deflator using a 1966 base year. 
E-1calculated from the average farm price paid for cane adjusted to ref lect the 
average annual yield of sugar per ton of cane and deflated wi th the GDP de-
f lator using a 1966 base year. 
Source: Liga Agricola Industrial de la Cana de Azucar. 
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Table 5, total slaughter from 1970 to 1973 averaged about 114,000 metric tons, 
it increased to a higher 125,000 metric ton level from 1974 to 1976 and then 
increased again to over 130,000 metric tons from 1977 to 1979. This total 
slaughter is divided between a domestic market which, as can be seen in Table 
5, has increased from 30 percent to 45 percent of total slaughter and an 
export market which has declined relatively and absolutely. Of the exported 
beef, over 95 percent is sold to the United States, most of it as frozen bone-
less beef. 
The main policy instruments used by by the Costa Rican government to 
intervene in the beef cattle market are export quotas and price controls. The 
CNP implements the export quota policy and the MEIC implements the price 
control policy. Because a higher price for beef exists in the export market 
than in the domestic market, an export quota has been devised to control the 
flow of cattle between these two markets. After obtaining an estimate of 
total slaughter based upon historical data and producer declarations of male 
cattle available for export, the CNP estimates domestic beef consumption needs 
and deducts this from total slaughter. The remainder is the amount available 
for export which is assigned as a quota to each export slaughter plant and 
beef producer.I./ The MEIC sets retail and wholesale price ceilings for beef 
which, in combination with the export quota, maintains lower beef prices in 
the domestic market than in the export market. 
The price trend for beef cattle in the domestic market and the export 
market, as well as the weighted average of the two markets for Costa Rican 
7/ See Stein for a thorough discussion of the beef export quota system 
in Costa Rica. 
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Table 5: Beef Cattle Production, Exports and Domestic Consumption, 1970-1979 
Domestic 
Calendar Total Slaughter Domestic Consumption 
Year No. of Head Quantity Exports Consumption As a Percent 
of Total 
Slau hter 
- metric tons - - - - - -
1970 280,043 111, 037 77,945 33,092 30% 
1971 291,567 116,090 68,918 47,172 41 
1972 301,245 115,705 73,354 42,351 37 
1973 312,546 116,408 74,332 42,076 36 
1974 325, 713 127,734 85,819 41,915 33 
1975 339,489 128,112 78,283 49,829 39 
1976 340,344 124,998 72,948 52,050 42 
1977 341,436 134,144 78,359 55,785 42 
1978 354,963 145,959 82,636 63,323 43 
197¢./ 340,365 137,120 75,580 61,540 45 
a/ 
- Preliminary estimates. 
N.A. is data not available. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica 
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producers, reveals that the deflated price of beef cattle has decreased by 
approximately 25 percent in the decade of the 1970s. As can be seen in Table 
6, the export price is about 30 percent higher than the domestic price for 
beef cattle which suggests that government policy has an adverse impact on 
domestic prices to beef producers ... ~/ Although nominal prices have increased 
throughout the decade, deflated farm prices reached their peak in 1973 and 
have declined fairly steadily since that time. Such declining prices may 
explain the stagnation of beef cattle production. 
Hog production increased at an average annual rate of 4.6 percent in the 
1970s, being fairly stable from 1970 to 1975 and then increasing rapidly from 
1976 to 1978 (Table 7). The deflated price of hogs was also quite stable from 
1970 to 1975 and then declined by about 10 percent near the end of the decade. 
Even though pork production has increased at a relatively favorable rate, 
Costa Rica has had to import increasing amounts of pork to fill the gap 
between domestic demand and supply. Broiler production has increased fairly 
steadily at an annual rate of 3.5 percent during the 1970s (Table 7). This is 
quite a favorable performance when one considers that the deflated farm price 
of broilers decreased by about 10 percent from the beginning to the end of the 
decade. 
As can be seen in Table 7, milk production has increased from approxi-
mately 200 million liters in 1970 to slightly over 306 ~Ilion liters in 1979, 
8/ In February, 1980, a new price policy which eliminated this price 
differential was approved by the Comision Regula<lora de la Carne which con-
tains representatives of the beef cattle producers, processors and the 
government. 
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Table 6: Domestic and Export Pr i ces of Beef, 1970-79 
Weighted 
Producer Price a/ Producer Price Average Producer 
in Domestic Markets- In Export Market~/ Price in 
Both Market~/ 
Calendar Current Deflated Current Deflated Current Deflated 
Year Price Price12./ Price Pric~ Price Price 
- - Colones per metric ton live weight - -
1970 2540 2170 3013 2574 2733 2335 
1971 2650 2210 3048 2542 2823 2354 
1972 2850 2233 3733 2925 3272 2564 
1973 3910 2668 4688 3199 4249 2899 
1974 4190 2320 4330 2398 4258 2358 
1975 3806 1692 4785 2128 4337 1928 
1976 3869 1475 4984 1901 4509 1719 
1977 4043 1318 5327 1737 4794 1563 
1978 5270 1593 7046 2129 6276 1897 
197<}~_/ 7080 1949 10463 2880 8945 2462 
~/The beef cattle price available in Costa Rica is that established at the 
Montecillos market - the principle beef cattle market in Costa Rica 
b/Prices are deflated with the GDP deflator using a 1966 base year. 
£/Preliminary estimates. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica 
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Table 7: Production and Prices of Livestock Products, 1970-1979 
c 0 M M 0 D I T y 
MI L K H 0 G s B R 0 
Deflated Deflated 
Calendar Farm a/ Farm a/ 
Year Production Price- Production Price- Production 
Thousand Colones per Metric Colones Metric 
Liters 000 liters Tons per ton Tons 
1970 206,093 804 9,447 2861 4,217 
1971 209,508 920 10,234 3410 4,411 
1972 221,979 905 10,271 3323 4,677 
. 
1973 235,298 788 10,415 3248 4,722 
1974 240,916 908 10,560 3306 4,900 
1975 250,774 945 9,619 3348 5,091 
1976 271, 750 864 11, 529 3089 5,415 
1977 290,299 749 12,509 3082 ·5,427 
1978 300,808 778 13,710 3043 5,590 
197~/ 306,524 770 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
-~/Prices are deflated with the GDP deflater using a 1966 base year. 
E_/Preliminary estimates. 
N.A. is data not available. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica 
I L E R S 
Deflated 














an average annual increase in production of about 4.8 percent • .2./ This would 
seem to be an adequate growth rate of output, but it has slowed to only a 1.0 
percent annual growth rate in 1978 and 1979, which is much less than the 
growth rate of demand for dairy products, and this has necessitated increased 
imports. 
Price policy in the dairy industry consists of maximum sell i ng prices for 
fluid milk administered by MEIC which are set below the market clearing price 
and are applied at all levels in the marketing channel from the producer to 
the consumer. The processors indicate that price controls such as those for 
fluid mllk result in an excess demand for the product and they must ration the 
limited supply among all consumers. Some of the ways which have been used to 
ration fluid milk consist of changing from daily delivery to homes or stores 
to an every other day delivery. In addition, pr ocessed milk products such as 
cheese, ice cream and yogurt do not have price controls so that processing 
plants may divert milk to those more profitable products, thereby further 
reducing the supply of fluid milk. 
The milk production increases have been achieved at the same time that 
the deflated farm price of milk has been decreasing. The deflated farm price, 
about 804 colones per thousand liters in 1970 has fluctuated substantially; it 
reached a high of 945 colones per thousand liters in 1975 and has tended to 
decrease since then to 770 colones per thousand liters in 1979. It is 
somewhat surprising that milk production has continued to increase during the 
9/ Since reliable estimates of raw milk production and consumption in 
rural areas are .difficult to obtain, the annual rate of increase in production 
may be inflated because of the substitution over time of pasteurized milk for 
raw milk. 
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last half of the decade in view of the declining price for the output; 
however, one would expect more of a lag in the production response to price 
changes for milk than for products with an annual production cycle. Because 
of declining prices, farmers may reduce milk output in the short run by tem-
porarily cutting back on the amount and quality of inputs such as the feed 
concentrates used for milk cows and the amount of urea and other fertilizers 
which they apply to their pastures. Conversations with milk producers indi-
cated that such reductions in the use of purchased inputs appear to have taken 
place in the Meseta Central and North during 1979. If prices continue low for 
long periods, producers will begin selling their milk cows for slaughter and 
diverting the pasture land to production of more profitable crops. The lack 
of current and reliable data on the dairy cow herd does not permit analysis of 
those numbers to observe whether dramatic changes in dairy cow numbers have 
occurred. 
III. International Price Comparisons 
When the prices of agricultural products in Costa Rica are compared with 
the prices of these same products in other countries, and these comparisons 
are made at the official exchange rate for the Costa Rican colon, Costa Rica 
appears to be non-competitive in the production of manyagricultural products. 
However, using the official Costa Rican exchange rate for such comparisons is 
inappropriate and misleading. Using the offical exchange rate is not only 
likely to mislead government officials in setting price policies for the agri-
cultural sector, but also directly affects agricultural output through incen-
tives for producers. If, as is the case in Costa Rica, the official exchange 
rate is over-valued, then revenues received in domestic currency for export 
-~-
sales are accordingly reduced, so that the incentives for producers to export, 
or even to produce those products which might be exported, are thereby 
reduced • .!.Q./ 
There are two separate reasons for arguing that the Costa Rican colon is 
over-valued, and each of these must be taken into account independently in 
arriving at an estimate of the exchange rate which should be used i n making 
international price comparisons. The first reason is based on traditional 
purchasing power parity arguments •. !!/ In mid-1974 Costa Rica officially 
devalued by unifying its multiple exchange rates at the higher free market 
rate of 8.57 colones per U.S. dollar, and this fixed official rate was main-
tained throughout the rest of the 1970s. From mid-1974 to mid-1979 the Costa 
Rican wholesale price index increased by 81 percent, while the wholesale price 
index in the United States, Costa Rica's major trading partner, i ncreased by 
47 percent. Assuming that the official exchange rate adopted in mid-1974 was 
an equilibrium rate at that time and using the relative changes i n wholesale 
prices in Costa Rica and the United States implies that the Costa Rican colon 
was over-valued by 23 percent as of mid-1979. It can further be argued that 
the mid-1974 devaluation was insufficient to remove completely t he over-
valuation of the colon even at that time, as the large deficit i n Costa Rica's 
balance of trade persisted after 1974. In fact, by the beginning of the 1980s 
this deficit had become so large that Costa Rica was forced to abandon its 
unified official exchange rate of 8.57 and in September, 1980, adopted a 
10/ See Schuh [1974) for an analysis of exchange rate pol i cy and U.S. 
agriculture. 
11/ See Officer [1976] for a discussion of these arguments. 
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system under which half of most international transactions take place at the 
official rate and half at a free-market rate. By mid October the free-market 
rate exceeded 13 colones per U.S. dollar, which implies an over-valuation of 
more than 25 percent for the official exchange rate if the equilibrium rate is 
assumed to be half way between the official and free-market rates. 
To this estimate of the over-valuation of the official exchange rate, 
must be added an estimate of the over-valuation due to the structure of 
protection. It is now widely recognized that the protection of import-
competing activities through tariffs and other trade barriers implies negative 
protection for export activities, in part because the domestic currency is 
valued higher vis-a-vis foreign currencies than it otherwise would 
be .lll Tariffs and other barriers against imports reduce the demand for 
foreign exchange and thereby raise the value of the domestic currency. 
Estimates of over-valuation due to the structure of protection are based on 
comparing the existing exchange rate with estimates of what the exchange rate 
would be under a regime of free trade. This depends, in turn, on estimates of 
the elasticities of demand for imports and of supply and demand for exports 
together with the rate of tax (or subsidy) on exports and the rate of nominal 
protection for imports (including both tariffs and other trade barriers) ... !1/ 
Estimates for Costa Rica based on data for 1978 yield an over-valuation of 
slightly more than 20 percent, and this figure is quite insensitive to 
12/ See Belassa and Associates [1971] for a full discussion of effective 
protection and for estimates of effective protection for several developing 
countries including Brazil . and Chile. 
JJ..I See Bacha and Taylor [1979]. 
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substantial changes in the elasticity estimates. However, it i s likely to be 
an under-estimate of over-valuation for several reasons, primari ly the dif-
ficulty of quantifying all non-tariff barriers against imports.J:.il In 
addition, the changes in foreign exchange markets which were ini tiated in 
September, 1980, involve a substant ial increase in nominal protection as many 
tariffs were increased and a system of prior deposits for import s was 
instituted. 
When the official exchange rate is used to compare farm level prices in 
Costa Rica with those in the United States, one set of conclusions is reached 
about the competitiveness and efficiency of Costa Rican agriculture, but the 
conclusions are strikingly different when the over-valuation of the exchange 
rate is taken into account. As shown in Table 8, the ratio of Costa Rican 
farm level prices to U.S. farm level prices at the official exchange rate 
suggests that Costa Rica is more efficient than the United States only for 
beef among the eight commodities examined. However, when a 40 percent over-
valuation of the official exchange rate is taken into account, (which is quite 
conservative given the foregoing estimates) Costa Rica is more e f ficient in 
five of the eight commodities: rice, milk, pork, ~nd possibly beans, as well 
as beef. Such a dramatic change in the competitive position for these 
p~oducts indicates clearly that an over-valued exchange rate can introduce 
serious distortions in government price policies and can eliminat e price 
incentives for producers of actual or potential exports. 
l!!_/ The estimate of a 20 percent over-valuation in Costa Rica due to 
protection appears quite modest compared to the estimates of Belassa and 
Associates of 27 percent for Brazil and 68 percent for Chile as of the 
mid-1960s. 
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Table 8: Comparison of Farm Prices in Costa Rica and the U.S. at the 
Official Exchange Rate and Adjusted for a 40 percent 
Over-Valuation of the Costa Rican Colon 
Average Ratio of Costa Rican Price 
Farm to U.S. Farm Prices at 
Price in Official Exchange Rate Commodity Costa Rica Exchange Rate Adjusted 40% 
Colones per 8.57 Colones 12.00 Colones 
Metric ton per U.S. $ oer U.S. $ 
Rough Rice 
1977 /78 1817 1.01 o. 72 
1978-79 1911 1. 24 0.88 
Corn 
1977 /78 1630 2.37 1. 70 
1978/79 1783 2.39 1. 71 
Sorghum 
1977 /78 1405 2.27 1.63 
1978/79 1405 2.10 1.50 
Dry Edible Beans 
1977 /78 4891 1.39 0.94 
1978/79 4891 1.32 0.99 
Beef 
1978 6276 0.68 0.49 
1979 8945 0.72 0.51 
Milk.~/ 
1978 2574 1.26 0.90 
1979 2799 1.19 0.85 
Hogs 
1977 9450 1. 27 0.91 
1978 10070 1.14 0.82 
Broilers 
1977 8690 1. 95 1.39 
1978 8579 1. 73 1. 23 
~/The price of milk is in Colones per thousand liters. 
Sources: Banco Central de Costa Rica and U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
F.Sr.s 11 Aa,.i r.nl tural Prices. 11 
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Since Costa Rican beef prices are about 70 percent of U.S. farm prices 
at the offfcial exchange rate and about 50 percent of U.S. farm pri ces when 
the over-valuation is considered, the Costa Rican beef industry should be in a 
strong competitive position in the export market. However, performance has 
not equalled this expectation. Because real (deflated) beef prices in Costa 
Rica have declined by about 25 percent during the 1970s, beef production has 
stagnated and beef exports have declined not only in absolute terms but also 
from 70 percent of total production to 55 percent. Stagnation resulting from 
low prices for producers is ultimately due to beef prices set low f or Costa 
Rjr.an consumers together with an over-valued exchange rate for beef exports. 
A more appropriate exchange rate could markedly increase producers revenues and 
thus provide the incentive necessary for increased beef output. 
Rice also appears to have strong potential as an export, but rel atively 
little has actually been exported because the over-valued exchange rate 
misleads the government policy makers who set support prices and distorts 
price signals to domestic producers. As can be seen from Table 8 , adjusting 
the official exchange rate for a 40 percent over-valuation makes Costa Rican 
farm level prices for rice about 20 percent lower than U.S. farm l evel prices. 
International price comparisons at an appropriate exchange rate t hus indicate 
that Costa Rican rice producers are quite competitive, something which is not 
apparent when the official exchange rate is used. 
Distortion of price policies and incentives through an over-valued 
exchange rate can also be found in the Costa . Rican dairy industry, even though 
the dairy industry is oriented toward the domestic market. It has frequently 
been argued that Costa Rica has a high cost, inefficient dairy industry which 
already receives too high a price for fluid milk. Evidence presented to 
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support this argument is that milk solids can be imported and reconstituted 
for sale as fluid milk in Costa Rica at a price competitive with locally 
produced milk. However, this argument ignores the fact that an over-valued 
exchange rate not only taxes the producers of export goods but also subsidizes 
the users of import goods. Because of the over-valued exchange rate, it 
appears more attractive to import milk solids than to raise domestic milk 
prices and thereby encourage domestic production. When the 40 percent over-
valuation of the official exchange rate is taken into account, Table 8 shows 
that Costa Rican farm level prices for milk are 10-15 percent below U.S. farm 
level prices. The Costa Rican dairy industry is thus not so inefficient and 
high cost as has been argued, and higher domestic milk prices may be 
preferable to importing milk solids which are subsidized through an over-
valued official exchange rate. 
For some commodities, such as corn and sorghum, Costa Rican farm level 
prices remain substantially above U.S. farm level prices even when the over-
valuation of the official exchange rate is taken into account, which confirms 
that Costa Rica is not competitive in these products. In the case of beans, a 
40 percent adjustment of the official exchange rate yields Costa Rican farm 
level prices which are about the same as U.S. farm level prices. Wide price 
fluctuations and a failure to focus on technical problems of bean production, 
rather than the inefficiency of domestic producers may have been the principal 
handicaps for bean production. 
International price comparisons for hogs at an exchange rate adjusted for 
over-valuation indicate that Costa Rican farm level prices are quite com-
petitive with U.S~ farm level prices, but broiler prices remain substantially 
higher in Costa Rica than in the United States. The main barrier to increased 
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production of pork, and especially broilers, appears to be the high cost of 
feed grains which comprise a high percentage of the production costs for these 
products. Since the official exchange rate is over-valued, it might seem that 
pork and poultry producers benefit from a subsidy on imported feed grains. 
However, as discussed above, feed grain prices (e.g., corn and sorghum) remain 
high even when the exchange rate is adjusted for overvaluation. The CNP 
controls grain imports and thereby maintains the domestic prices of these 
inputs for pork and poultry substantially above world market levels . 
IV. Agricultural Credit 
The commerical banking system has traditionally been the predominant 
source of agricultural credit in Costa Rica, accounting for two-thirds to 
three-quarters of agricultural lending, with most of the rest spread among a 
variety of informal sources such as moneylenders and friends and 
relatives • ..! .. ~/ No comprehensive survey has been carried out during the 1970s, 
but it is likely that the commerical banks have maintained their share of 
agricultural lending, while the growth of financieras (quasi-banks which avoid 
most government banking regulations) and agricultural suppliers ha s eroded the 
shares of other informal sources of credit. The Costa Rican banki ng system 
consists of a Central Bank and four commercial banks, all of which are owned 
by the government of Costa Rica, but which operate with some autonomy, espe-
cially the commercial banks. The most important attributes of commerical bank 
agricultural lending in Costa Rica, at least until the financial reform of 
late 1978, have been the low interest rates set by the Central Bank and the 
15/ See Vogel and Gonzalez-Vega [1969]. 
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limits (both minimum and maximum) which the Central Bank sets on the amount of 
credit to be made available for different activities. 
Throughout most of the 1970s, interest rates on bank agricultural loans 
have been set between 8 and 11 percent, with the lowest rates on loans for 
small farmers and for certain preferred activities such as planting basic 
grains and oilseeds. The argument for these subsidized low interest rates, 
which have even been below the rate of inflation in Costa Rica during several 
years of the 1970s, is that they improve the distribution of income and pro-
mote agricultural production in the face of other distortions which place the 
agricultural sector, and especially small farmers, at a disadvantage.~/ With 
respect to the distribution of income, bank agricultural loans have been found 
to be highly concentrated in large loans to relatively wealthy farmers, a 
pattern unlikely to facilitate an improvement in income distribution • .!2./ As 
will be shown below, the relationship between subsidized credit and agri-
cultural production is also unclear, inspite of the Central Bank's limits on 
lending for different activities. This is due in part to two elements which 
weaken the Central Bank's system of credit limits: (1) the commercial banks 
are sometimes able to lend less than the minimum limit or more than the 
maximum; and (2) the limits apply to broadly-defined activities (e.g., 
planting seasonal crops) and not to specific activities (e.g., planting corn). 
However, the most important reason is borrower behavior, that is, even loans 
that are said to be for the planting of corn do not necessarily lead to more 
corn being planted. 
J:il See Lizano, [1980] Chapter IV. 
17/ See Vogel, [1977]. 
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Table 9 shows for each of the principal crops the amount of credit dis-
bursed by the commercial banks for each year, 1970 through 1978, and the per-
centage of total bank agricultural credit accounted for by each crop. In 
addition, bank agriculture credit is shown as a percentage of total bank 
credit and in real terms (using the deflator for gross domestic product). 
Data for 1979 are not shown, in part because the breakdown by crop is not yet 
available, but especially because the year since the financial reform of late 
1978 deserves separate attention. Although the agricultural sector may be 
favored with subsidized low interest rates, it is not clear that the agri-
cultural sector has been favored with abundant credit. Bank agricultural 
credit has not only tended to decline as a share of total bank credit during 
the 1970s, but has even failed to keep pace with inflation during most years. 
If a principal purpose of government credit policy is to promote agricultural 
production, the volume of credit available is likely to be more important than 
subsidized low interest rates. 
It is also important to look for consistent relationships for individual 
crops between production and the amount of bank credit allocated. However, it 
must be recognized that any such relationship may be due as much to the demand 
for credit by producers as to Central Bank policies which attempt to allocate 
the supply of credit. Looking first at the main export crops, it is difficult 
to find any consistent evidence of a close relationship between Costa Rican 
bank credit and production. For coffee, Costa Rica's most important e~port in 
most years, production has tended to rise somewhat during the 1970s in the 
face of a decline in bank credit in real terms and as a share of total agri-
cultural credit. Bananas, usually the second most important export, have 
never been ·allocated an appreciable amount of credit by Costa Rican banks. 
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Table 9: National Banking System 
Distribution By Product of Credit Disbursed for Agriculture, 1970-1978 
(Millions of Colones and Percents) 
1 9 7 0 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 3 
.Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent 
of of of of of of of of 
Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit 
1. Coffee 470.5 64.2 461.5 47.8 454.1 47.8 528.7 45.4 
2. Bananas 14.8 2.0 25.8 2.7 4.6 0.5 2.8 0.2 
3. Cacao 1.6 0.2 1. 5 0.2 1.0 0.1 2.0 0.2 
4. Sugar Cane 27.7 3.8 27.9 2.9 31. 9 3.4 25.2 2.2 
5. Rice 23.8 3.2 39.8 4.1 43.1 4.5 43.8 3.8 
6. Corn 2.4 0.3 6.3 0.6 8.9 0.9 6.3 0.5 
7. Beans 1.8 0.2 1.8 0.2 1.5 0.2 1.2 0.1 
8. Sorghum 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.8 0.2 
9. Beef Cattle 163.4 22.3 268.0 27.8 267.2 28.1 428.5 36.8 
10. Dairy Cattle 11. 7 1. 6 36.5 3.8 32.7 3.4 20.8 1.8 
11. Hogs 0.6 0.1 2.8 0.3 3.9 0.4 2.5 0.2 
12. Poultry 2.2 0.3 4.4 0.4 4.7 0.5 5.5 0.5 
13. Other 11.6 1.6 88.7 9.2 96.1 10.1 93.9 8.1 
14. Total 732.3 100 965.6 100 950.8 100 1,163.2 100 
15. Deflated 
Amount of 
Credit!!./ 625.6 805.2 745.1 793.7 
16. Amount of 
Credit for 
Agriculture 
as a percent 
of all Bank 
Credit 49.9 45.6 43.0 44.7 
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Table 9: cont'd 
1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 
Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percen1 
of of of of of of of of of of 
Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credi· 
1. 649.9 42.5 591.1 32.5 582.7 30.2 348.3 16.7 411.5 .16 . . 
2. 29.4 1. 9 1.0 0.0 7.1 0.3 15.9 o. 7 6.2 o. 
3. 2.1 0.1 7.8 0.4 8.8 0.4 8.6 0.4 6.8 o. 
4. 43.4 2.8 i.02.8 5.7 37.0 1. 9 97.5 4.6 58.0 2. 
5. 74.7 4.9 244.5 13.5 244.9 12.7 212.3 10.l 236.7 9. 
6. 12.3 0.8 38.4 2.1 40.9 2.1 41.4 2.0 29.3 1. 
7. 8.0 0.5 16.4 0.9 11.3 0.6 12.9 0.5 9.4 0. 
8. 8.5 0.6 25.4 1.4 32.3 1. 7 38.5 1.5 48.7 1. 
9. 475.8 31.1 390.1 21.5 424.3 22.0 542.6 26.0 668.4 26. 
10. 33.9 2.2 48.9 2.7 75.5 3.9 146.5 7.0 146.1 5. 
11. 2.8 0.2 4.3 0.2 7.1 0.4 10.7 0.5 19.8 o. 
12. 10.5 o. 7 6.2 0.3 14.4 0.7 18.4 0.8 16.3 o. 
13. 176.2 11.5 333.4 18.4 435.4 22.6 565.6 27.3 827.1 33. 
14. 1, 527 .5 100 1,816.7 100 1,924.6 100 2,068.6 100 2,486.2 10 
15. 845.9 807.8 734.0 674.6 751.4 
16 40.0 37.9 38.0 37.8 37. 
_!/The amount of credit is deflated with the GDP deflator using a 1966 base year. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica. 
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Bank credit for cocoa rose to a substantially higher level beginning with 
1975, dnd production rose appreciably in 1977 and 1978. However, the increase 
in cnc•H prices heginnhg in 1973, and especially in 1977 and 1973, CTay be 
more responsible for the increases in credit and production than any attempts 
hy the Central Bank to allocate more credit to cocoa. Bank credit for sugar-
<:anP lvis been quite erratic, with especially large increases in 1975 and 1977, 
hut these fluctuations do not appear closely reL'~ted to flue tua t ions iri 
pr·Jduct ion . 
r,.:.ir basic grains any relationship between credit and production would be 
especially interesting because of the number of programs that Costa Rica has 
had to promote the production of basic grains, including several credi t 
progrAms . High prices for rice in 1974 and 1975 led to substantial increases 
in production and bank credit for rice in 1975 and 1976. Since then , rice 
production has continued at a high level, especially in 1978 and 1979, while 
bank credit for rice has fallen in real terms and as a share of total agri-
cultural credit. Corn production and credit both fluctuated somewhat during 
t11e e~rly 1970s, but without any close association. However, in 1975 bank 
credit for corn rose to its highest level in real terms and as a sha re of 
total agricutural credit, while production continued at a low level. Corn 
prodnction reached a peak in 1976 and has since settled back to its earlier 
1 cvel, \Jhile bank credit for corn has continued to be more iraportant in the 
l::ite 1970s than earlier in the decade. The pattern for bean production and 
credit i.s similar to corn. Bank credit increased sharply in 1974, while bean 
rroduc•:i.on rer1ained he.lo\! its 1972 level. Bean production reached its peak in 
1976, after bank credit for beans had begun to taper off. Only soq~hum, of 
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the four basic grains, shows a pattern of increasing bank credit accompanied 
by increasing production. 
The relationship between meat production, especially heef, and favorable 
credit conditions (or favorable prices) is ~uch more difficult to detect 
because increased credit may initially lead to less slaughter as producers 
build their herds in anticipation of increased long-run profits. Bank credit 
for beef cattle tended to increase during the early 1970s, reaching a peak in 
1973 and 1974 in real terms and as a share of total agricultural credit, but 
fell sharply in 1975 and 1976, and then rebounded somewhat in 1977 and 1978. 
Beef production remained quite stable from 1970 through 1973, fluc tuated 
around a higher level from 1974 through 1976, and then fluctuated around a 
still higher level from 1977 through 1979. Bank credit for hogs increased 
appreciably in 1971 and 1972 and then declined somewhat in the following two 
years, while hog production fluctuated with no clear trend from 1970 through 
1975. Only since 1975 has there been a steady upward trend in hoth production 
and bank credit for hogs. Broiler production has tended to increase quite 
steadily throughout the 1970s, while bank credit increased very modestly 
through 1973, then rose sharply, fell back and rose again in the subsequent 
three years, and finally remained fairly stable in 1977 and 1978. Milk pro-
duction has also risen at a fairly steady pace during the 1970s, while credit 
for dairy cattle has shown significant fluctuations. Bank credit increased 
greatly in 1971, fell back the next two years, and then returned to its former 
level in real terms and as a share of total agricultural credit over the 
following two years, before increasing sharply in 1976 and 1977 a nd falling 
back again in 1978. 
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The examination of production and bank credit during the 1970s for most 
of Costa Rir:a's main agricultural products does not give the impression of any 
(;lose:: association between credit and output. Given the impact of the 
government's price policies on agricultural production, there is litt le indi-
cation that bank credit at subsidized low interest rates has effectively 
either complemented these price policies or offset any distortions that may 
have been induced. Recent studies of rural financial markets which emphasize 
the fungihility of credit help to explain why this is so.~/ Because credit 
is fungible , preferential low interest rates for the agricultural sec tor will 
fall to redirect resources toward favored activities in the agricultural 
sector. Preferential low interest rates do not change the prices paid by 
farv~rs for inputs or received for output or the technologies available to 
them and hence leave unchanged the relative profitability of agricultural and 
non-agricultural activities as well as different activities within the agri-
cultural sector. 
Since credit provides general coomand over resources, it cannot easily be 
tied to the production of particular goods. Diversion of loans to other than 
the prescribed uses by farmer5 has been found to be widespread whenever audits 
of credit use have been carried out.12./ Even diligent and costly programs of 
credit supervision have failed to elininate diversion and, in any case, are 
baserl on the dubious assumption that supervisors know better than farmers what 
farmers should he produci.ng and how they should he producing it.20/ More 
--------------
18/ Sec especially Von Pischke and Adams, [1980]. 
lq/ ?ew of these studies have been published because they are typi cRlly 
ci'll"rlPd nut on R .-.onfi[.lential hasi_s by international len<ling institutions. 
20/ See Lipton, [1976] for a strong attack on credit supervision from a 
S(J!1t'\·:li ;1t r,1di r:a l ncrspective. 
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subtle and pervasive than outright diversion is the case in whic h the farmer 
presents the lender with his most attractive undertaking, one wh i ch would be 
carried out even if a loan were not received, .:rnd then use s the .1 dditional 
resources obtained with the loan for some unspeci f i~d activity. Such be havior 
is especially likely for relatively wealthy farmers who, as ment i oned above, 
obtain the lion's share of bank agr icultural credit in Costa Ric a and who nost 
often have a variety of activities both inside and outside the agricultural 
sector. 
As indicated above, Costa Rica underwent a major financial reform i.n late 
lq78, so that the pattern of credit allocation for 1979 deserves special 
attention, even though information on credit for individual crops is not yet 
available. The main element in this financial reform was a subs t antial 
increase in some interest rates and a complete freeing of others frorn Central 
Bank control. However, certain interest rates, especially for ac tivities 
within the agricultural sector, have continued to be fixed at low levels. 
Small farmer loans continue to be made at 8 percent per year and short-term 
loans for seasonal crops at 10 percent, ~1ile certain livestock activities are 
financed at preferenti.al rates, hut mostly above 10 percent. Interest rates 
on loans from the financiera sections of the commercial banks are uncontrolled 
and have ranged from 20 to 25 percent during 1979, while the rat e on loans 
from the banks' cor111:iercial sections cont i.nues to be set by the Ce ntral Bank, 
but at a rate which varies according to the London inter-bank rate, and has 
fluctuated somewhat below 20 percent during 1979. 21 / 
21/ Costa RicA.n commercial h;rnks art> divid<·rl i.ntn rlt'rartrnen t s, :1r1on1~ whid1 
the most important are the commercial an<l financler<1 sections . 
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~he interest rates paid on time deposits also vary according to the 
London. inter- bank rate and have ranged around 15 percent during 1979, wl1 i..Le no 
inter'-'~t i--: nc1irl on dicmand rlepo~;its a:1d the rate on savings deposits is fixecl 
at S percent. As night he expected, tine deposits grew rapidly during 1979 
r2lative to both demand deposits and savings deposits. Given the structure of 
Cost.1 Rir: ::i.n rnmmercial hanks, this has implied more resources available tn the 
financiera sections to he lent at higher uncontrolled rates compared to the 
n~sour ce1:. available to the commercial sections to be lent at lower preferen-
t i~l rates (either fixed or flexible). This relative lack of resourc es for 
the comEtercial sections could, of course, have been offset by Central Bank 
l ending or by bo r rowing froo foreign sources . In fact, these sources were 
used l1eavily during 197') as domestic credit from the Central Bank to the c01;i-
ner i c:-il hanks 1:iore than tripled, whil e the Central Bank al1:iost doublecl the 
foreign resources channelled to the commercial banks , and the commercial hanks 
tliemsel ves increased their direct borrowing from foreign sources. The foreign 
resourr:Ps he lped to offset the large deficit in Costa Rica ' s balance of trade, 
but n10 r e sig nificantly almost all of these resources went to finance Costa 
Ri <:c1 's large governr.ient defii::it, as co1!lmerc.:ial bank lending to the public 
sector almost tripled during 1979 . 
The net result of the interest rate reform, together with the fo r eign 
horru1-.·i!lg ;:ind the government ' s defi.cit, was that cor.1merci.al bank credit to the 
rrivate sector increased very little e ven in nominal terms during 197':) and 
actually declined in real ter;ns· . 'foreover , all of the increase \-las in high 
inter,_.,s:_ rat•? loans frurn the fi.nancier a set.:tions , as loans outstandins f rum 'the 
<:flrn:ie1·cL11 sec tions t o the rrivat~ sector were virtually the sar.ie a t the e nd 
r, f l':J 7') as ;i t the end of l 'J73 . r\gric nlture fared sor,1ewhat wors e thar. tilP rest 
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of t h e private sector . Its share of bank credit outst a ndi ng t o t h e pri vate 
~;.:c t •) r f;.: l l from 43 . 5 per •: t-.nt at the e nd o f 1978 Lo 41. S fk~ r ..:en t :-i t Lhe end of 
1979 , while its share of new lnans disbursed was 37 . 1 per(.;ent -iur ing 1978 a nci 
35 . 3 pe r cent during 1979 . Agriculture actually increa s ed its share of cr edit 
from .the commercial sections and maint;:i.ined its share of c r edit fr om the 
financie r a sections . ijowever , agricult11re has t r adit i onally depe nded heavily 
on the comme r ical sections and only l ightly on the fi nanciera sect ions, so 
that the s ubstantial decline of the 1.:ommcrcial sectior, r ela tive t o the f inan-
c.iera sections led tu the overall decline in bank credit t o the a g ric ultura l 
sec t or . 
lt is too s oon t o evaluate the i mpact of thes c> chan ges on ag ricu l tur~l 
produc t i on because production fi gures for 1979 are stil l prelimina ry and 
figures on bank C'redit by crop are not yet available. However, t h e fact tha t 
the agricul t ural sector lost out relative to the rest of the priva t e s ec t o r 
which in turn lost out to the publi i: ,.;ec c:or in cr edit f roi:i the bar. k i n r, svs t em 
suggests some pr oblems . The main prob l em for agriculture from the f ina ncia l 
reform does not appear to be the higher interest rates, as the a g r i cultural 
sec. t or was able to r.laintain Hi:; share of credj t from the f i n<1nc i.era sec ti o ns 
whe r e allocation. is largel y ba s e d on horrower demand, but rather in the 
restriction of credit from the commerr: ial sections whi ch h H V•' tratht i.onn l lv 
heen the main 8nttr<: e o f ag rict11tura1 r:rerlit . A r.lOre co•1p l e t e int t. rest r;1 tf' 
reform which allows higher interes t rates on comme rica l sect ion l oa115 coul. <l 
help to reso lve this problem . 
V. Conclusion 
Costa lli.can a g ri c t1ltural produc tion. l1as tended Lo s t d.f nat 1' til•r in;; :. :1l ' 
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price policies for the agricultural sector have contributed substantially to 
this stagnation. Although the prices of most agricultural products have risen 
in nor:iinal terms during the 1970s, converting to real prices using the defla-
tor for gross domestic product reveals much lower relative prices for most 
agricultural products at the end of the decade than at the beginning or in 
mld-decade. Government price policies for the agricultural sector have either 
ignored the reality of inflation or have attempted to combat inflation through 
agricultural price controls , and these have heen costly policies in terms of 
agricultural output foregone. 
The government nay have been misled by making inappropriate international 
price cor:irarisons based on the of fie ial exchange rate, comparisons which 
su~gest that Costa Rican is an inefficient and noncompetitive producer for 
r.iany of Lts main agricultural products. When the official exchange rate is 
adjusted for an over-valuation of at least 40 percent, Costa Rican producers 
are shown to be efficient and competitive in a variety of agricultural 
products which are not currently being exported or are even being imported. 
Thus, Costa Rica is not only foregoing agricultural output but is also wasting 
foreign exchange at a time of large balance of trade deficits. Moreover, 
government credit policies of subsidized low interest rates on bank agri-
cultural loans have done little or nothing to offset the effects of adverse 
price policies . 9ecause credit is fungible it cannot readily be tied to par-
ticular activities , and low interest rate loans do not change the relative 
profitability of different activities either inside or outside the agri-
culturd l sect •Jr. The main result of recent govet·q1:ient cr~dit policies has 
heen t q r •! duce the flow of hank credit to the agricultur.::il sector in real 
tf'ri:ls, '= il t,t·ehy cor.irlementing goverm:ient rrice polic:ies in their discrimination 
;1 1:.1inst Lilt· ;ig ri..:11lturnl sector. 
-71-
References 
Bacha, Edmar and Lance Taylor. "Foreign Exchange Shadow Prices : A 
Critical Review of Current Theories." Quarterly Journal o f 
Economics. May, 1979. pp. 197-224. 
Balassa, Bela and Associates. The Structure of Protection in Developing 
Countries. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 1971. 
Banco Central de Costa Rica. "Cifras de Cuentas Nacionales de Costa Rica, 
Serie 1957-1977, Estimacion 1978." Departamento de Inves t igaciones 
y Estadistica. Seccion de Cuentas Nationales. 
"Cifras Sabre Produccion Agropecuario, 
1967-1978." Departamento de Investigaciones y Estadistica . 
Seccion de Cuentas Nacionales. 
Credito y Cuentas Monetarias, Va r ious issues. 
Liga Agricola Industrial de la Cana de Azucar. "La Agricultura e Industria 
de la Cana de Azucar en Costa Rica." (LAICA), Noviembre de 1979. 
"Informe de Labores y Movimenta Economica." 
LAICA, Enero de 1980. 
Lipton, Michael P. "Agricultural Finance and Rural Credit in Poor 
Countries." World Development. July, 1976, pp. 1-60. 
Lizana, Eduardo. Agricultura y Desarollo Economico. San Jose, Costa Rica: 
Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia. 1980. 
Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia. Boletin Estadistico Agropecuario, 
Various issues. 
Officer, Lawrence H. "Purchasing Power Parity Theory of Exchange Rates: 
A Review Article." International Monetary Fund Staff Papers. 
Vol. XXIII No. 1. March, 1976. pp. 1-60. 
Schuh, G. Edward. "The Exchange Rate and U.S. Agriculture." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. Vol. 56, No. 1. February, 1974, 
pp. 1-13. 
Stein, John P. "Costa Rica's Beef Export Quota: How It Functions and 
Might Function." Associated Colleges of the Midwest, Central 
American Field Programs. San Jose, Costa Rica. August, 1969. 
U.S.D.A. Economics, Statistics and Cooperative Service. "Agricultural 
Prices." Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Off i ce. Annual 
summary for several years. 
Vargas, Thelma, Claudio Gonzalez-Vega y Alberto Di Mare. El Segura 
Agropecuario · en Costa Rica. San Jose: La Academia de Centro 
America. 19 79. 
-72-
Vogel, Robert Cross and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega. Agricultural Credit in 
in Costa Rica. Associated Colleges of the Midwest and U.S./A.I.D., 
San Jose, Costa Rica. July, 1969. 
Vogel, Robert Cross. "The Effect of Subsidized Credit on the Distribution 
of Income in Costa Ri~a." Paper presented at the Rocky Mountain 
Council for Latin American Studies, Tucson, Arizona. April, 1977. 
Von Pischke, J. D. and Dale W Adams. "Fungibility and the Design and 
Evaluation of Evaluation of Agricultural Credit Projects " American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. Vol. 62, No. 4. November; 1980. 
pp. 719-726. 
-73-
2nd Session: Rapporteur's Report and Discussion 
Exchange Rates, Pricing Policies and Credit Policies 
1. Exchange Rates: 
There is a danger that holding a local currency fixed 
in relation to those of its major trading partners i n the face 
of rising domestic inflation will create a drift from real 
price situations. When the drift steadily overvalues a 
currency then, in the countries in question, this causes 
the following: 
i) imported food appears cheaper. 
II) exported agricultural products appear dearer. 
Thus the agricultural sector is penalized as it may appear 
less efficient than it is in reality. Therefore Governments 
should establish the machinery for on-going realist i c evalu-
ation of exchange rates. 
2. Subsidies: 
In times of economic stress the continued viab i l i ty of 
both the agricultural sector and credit institutions servicing 
this sector is of importance. Subsidies may be app l icable. 
These may be direct (on prices and interest rates) or 
indirect (provision of infra-structure). The tempta tion to 
subsidize small farmers' production activities by subsidizing 
interest rates on loans should be resisted. In cert ain cases 
a strategically aimed subsidy on output, or even on inputs, 
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may be applicable but, in general, indirect subsidies such 
as providing farm services, (e.g. research and extension) 
and, strengthening the viability of institutions providing 
such services are likely to be the most satisfactory type 
of help for the small-farmer sector. (For example, subsidizing 
the initial costs of an institution, for the establishment 
and operation of a well-developed branch network). In general 
indirect, infra-structural subsidies (marketing services, 
irrigation networks, feeder roads, etc.) lead to less distor-
tions than direct subsidies on prices (including the price 
of credit). In favourable times, with the right technology, 
there is no case for a subsidy. Credit institutions should 
seek to direct investment to those enterprises/farmer-
borrowers which promise the best return. 
3. Pricing Policies: 
Pricing policies which result in cheap food for consumers 
penalize the farming sector and make credit-financed invest-
ment difficult. Both the farmer and agricultural bank suffer. 
The danger is that the producing sector will contract, short-
ages ensue and price controls become impossible to enforce. 
4. Productivity of Agriculture: 
When a farmer's terms of trade are favourable and produc-
tivity of resource use is good then his borrowing is likely 
to be of benefit both to him and to the lender, and vice versa. 
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Terms of trade and productivity are affected by: 
a) input prices; 
b) product prices; 
c) nature of the enterprise (risk and uncertainty 
involved); 
d) farmer's skill as a manager and in general his 
command of resources. 
Credit institutions cannot easily influence (a) and 
(b). However, they can directly choose to whom they lend 
and for what. Therefore, they can control (c) and (d) 
provided they are prepared to do so and that they have the 
necessary expertise. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The experience of small farmer credit programs in Jamaica 
during the 1970's illustrates many of the classic dilemmas faced 
by these programs in most LDCs. This paper discusses these 
experiences but, in so doing, the reader is reminded that the 
performance of the Jamaican small farmer credit institutions 
and programs are replicated in many other LDCs and the critiques 
and discussion that follow should not be thought only relevant 
to the Jamaican case. The paper is organized into four sections. 
First a brief overview is made of the performance of the economy 
during the seventies. Second, the rela t ive scope and role of 
the small farmer credit initiatives in t he larger rural finan-
! 
cial market setting is establish~d; thi rd a specific analysis 
of the three major small farmer credit p rograms is offered and 
finally we conclude with a set of recommendations to restructure 
and revitalize the rural financial markets in Jamaica. Through-
out the paper attempts are made to distin~uish between the issues 
of performance in the real economy. This issue is important 
since the factors and policies conditioning the performance of 
the economy in general and the agricultural sector in particular 
are crucial determinants of the performance of rural financial 
markets and programs. 
II. ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN THE 1970's 
During the late sixties and early seventies, the Jamaican 
economi registered respectabl e rates of growth (six percent for 
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real Gross Domestic Product) although this was not true of the 
agricultural sector which declined at an average annual rate of 
fo ur perc ent. From 1973 onwards, however, a severe economic 
r ecession set in. Total real gross domestic product decreased 
by 2.8 percent per annum between 1973 and 1978, negative growth 
being recorded in each of the last five years. Key sectors 
such as mining, manufacturing, construction, and commerce de-
clined at average annual rates of three percent, seven percent, 
10 percent and eight percent, respectively. The agricultural 
sector was the only productive sector to experience positive 
growth (three percent per annum) over the same period. 
This dismal growth experience was associated with sharp 
contractions in domestic savings and investment. Domestic 
savings which averaged 17 percent of gross national product 
• 
in between 1965 and 1970, averaged only 10 percent between 1971 
and 1975, becoming negative thereafter. Though foreign invest-
ment helped to boost real national savings early in the decade, 
real net capital formation contracted almost continuously from 
J$250 million in 1970 to J$29 million in 1977. 
The growing deficit in the balance of payments has had a 
seriously debilitating effect on the economy. Net foreign re-
serves fell from J$130 million in 1974 to minus J$196 million 
i n 1977 to place Jamaica on the verge of international bank-
ruptcy. A sharp, prolonged decline in export earnings combined 
with an inability to reduce imports sufficiently led to this 
state of affairs. Domestic inflation also accelerated during 
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this period, largely as a result of the growing public sector 
deficit and rising import prices. Annual inflation rates (using 
the Consumer Price Index as the measure} rose from 9 percent in 
1972 to 48 percent in 1978. 
"Stagflation" affected the financial sector. Government 
debt increased substantially as a proportion of commercial bank 
assets (from 11 percent in 1970 to 33 percent in 1977). Commercial 
banks increased their holdings of government securities because 
the decline in aggregate demand and credit ceilings reduced pri-
vate sector demand for bank credit, and because legal liquid 
assets reserve requirements were period i cally increased. Interest 
r.ates, ranging between two percent and 12 percent on bank de-
posits, and . seven percent and 12 percent on government securi-
ties during the past five years, did not keep pace with infla-
tion. Negative real rates of interest ranging between eight 
and 40 percent prevailed. Consequently, savers have subsidized 
borrowers. 
In summary, the Jamaican economy experienced a long eco-
nomic recession since 1972. Exports declined, balance of pay-
ments deficits grew, and inflation rose to unaccustomed levels 
contributing to a negative real rate of interest situation in 
which savings have b~en penalized and borrowing subsidized. 
The agricultural sector, however, has been the one principal 
area experiencing some degree of positive growth although scarce 
and imported agricultural inputs raised costs to farmers during 
this period. 
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The extent to which substantial credit flows contributed 
to the favorable Jamaican agricultural performance is a matter 
of some controversy. The main thrust of this analysis is that 
fundamental weaknesses were evident in the design and opera-
tion of the public sector credit programs. These weaknesses 
along with the general economic disequilibrium undermined the 
effectiveness and viability of rural credit programs in Jamaica. 
III. THE NATIONAL RURAL FINANCIAL MARKET SCENE 
A. Growth 
There have been five major formal sources of agricultural 
credit in Jamaica throughout the 1970s: the commercial banks; 
the Agricultural Credit Board; the Jamaica Development Bank; 
the Self-Supporting Farmers Development Programme; and the Crop 
Lien Programme. Commercial banks are the largest single source 
of credit to the agricultural sector. This credit is largely 
short-term and goes to medium sized and larger farmers with 
good credit ratings and limited risks. In more recent years 
the commercial bank network has extended loans to large govern-
ment agricultural cooperatives such as the sugar cooperatives 
which bought out the former large sugar estates that had been 
in private hands. 
The remaining agricultural credit sources are public sector 
institutions or programs. The oldest of these public institu-
tions is the Agricultural Credit Board created in 1960. This 
institution has two portfolios: one serving larger farmers 
I • 
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through direct loans: the other aimed at small farmers and 
channeled through the national network of small people's coop-
erative banks. Loans in both cases are largely short-term 
and seasonal and, in the case of the people's cooperative 
banks, includes small loans as well. 
The Jamaica Development Bank began making large, medium 
to long-term "development" loans to essentially medium to 
large farmers from 1969 onwards. The Small Farmer Development 
Programme was also established in 1969. I t makes medium to 
long-term loans to much smaller farmers than those serviced 
by the Jamaica Development Bank. Limitations on f arm acreage, 
gross sales and assets have created a clientele for the SSFDP 
that can best be characterized as medium sized farmers. 
Finally, there is the Crop Lien Programme created by the govern-
ment in 1977 and administered by the Ministry of Agriculture 
through their extension agents in conjunction with the people's 
cooperative banks which disburse these loans. Crop Lien loans 
are strictly small, short-term and seasonal, limited to domes-
tic foodstuff producers and focused on small farmers with 
little or no previous loan experience. 
Table 1 summarizes the growth of formal agricultural credit 
through these five major sources. Although loans outstanding in 
nominal terms grew almost seven-fold in eight years, this in-
crease was only two times in real terms, reflecting the inf la-
tionary erosion of the capital base for agricultural lending. 
The large rise in loans outstanding between 1974 and 1975 
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{Table 1) is partially due to a change in the Bank of Jamaica's 
cldssi Eic.1tion of agricultural loans reported by commercial 
banks in 1975. Some kinds of loans which had previously been 
r eported under distributed trades and other sectors were here-
a fter listed as agriculture. It is estimated that slightly less 
t han half of the net increase in loans outstanding from 1974 
t o 1975 were due to this change in classification (Graham, 
Bourne and Begashaw, 1978, Ch. IV). In 1978 . there was prac-
t ically no change in the amount of credit in nominal terms, and 
a pronounced contraction in real terms. 
B. Institutional Changes 
Table 2 permits an insight into the changing roles of the 
s everal institutions and programs comprising the agricultural 
c redit supply network during the 1970s. The sources are clas-
sified into the farm size categories that most typically re-
flect the majority of their portfolio. From this profile it 
can be seen that large farmers benefited handsomely from the 
agricultural credit initiatives in Jamaica during the 1970s. 
Commercial banks and the Jamaica Development Bank increased 
their relative portfolio substantially until 1977 while, at the 
o ther end of the spectrum, the small farmer oriented Agricul-
tural Credit Board Peoples Cooperative Bank program lost ground 
markedly. In 1977 and 1978 there was an improvement in the 
c redit status of small farmers. Two factors accounted for the 
l ater shift: first, the Crop Lien Programme was established 
and people's cooperative bank credit expanded; second, commercial 
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banks reduced their lending to agriculture. The Crop Lien 
Programme was the largest source of credit increase during that 
year, eclipsing the customarily dominant role of commercial 
banks within the total portfolio. No doubt the substantial 
erosion of the older small farmer credit line through the 
Agricultural Credit Board-PC network had caused sufficient 
concern and grievances that a new initiative and program was 
felt necessary to redress th i s imbalance. Unfortunately this 
initiative led to substantial problems of default. 
In addition to the large vs. small farmer profile depicted 
in Table 2, there is a foreign vs. domestic resource division 
that merits discussion. A large proportion of the loanable 
resources of the Jamaica Development Bank and the Self-Supporting 
Farmers Development Programme come from foreign sources (i.e. 
the World Bank ~nd Caribbean Development Bank in the former 
case and the Inter-American Development Bank in the latter 
case). Domestic sources are almost exclusively geared to short-
terrn seasonal loans (through commercial banks, the Ag r icultural 
Credit Board and Crop Lien Programme) while foreign resources 
are earmarked for medium to long-term developmental loans (the 
Jamaica Development Bank and the Self-Supporting Farme rs 
Development Programme). In 1970, the rural financial market 
expanded to include the new, internationally financed Jamaica 
Development Bank and the Self-Supporting Farmers Devel opment 
Programme. Whereas in 1969 they played no role whatsoever, 
these institutions were the most rapidly growing sources of 
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funding for agricultural credit between 1974 and 1978. The role 
o f in t ernational resources was crucial to the expansion of 
total credit supply during the 1970s, and more importantly, in-
dispensable towards lengthening the term structure to include 
developmental financing. However, growing problems of delin-
quency and declining foreign exchange earnings raise serious 
questions as to whether Jamaica will be able to secure new 
international financing for these activities or, for that 
matter, even service the current debt obligations incurred on 
past loans from the international agencies. 
c. Performance 
It is useful to assess the performance of the system as a 
whole. Column 2 of Table 3 underlines the fact that total 
credit has been rising substantially as a percent of gross do-
mestic product since the early 1970s. This reflects the grow-
ing rate of inflationary financing in the economy through sub-
stantial increases in the money supply. Agricultural credit 
per se slightly declined as a proportion of total credit 
{panel A, col. 1). However, from 1975 to 1977, it has been 
growing more rapidly than total credit. (For reasons cited 
earlier on pages 5 and 6, the only unambiguous trends are those 
from 1970 to 1974 and from 1975 to 1977.) The agricultural 
credit/agricultural GDP ratio {col. 3) increased from 32 to 
roughly 37 percent in the earlier subperiod and from 56 to 
63 percent between 1975 and 1977. This rising average ratio 
of agricultural credit to agricultural gross domestic product 
t , •• 
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implies an even higher marginal agricultural credit-agricultural 
GDP ratio. As a result of the credit slowdown (col. 1, Table 3), 
the average credit ratio decreased substantially in 1978. 
The ratio of agricultural credit to agricultural GDP has 
been rising in recent years because of the "deadwood syndrome." 
Many of the loans outstanding are deadwood, that is, in perma-
nent default on the one hand, and very likely permanently di-
verted to non-agricultural uses on the other hand. The high 
and rising credit/GDP ratio when combined with high and rising 
delinquency strongly suggest that farm loans are either not 
being applied to agricultural activities or, are being applied 
'inefficiently when compared to earlier years. Given the grow-
ing stagnation in the economy as a whole, it is possible that 
much of this credit may be leaking out of the economy as 
capital flight as well as into real estate, land and other in-
flationary hedges. This indicates the need for a refo r m of the 
credit strategies adopted in recent years. 
The final issue warranting discussion in this section is 
the "implicit subsidy'' built into the current credit programs. 
Panel B of Table 2 present estimates of the real rate of inter-
est for agricultural credit. The average interest rate charged 
for agricultural credit (from a low of three to seven percent 
in government programs to 13 to 14 percent in commerc i al banks) 
is clearly below the average rate of inflation (col. 2 vs. 
col. 1). The net result is a nega tive real rate of interest 
(col. 3) which in recent years has been rising dramatically. 
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Furthermore, if one multiplies the real rate of interest times 
t h~ agricultural credit/agricultural GDP ratio one can estimate 
t h e implicit credit subsidy as a percent of agricultural GDP. 
Column 5 shows that in 1978 this reached 9 percent, a high 
level by any standard. 
Thus, not only does credit appear to be increasingly used 
in an inappropriate (i.e. non-agricultural) or inefficient 
fashion, but also the beneficiaries or borrowers are enjoying 
a sizable subsidy. The social costs of this credit strategy 
could be substantial if, as indicated earlier, relatively 
large borrowers form an important part of the credit portfolio. 
This calls for a more detailed evaluation of the performance 
of the major institutions and programs comprising the national 
system of agricultural credit in Jamaica. The remainder of 
this paper, however, will concentrate on the small (and medium 
sized) farmer credit programs, their performance and their 
major problem areas. 
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IV. SMALL FARMER CREDIT PROGRAMS IN JAMAICA: 
PERFORMANCE AND PROBLEMS 
Prior to discussing each small farmer program separately, 
it is helpful to clarify the degree to which these programs have 
penetrated the small farmer scene in Jamaica. Separate field 
studies by a UWI-OSU research team suggest that this spread is 
still limited in many areas of the island. Based on a large 
sample of farmers in Northern St. Catherine that statistically 
represented close to 3,000 farmers, only 22 percent of the sur-
veyed farmers had any form of formal credit in the last five 
years. In a comparable region in Southern St. Elizabeth repre-
senting a farm population of 1,000 farmers, only 18 percent 
registered access to formal credit in the same period. These 
are predominantly small farmer regions and were chosen precisely 
to determine, among other things, the degree to which small 
farmer areas have been reached by formal credit. Between 75 
to 80 percent had never had access to formal loans in the last 
five years. The results show that this access is limited, even 
in the face of a large effort to reach these farmers with the 
Crop Lien Programme. 
Secondly, it is important to point out that many of these 
farmers, though excluded from the formal credit market, are 
still active in loaning and borrowing funds and in savings 
activity as well. In both these areas informal credit activity 
reached 65 percent of the total sample. Moreover, the total 
dollar amount of informal loans was considerably larger than 
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the total dollar amount of formal loans through all the loan 
9 r ograms (and commercial banks) recorded in the area. Savings 
acti v ity was also high with roughly 40 percent of the farmers 
in these two areas holding a formal savings instrument in the 
last year. Fi~ally, off-farm employment was widespread among 
these small farm households with almost one-half of the farmers 
surveyed being active in part-time off-farm work. More than 
one-third of the farmers stated that off-farm income was more 
important than farm income in total family income. Moreover, 
it is interesting to note that roughly 85 percent of the 
farmers engaged in off-farm employment also were involved in 
either formal or, more importantly, informal credit activity. 
Thus, in summary, small farm households in the Jamaican setting, 
although not widely reached by formal credit programs, have 
alternative means of generating liquidity, namely informal 
sources from friends and neighbors and, to an important extent, 
off-farm income from their off-farm employment. These . informal 
and off-farm income sources diminish (and access to formal 
sources increase) as farm size increases. The foregoing illus-
trates the way in which small farmers live and function within 
a setting in which their access to more formal lines of credit 
is limited. Furthermore, it would appear that these sources of 
liquidity are sufficient to generate a respectable level of 
savings, given the large number of farmers who either hold sav-
ings deposits or make loans to other farmers. With this as a 
background it is useful now to review the three major efforts 
to provide small farmer credit on the island. In so doing, 
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attention will be limited to the more important issues and 
problem areas in designing and administering these programs 
rather than getLi :ig involved in any extensive detail on their 
historical background or organizational structure. 
The ACB-PC Bank Network 
The People's Cooperative Bank network (numbering some 115 
small branches scattered throughout the island) dates back to 
the early 20th Century. From 1960 onwards the Agricultural 
Credit Board (ACB) has been the principal source of government 
funds allocated to these small banks. The loans allocated 
through this network are generally small in size (from several 
hundred up to 2 to 3 thousand dollars), largely for seasonal 
production loans. Local bank committees along with the PC 
Bank manage~ and, on occasion, a loan officer from the ACB 
review loan applications which are then processed through the 
central office of the ACB in Kingston. After review and approval 
in Kingston the loan funds are then granted from the ACB re-
volving fund and allocated out to the branch in question for 
disbursement to the farmers. Loans are granted at 6 percent 
interest to farmers with the branches expected to repay the ACB 
at a rate of 3 percent, thus leaving a margin of 3 percent to 
cover lending costs at the branch level. 
Several important features stand out in this loan program 
which can be summarized as follows: 
' . 
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1. These institutions do not engage in any savings mobili-
zation activity except for the relatively inconsequen-
tial "share" contributions (i.e. 2 dollars) required 
from the farmer. No savings deposit function exists. 
Thus, these farmers deposit their savings in branches 
of commercial banks (from whom they do not receive 
loans) while receiving loans from the PC Banks. 
2. As a result of no. 1 above, the PC Banks are used as 
"retail" outlets for centrally generated funds. Given 
the vissicitudes of government funds and budget con-
straints these funds are not a constant flow but rather 
vary markedly creating uncertainty at the field level 
about the reliability of future funds. 
3. The PC Banks have frequently been used as the retail 
arm for disaster relief as well as for the more normal 
revolving funds. Disaster relief has frequently been 
structured as loans, though farmers invariably consider 
them grants, thus complicating loan recovery and, in 
part, injecting a grants mentality for the normal 
portfolio as well. 
4. Local accounting and bookkeeping procedures at the 
branch level are frequently rudimentary, confusing 
and/or non-existent in many important respects. 
Questionable practices at the branch level have in-
duced the ACB to intervene and manage some branches 
with their own management for varying periods of time. 
• u 
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5. Examples of deficient reporting can be seen in not hav-
ing arrears records based on amounts due. Instead, 
arrears are merely recorded in aggregate absolute dollar 
amounts at the central office but not associated with 
a time profile of arrears on amounts due. At the 
branch level such a measure could alert bank managers 
to the problem areas and problem farmers in their loan 
portfolios. Other data useful for reference and easy 
to record would be loans made by enterprise or crop-
type and by loan size. Unfortunately many PC Bank 
managers and their assistants are not sufficiently 
trained to engage in any systematic documentation of 
loan information that can be used to monitor loan 
performance or help in the analysis of loan problems. 
This, in turn makes it difficult for the central office 
to prepare up to date annual reports with detailed 
loan performance data. 
6. Loan recovery is a perennial problem in all the PC 
loan portfolios. High arrears rates are common repre-
senting close to 40 percent of the loans outstanding 
in 1978. No ratios or rates are available on the 
amounts due. Loan recovery is compromised by the dif-
ficulty and expense involved in enforcing contracts 
and prosecuting delinquent borrowers in the courts. 
While some of the more astute and determined PC Bank 
managers diligently pursue this effort for some of 
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their most serious arrears cases, they frequently 
encounter difficulties in collecting. 
'I . The fixed interest rate of 6 percent on all loans is 
unrealistic and counter-productive in the face of 
rising inflation of 20 to 30 percent per year. The 
costs of administering loans rises with the general 
rise in prices yet loan recoveries are eroded through 
a decline in their real value. Farmers are enjoying 
a negative real rate of interest (i.e. a subsidy) 
while the PC Banks and the ACB are suffering from a 
growing cost squeeze which in turn demands further 
government subsidization. 
What emerges from this picture of the PC Bank network is a 
government subsidized loan program that would have little chance 
of survival if it had to depend on its own loan recoveries, 
particularly with the current low nominal rate of interest. 
This is an extensive network that the government has found 
convenient to use to disperse disaster funds in the past or to 
retail new funds such as the Crop Lien Programme. At no time 
was there ever a serious effort to prepare any of these insti-
tutions to mobilize savings locally and in part reverse the 
top-down centralized role of merely being a retail agent for 
government funds. 
In all fairness to the PC network and to some of the dili-
gent administrators in the ACB that try to manage the declining 
revolving fund within tight budgets, many PC Banks are still 
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generally well regarded in their communities. The loan committees 
are drawn from the local farm communities and, one can find cases 
where determined bank managers work tirelessly to protect their 
loan portfolios, lecturing the loan committees for more careful 
loan appraisals, badgering delinquent farmers to the point of 
prosecutions and carefully husbanding their loan recoveries by 
investing them in local savings deposits of commercial banks 
(rather than returning them to the Central ACB office). In do-
ing this they can have a local source of funds for relending 
without resorting to the uncertain ACB dispersals from Kingston. 
This latter tactic suggests that greater decentralization re-
warding local initiative and responsibility, combined with a 
local capacity for mobilizing savings and a more flex i ble in-
terest rate policy to cover lending costs might go a l ong way 
in helping some of the better managed PC Banks to mat u re into 
more complete and viable lending institutions that would be 
less dependent on outside subsidized support. 
The Self Supporting Farmers Development Programme (SSFDP) 
The SSFDP represented a major change in the approach to 
small to medium farmer credit delivery systems in Jamaica. 
This is your classic supervised credit program. Introduced 
through the ACB back in 1969 and then transferred to the Jamaican 
Development Bank (JOB) in 1974, the SSFDP gains its funds through 
low interest loans from the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB). 
The Jamaican government contributes budgetory suppor t to help 
-94-
cover the high overhead costs associated with the technical 
ass ist~nce component of the program. Loan rates to farmers are 
ctt 7 per ; ent while the IDB charges a 3 percent interest charge. 
Four features stand out in the design of this program: 
(1) medium to long-term investment loans geared to changing 
the production function (i.e. modernizing} on its clients farms; 
(2) a large technical assistance component is built into the 
loan to promote and then monitor this technical change; 
(3) thirteen regional off ices disbersed throughout the island 
act as the major points of loan monitoring and technical super-
vision; and (4) small to medium sized farmers from 5 to 25 
acres are the principal target group serviced by the program. 
These features stand out in contrast to the shorter term, 
seasonal loans that characterize the ACB-PC system. Also, the 
technical assistance component built into the loan contract was 
a new approach in the Jamaican small farmer setting. Whereas 
the ACB-PC Bank loan prog ram generally serviced existing farm 
technolog y and practices, the SSFDP was desig ned to introduce 
technical change and changed farm practices. As one would ex-
pect the average loan size was much larger in the SSFDP port-
folio than in the ACB- PC portfolio, ranging from roughly 4 to 
5,000 dollar loans up to 40 to 50,000 dollar loans. Finally, 
the average farm size was generally larger. Whereas, the ACB-PC 
system generally serviced farmers in the 3 to 10 acre range, 
the SSFDP was largely servicing a portfolio (in terms of the 
distribution of the value of its loan capital) from 10 to 25 acres. 
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The operational performance, successes and remaining prob-
lem areas are summarized below. Again it should be emphasized 
that the problem areas identified here are characteristic of 
most supervised credit programs and not limited to the Jamaican 
program alone. 
1. Field studies strongly suggest that the SSFDP has been 
successful in promoting new production technology and 
new enterprise types on their clientele farms. At the 
same time there has been an apparent increase in output 
and net worth of the farms serviced. The foregoing 
would suggest that there has been only limited credit 
diversion to non-agricultural uses, a common problem 
in non-supervised credit programs. 
2. The SSFDP has the lowest arrears rates of all the public 
sector credit programs on the island probably reaching 
15 to 20 percent for the amounts due. Of this amount 
a large part may be associated with the earlier farm 
customers from 1969 to 1974 when disbursement was too 
rapid and the loan appraisal and loan monitoring re-
sponsibilities were not as effective as in the post-
1974 period. Still it should be pointed out that the 
program still does not structure its accounting pro-
cedures in such a way as to be able to determine easily 
arrears on amounts due. It would be in the interest 
of the program to do this, not only to detect potential 
problem clients earlier in the life of the loan (and 
-96-
take corrective measures with the farmer) but also to 
clarify the degree to which the current aggregate 
arrears rates is primarily a result of the earlier 
non-JOB chosen farm clientele (as is commonly believed) 
and how much a result of the more recent farm clientele. 
3. With the exception of the above noted deficiency the 
data collection and accounting skills and efforts in 
the program are superior to those in other public 
sector programs. Information on the farmer is more 
extensively recorded and, one would assume, loan 
monitoring therefore more effective than in other pro-
grams. The two areas in which improvement is called 
for is in the collection and presentation of the arrears 
data (as noted in no. 2 above) and a redesign of the 
bookkeeping procedures to first determine the true 
lending costs incurred by the institution and, secondly, 
associate these costs with specific program functions 
(such as technical assistance; regional vs. central 
off ice activity, loan collection and recovery activity, 
etc ..•. ). I f data could be collected and recorded in 
this fashion, officials could engage in a more analy-
tical study o f the current and potential problem areas 
that need to be dealt with. 
4. The SSFDP illustrates the classic trade-off between 
relatively low arrears and high supervisory costs and 
high arrears and low or no supervisory costs. The SSFDP 
program falls into the former category while the other 
. . 
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public sector credit programs on the island {whether 
servicing large or small farmers) fall into the latter 
category. 
5. Item 4 above raises the question as to whether the 
broader social or economic benefits of supervisory and 
especially technical assistance (increased farm output 
at lower cost) outweigh or justify the high administra-
tive costs of offering this supervisory role. First be-
cause the program cannot "inter nalize" these benefits 
{i.e. it is society at large that rece i ves these bene-
fits of increased farm output at lower unit costs) does 
not mean they shouldn't incur t he higher initial ad-
ministrative costs to generate these benefits. Crucial 
here is a more detailed evalua t ion of the technical 
assistance role through independently contracted sur-
veys of the farm clientele to r esolve essentially two 
issues: {l) the degree to which technical assistance 
is relatively all that impor t ant in generating the 
recorded increases in output and changes in f arm prac-
tices; and (2) the degree to which the loan monitoring 
and loan recovery efforts are important in keeping down 
the arrears rates. 
6. Common to most supervised credit programs, the SSFDP 
is an incomelete financial institution in that it is 
entirely dependent on outside f unding and ha s not en-
gaged in ·any savings mobilizat i on activity. Given the 
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decline in outside funding and the increased uncertainty 
and variation of these sources, and, given the presumed 
success of the SSFDP farm clientele in increasing their 
income, a logical strategy to gain more self reliance 
and independent control of one's activities would be 
to broaden the mandate and role of the program to in-
clude the mobilization of savings from these farmers. 
This would lower the costs of receiving funds from out-
side, increase institutional viability and autonomy 
and draw the farmer into a closer and more complete 
identification with the institution. 
7. Consonant with any effort to make the SSFDP a more 
complete financial institution (as noted in item 6 
above) is the need to balance its asset or loan side 
with more short-term loans to service its farmer 
clientele. This would also allow it to offset and 
service the short-term savings deposit function dis-
cussed above as well as meet the legitimate farm need 
for working capital to use in conjunction with implemen-
tation of its investmen~ loan. 
8. The graduation syndrome is another important issue in 
supervised credit programs. To what extent should the 
SSFDP encourage its more established and secure cus-
tomers to leave their portfolio and try to "make it 
on their own" (i.e. through more loans from commercial 
banks while the program concentrates on incorporating 
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into their program new and risk i er farmers who may need 
more supervisory help? The "turnover" or graduation of 
farmers out of the SSFDP portfo l io has not been studied 
nor, I suspect, considered as an important function for 
the program. Given the time and effort invested in 
these more successful farmers, no institution will want 
to lose them since their overall performance record 
might suffer with higher arrears rates and a higher 
administrative cost load with the riskier and newer 
clientele. Finally to the extent that the SSFDP chooses 
to become a more complete and v i able lending institution 
(as discussed in items 6 and 7 above) it would want to 
keep these customers in its por t folio. 
9. Finally a more flexible interest rate policy is called 
for in this program as in the ACB-PC Bank program. 
Lending costs have increased wi t h inflation which would 
suggest that a higher rate is called for to re-establish 
the previous spread or margin in former years. At the 
same time the purchasing power of the loan portfolio 
gained through loan recoveries will dec l ine with . in-
flation if negative real rates of interest prevail for 
any period of time. Furthermore, to the extent that 
the SSFDP is concerned about gaining more autonomy, 
relying less on outside funding and possibly incorporat-
ing a savings mobilization role, realistic and flexible 
interest rates are necessary to protect the real value 
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of its portfolio which would now be more dependent on 
successful loan recoveries. 
In iummary, the role and performance of the SSFDP program 
i l lustrates many of the problems of public sector small farmer 
credit programs. In addition, its supervisory and technical 
assistance role creates a set of additional issues and potential 
problem areas that other public sector credit programs do not 
experience. The two most important issues noted above that need 
more informed discussion and analysis in the Jamaican setting 
are the degree to which the supervisory functions within the 
SSFDP are justified and, second, the degree to which this pro-
gram should transform itself into a more complete lending insti-
tution in order to better prepare itself for a future with less 
outside funding. 
The Crop Lien Programme 
The Crop Lien Programme, introduced in 1977, represents 
yet a third effort to create a small farmer credit delivery 
system in Jamaica, one that has turned out to be the most con-
troversial of the three. In contrast to the previous two pro-
grams, this effort was initiated and controlled in a non-
f inancial institution - the Ministry of Agriculture. The 
stated motive for this initiative was to service the short run 
seasonal credit needs of the Emergency Production Plan, a pro-
gram set up in 1977 to relieve the growing balance of payments 
constraint on the importation of foodstuffs. Thus the purpose 
• 4 
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was to promote domestic foodstuff production of vegetables, 
legumes and root crops to replace the import of cereal products. 
The Ministry felt the existing credit programs were too large 
farmer oriented; not directed towards the import-substitution 
of domestic foodstuffs and not reaching a sufficiently large 
number of small farmers. 
In 1977 roughly 10 million dollars were allocated to this 
effort, the largest single source of credit for agriculture 
during that year. By 1978, under growing criticism and budget-
ary constraints this was cut in half. Succeeding allocation 
in 1979 and 1980 have been less than 5 million dollars. The 
operational design, performance and growing controversies sur-
rounding this program can be summarized as follows: 
1. The program did reach a relatively large number of 
farmers during its first year, roughly 27,000 with 
loans ranging from as low as 200 to a high of 4,000 
dollars. This mislead Ministry officials into be-
lieving that this was responsibl e for the lar g e 
increase in domestic foodcrop output in 1977 and 1978. 
However, their own statistics show that many of these 
.farmers had extremely small acreages harvested. The 
increase in food output was much more a function of 
the output of the much larger number of farmers and 
acreage in foodstuffs not in the program and, even 
more importantly, a result of two years of unusually 
good rainfall following the droughts of 1974-76. 
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2. Wholesale delinquency was the single most visible and 
controversial performance indicator of the program. 
Less than 5 percent of the farmers repaid their 
seasonal production loans two years after its inception. 
3. Key operational features that led to the widespread 
delinquency were: 
a) far too rapid disbursement of funds 
b) perfunctory loan appraisals 
c) use of extension agents, who hitherto had never 
dealt with credit activity, to act as loan appraisers. 
d) no collection effort made with voluntary compliance 
expected. 
e) use of the ministry as loan source created image 
this was another subsidy program. 
f) no collatoral required 
g) farmers feeling that arrears would bring no 
effective sanctions. 
4. Farmers appear to be dissatisfied with this program 
and voice complaints about being forced to grow crops 
they otherwise would not have chosen to gain the first 
installment and their incurring fairly high transactions 
costs to attempt to gain second installments frequently 
without success. PC bank loans are invariably rated 
more favorably as a loan source by farmers surveyed 
in the Crop Lien portfolio. The PC bank loan program 
had a more established presence and role in the farmer 
I "' 
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communities, did not require specific crops to be 
grown, allowed a greater role for the farmer in 
influencing loan terms and issued their loans in time 
for effective use compared to the Crop Lien adminis-
tration. 
5. Several important negative externalties were incurred 
in the operation of the Crop Lien Program such as: 
a) compromising the performance of the PC banks 
portfolio since they were forced to retail the 
Crop Lien loans after the extension agents approval. 
This took PC staff away from the monitoring of their 
own loan portfolio and, at the same time, the 
"grants mentality" generated by the Crop Lien 
Program may have affected their own loan recoveries. 
b) extension agents were drawn off of their traditional 
functions to act as credit agents, a task they 
were ill-suited for, with a consequent morale 
problem emerging. 
c) the wholesale failure of loan recovery added to 
the government deficit exacerbating inflation and 
stabilization efforts. 
d) the recent transfer of the Crop Lien Program 
into the JDB may create greater problems for 
the SSFDP program to administer their own port-
folio while at the same time being forced to inherit 
a delinquency-ridden portfolio. 
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The Crop Lien Program could stand as a testament as to 
how not to design a credit program. Unfortunately the potential 
fo t d isaster was not foreseen in its initial design and adminis-
tratio n. It would appear that many of these lessons have still 
not been learned in that political pressure has persisted in 
an attempt to restructure and continue the program in some 
new format. 
The two greatest social costs incurred in persisting in this 
effort in a new guise is the potential damage this program could 
do to one of the more successfully run credit programs on 
the island (i.e. the SSFDP) and, secondly, the high opportunity 
cost incurred in not using the resources devoted to the Crop 
Lien effort to address directly many of the important bottle-
necks and problem areas affecting the economic rate of return 
to agricultural activity in Jamaica. Activities that come to 
mind here are a better financed research effort, an up-graded 
extension service and an improved marketing structure among others. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The performanc e hi s tory of the three smal l farme r credit 
programs illustrates the difficulties of attempting to reach the 
small farmer with formal lines of credit. Several lessons 
emerge from this e xperi e nce. First, within the given constraints 
of risk, political interference, interest rate policy and limited 
organization~! and administrative skills none o f these programs 
are viable in the s ense tha t they could maintain their current 
c redit portfolios in r eal terms and cover the i r cos ts with 
their loan recovery record. They all have to be heavily sub-
sidized. 
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Second it is clear that loan a : .sal procedures are 
rather perfunctory in two of the programs and very expensive 
in the third (i.e. SSFDP). At the same time loan monitoring 
and collection procedures are weak to non-existent in two 
and expensive in the third. Even if one accepts the premise 
that some element of subsidy is necessary and justified, it 
is clear that these programs should attempt to measure and 
consider the true lending costs they are incurring in t rying 
to service these farmers. Only through an effort that 
quantifies and clarifies the relative proportion of these 
costs (as a percent of the loans issued) as well as identifying 
the incidence of these costs by program or administrative 
function can the institutions or programs in question appre-
ciate the need for requiring a larger spread in their borrowing 
and lending rates of interest to protect themselves and/or 
economize on the more costly program elements. 
Third, high delinquency is one of the most costly elements 
affecting the viability of all three programs. Arrears measures 
based on amounts due rather than on credit outstanding is a 
crucial piece of information needed to prevent early-on the 
potential for the rapid deterioration of a program's portfolio. 
This argues for much more car~ful and intelligently designed 
data collection efforts than those typically associated with 
these programs. 
In addition to these more nmicro-oriented" administrative 
reforms within programs, there are important ''macro-oriented" 
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considerations that have been touched on in this review. 
Important here is the frequent but misleading idea that 
" s upply·- Jeading" credit programs can resolve the more deep 
~eat2d r eal economic problems lowering the economic rate of 
return to agricultural activity. Throwing more credit into 
the farm sector will do little to resolve the problems of 
low or declining productivity or the risks associated with 
farming. The budgetary allocations used to subsidize credit 
operations could very likely have a higher social rate of 
return to society if they could be redirected (or a good 
portion thereof) towards improved research on better seed 
varieties; discovering more efficient farming systems for 
small farmers; more secure and less risky marketing infrastruc-
ture, etc .•. The opportunity cost of short-changing these 
efforts in order to subsidize short-term credit needs (with all 
the credit diversions implicit here) is high. 
Furthermore, it is counterproductive to penalize agricul-
ture with overvalued exchange rates, subsidized food imports 
and price controls on foodstuff s and then attempt to offset 
this with subsidized credit. If the incentives are not in 
place to allow the farmer to use his credit productively, he 
will either experience a low rate of return and loan recovery, 
or he will divert this credit to non-agricultural uses. 
Two final elements of reform also require a change in the 
mind set typically operating in the credit field: a more flex-
ible interest rate policy and efforts at savings mobilization. 
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In the face of persistently higher inflation, a more flexible 
interest rate policy is required to cover lending costs and 
prevent the enormous rise in subsidy to farmers associated 
with negative real rates of interest. There is no way a program 
can maintain the real value of its portfolio if interest rates 
are fixed while inflation rises. Finally a greater effort 
should be made to restructure interest rates (and engage 
in other incentives) to encourage the domestic mobilization 
of savings. Surveys have shown that many more small farmers 
hold savings instruments than have credit. A program that 
encou~ages savings mobilization could have a more favorable 
impact on income distribution than subsidized credit, a nd 
at the same time, allow these institutions greater sel f -reliance 
and autonomy from government interference and dependenc e on 
uncertain foreign funding. This would require that the se 
institutions and programs would have to become more complete 
financial intermediaries (or at least some of them) and retool 
and train themselves for the future with a broader set of 
responsibilities than they have undertaken in the past. 
TABLE 1 
Total Loans Outstanding to Agriculture in Jamaica In 
Current and 1970 Dollars: 1970-1977 
Total Agricultural Loans Outstanding In Current Values 
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Monetary Statistics (Department of Statistics), 
various years; 
Annual Reports of the Jamaica Development Bank, 
Self-Supporting Farmers Development Program. 




Selected Data on Loan Activity by Farm Size 
and Source of Loans in Jamaica 
During the 1970s 
A. Percentage Distribution of Total Agricultural Loans 
Outstanding at End of Year by Farm Size Categories 
and Source for Selected Years in Jamaica 
Years 
1971 1974 1976 1977 1978 
Farm Size and Sources (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
% % % % % 
I. Large Farmers and 
Coo2eratives 45.8 60.8 77.4 72 .0 68.2 
(a) Commercial Banks 19.T ~ oo:""T 34:-4 1;8.1f 
(b) ACB-Direct Loans 
to Farmers 4.7 4.2 3.0 2.9 3.4 
(c) Jamaica Dev. Bank 2.0 12.4 14.2 14.7 16.0 
II. Medium-Sized Farmers 13.2 16.2 11.5 12. 7 14.9 
(a) Self-Supporting 
Farmer Development 
Program 13.2 16.2 11. 5 12. 7 14.9 
III. Small Farmers 40.9 22.9 11. 0 15.2 16.9 
(a) ACB--Peoples Coop. 
Banks Loans 40.9 22.9 11.0 9.5 9.9 
(b) Crop Lien Program 
(Min. Agric.) 5.7 7.0 
TOTAL (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
TOTAL (J$MN) 30.5 60.1 136. 7 165.8 167.8 
B. Percentage Distribution of the Annual Change in Loans 
Outstanding to Agriculture (from January 1st to 31st 
December) by Farm Size Categories and Sources for 
Selected Years in Jamaica 
Years 
1971 1974 1976 1977 1978 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
% i. % % % 
I. Large Farmers and 
CooEeratives 54.9 76.0 80.2 46.9 -221. 2 
(a) Commercial Banks "!o."O" '3T.7 41.'l. 7[f.4 -453. 1 (b) ACB-Direct Loans 
to farmers 8.3 2.5 2.3 2.4 46.9 (c) Jamaica Dev. Bank 10.6 36.3 30.7 17.1 185.6 
II. Medium-Sized Farmers 36. 7 17.2 16.8 18.2 159.5 
(a) Self-Supporting 
Farmer Development 
Program 36.7 17.2 16.8 18.2 159.5 
III. Small Farmers ~ 6.9 3.0 34.8 161. 5 (a) ACB-Peoples Coop. 
Bank Loans 9.2 6.9 3 . 0 2.9 38.9 
(b) Crop Lien Program 
(Min. Agric.) 31. 9 122.6 
TOTAL (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 





Credit Ratios and Implicit Credit Subsidy For 














































Estirnat~~ of Real Rate of Interest for Agricultural 
Credit and Implicit Credit Subsidy As Percent Of 
Agricultural GDP 
Ra te of Avg. No1ninal Real Rate Agr.Credit/ Credit 
Year Inf lat ion Interest Rate of Interest Agr.GDP Subsidy as 
Agr.i c.Loan s (Col.2-Col.l) % of Afric. 
GDP(l 
1975 15.7 10.0 - 5.7 55.8 
1976 8.2 10.0 + 1 .8 60 . l 
1977 14.0 10.0 - 4.0 62.6 
1978 27.9 10.0 - 17 .9 53 . 2 
Sour....:es: Statistical DirJest (Rank of Jamaica) , vario us years; 
Nat.lOn"afrncorricand Prcduct (Department of Statistics) I 
various yc:cirs. 
Notes f.::•:r P<-l!i•..:l (' : (1) SuLsjdy ....:s a , ;~n:ent of Ayric . GDP is 
(;::; t l.f!ta ted :::iy tak iri9 the i·ropcrti on of tc1tal 
,)Ut.'-:tc:H1di1;q u.'Jricul Lui.al credit cu tr_,tdl 
Li<jrlcul turu l CDP (c.;clurnn 4) and multi::1lying 
this by tht.: neqaL.vc ru.te of interest. 
(culun~n 3). For this exercise, ~he: 
CIHJropr late rneasurt.! of inflation i .s ti10 
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3rd Session: Rapporteur's Report and Discussion 
Issues Surrotmding the Design and Performance 
of Small Farmer Credit Programs: 
A Review of the Jamaican Experience 
Dr. Graham introduced his paper by first referring -to the 
recent economic decline in Jamaica which conditioned the 
overall performance of rural financial markets. He then 
outlined the growth of agricultural credit in real t erms and 
the changes in the percentage shares of the major credit 
sources over time. Attention was drawn to the high ratio 
of agricultural credit to agricultural gross domest i c product 
which implied substantial credit supply and possibly credit 
diversion and inefficient use of credit. Dr. Graham pointed 
out the substantial implicit interest rate subsidy i n dollar 
terms and in relation to agricultural GDP. 
Specifically on the small farmer credit programs, limited 
out-reach of these programs was noted, and attention directed 
to the high activity of small farmers in formal savings and 
in informal credit. The participation in formal savings, 
Dr. Graham argued, would indicate that reasonable rates of 
interest on savings are a better way of helping many farmers 
than cheap credit which only reaches a few. The significance 
of off-farm employment as a source of farm income was also 
highlighted, as were some of the ways of measuring effective 
loan demand, and the fact that borrower transaction costs were 
high and exceeded explicit interest charges on loans. 
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Dr. Graham then described and appraised the operations 
and performance of the ACB-PCB programs, the SSFDP, and 
the Crop Lien Program in terms of their loan volumes, loan 
recovery experience, loan appraisal and accounting procedures 
(especially arrears measures), interest rate policies, and 
their provision of technical services and credit supervision. 
His main conclusions are (1) that none of the programs are 
viable and all require heavy subsidies; (2) loan appraisal 
procedures are perfunctory in the ACB-PCB and the Crop Lien 
Programs and very expensive in the SSFDP program; (3) high 
delinquency is one of the most severe problems; (4) supply 
leading credit programs cannot resolve the more fundamental 
problem of uneconomic rates of return in agriculture; 
(5) there is a need for interest rate reform and for savi ngs 
mobilization by rural credit programs; (6) agricultural 
development banks should develop macroeconomic and agricultural 
sector indicators to further assist in the appraisal and 
monitoring of agricultural loans. 
The discussant, Mr. Headley Brown, while corrnnending 
the paper, raised some points for further discussion. He 
suggested that the number of feasible borrowers is smaller 
than the total number of farmers recorded by national censuses 
in which case the outreach of the credit programs is greater 
than Dr. Graham intimated. Also, adverse trends in agricul-
tural input and product prices set a limit to feasible interest 
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rate reforms. Mr. Brown questioned the extent of conunercial 
bank involvement in the financing of agricultural production. 
Another important issue raised was the feasibility of credit 
programs absorbing the high costs associated with extensive 
credit supervision and technical assistance. Mr. Brown 
suggested a third interpretation of the high agric: credit/ 
agric: GDP ratios, viz., that the credit volumes contained 
a large proportion of investment capital which should be 
related to several years GDP and not just one year's. The 
role of higglers vis-a-vis formal public sector marketing 
agencies and their link with loan recovery was also raised. 
Dr. Brown thought that given the limited produce dealings 
of public sector marketing enterprises, a crop lien system 
of loan recovery was not promising. 
Conunentators from the floor and Dr. Graham addressed 
several of the issues already raised. Among the more sub-
stantial additions made were the conunent that the alleged 
inconsistency between conunercial and developmental credit 
might be more imagined than real; that commercial banks do 
finance a substantial proportion of small farming indirectly 
through financing of producer associations who on-lend to 
their members through credit for land purchases, and through 
a new farm investment program. 
-116-
Further, the positive role of the higglers should be 
recognized and consideration given to utilizing them more 
fully in the credit and agricultural system. 
The desirability of structuring arrears data also by 
product type and length of the arrears period was recognized, 
as was the importance of suppliers credit in some Caribbean 
countries. The important role of the extension service 
was elaborated by several speakers. Weaknesses in the 
system of education, pecuniary incentives, and work environ-
ment were identified as reasons for the poor performance of 
extension services and for the failure of the extension 
agencies to retain staff. It was also suggested that greater 
emphasis should be given to strengthening the extension 
services as a means of improving the rate of return to 
agriculture even if this means less resources for farm credit. 
The efficiency of credit supervision in reducing loan 
delinquency occasioned some debate. One opposing view is 
that it does, while the other view is that other factors 
pertaining to the character of borrowers, and the quality of 
the credit service are more important determinants of repayment 
performance. 
Centralization of agricultural credit facilities was 
another issue raised. A few commentators felt that centrali-
zation generated cost economies, reduced loan delinquency, 
and enabled the use of credit as an instrument for technical 
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change. Against this, it was argued t hat experience in 
other countries showed that farmers regarded the emergence 
of credit monopolies as inhibiting. 
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GROUP LENDING EXPERIENCES IN 
REACHING SMALL FARMERS 
by 
B. M. Desai 
Visiting Professor 
November 1980 
Agricultural Finance Program 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology 
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2120 Fyffe Road 
Columbus , Ohio 43220 
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Group Lending Experiences in 
Reaching Small Farmers 
B . M. Desai * 
The rural poor in many low income countries (LICs) have 
received very little formal credit . To improve their share 
these countries have introduced one or more of such reforms as 
supervised credit programs , concessionary interest rates , 
special credit institutions , group lending , loan insurance , 
and credit reservation . This paper deals with the experiences 
of one of these reforms , namely group lending in the Dominican 
Republic , Ghana, Malawi , Bolivia , Philippines , Thailand , India , 
Nepal , Sri Lanka and Bangladesh . Based on the analysis of 
these experiences we attempt to show that t he potential inno -
vative1 nature of this reform is greatly constrained by the 
sirnultaneous pursuit of policies characterized by the conces-
sionary and inflexible interest rates , lack of balance in 
developing credit and other services, .and the inadequacies in 
t he perf o rmance evaluation norms for the bank staff . Before we 
present this analysis we briefly compare justification for and 
features of this reform with those of the cooperatives patterned 
after the Raiffeisen model. 
* Visiting Professor , Department of Agricultural Economics and 
Rural Sociology, Ohio State University , and Associate Pr ofessor 
·Jn leave from Indian Institu'i...e of Management , Ahmedabad , India . 
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Rationale and Features of Group 
Lending C>.r1d C1)operative Reforms 
Both tbe~;E reforms have been introduced to impr >V ( the 
rural poor ' s share in the formal credit . They have OE't-:; :1 ~ho ::-.t.: 11 
for both economic and non- economic reasons . But th• .. · 2 <-u·e 
some important differences in the emphasis attached to ~hes e 
factors . 
Coope1·at i ve reform , unlike the group lending , •• 3.S :t-- 1 omp t e el 
i': ·om a concPrn to organize a force to counter the u . 1J r · ·Ju.:; 
2 p. _ wer of the village moneylenders . Private cornrnerc i.o.l b3.nk~ 
M re not prs·ferred because they were also considere,_. :i .q ilL.: lt. 
a.id indirect. partners of the usurious rural credit rl\ L ,·c nrn en , . 
lJ: less an organization based on the village communi ·: '' 1· r•' . i -:: i-
p:ition was developed , it was believed the virtues o _._ ..: '. _,_ ' '-hel r , 
~ 1.rift , and mod c· rnized attitudes3 which are necess<.!.··y t-'' <le .=il 
1'.i ~th the local moneylenders could not be promoted . Tn i -: ·i (' 
' "' 
riot to suggest that the consideration of high costs a n· ! h Lt;h 
risks of rural f i nance operations did not motivate t h e: .: ou J.JC I'-
ai_ive movement . Indeed , the features of administra t.ior; u,-y 
h r:morary management and local part ic ipat ion , unlimi t ec: L l , l!J i l i t ~· 
of the members , and small and simple ope rat ions were t r Li •_' lµ 
r --·duce thesP costs and risks . 4 Another feature was th;,'~ t lie .; e 
cooperatives were to receive state partnership in b ·) ti1 ·ci .. d t;y -
capi tal and administrative leadership . 5 
Group lending unlike the cooperatives had its l~nediate 
origin in the collateral related difficulties6 experienced by 
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the exlsting formal agencies in the rural financial market (RFM) . 
Neithe r the clear and heritable land title nor the guarantee 
of the reputable third party nor the hypothecation of reason-
ably "assured" anticipated crops produced could be available 
from the rural poor . Under these conditions the rural poor ' s 
dependence on the informal credit agencies continued to persist . 
Even when these conventional collaterals were available they 
could not be used to foreclose the loan when necessary because 
of legal , political and economic difficulties in enforcing the 
contract . The joint liability principle of group lending was 
considered to act as a substitute for the conventional collateral . 
In some countries like Ghana , tangible collateral in the form 
of land or some other property was taken from one of the 
members of the group . Other members were required to sign a 
promissory note only . Peer pressure and collective responsibility 
were combined to reduce the default risks . 
Because of such reliance on local participation and un-
limited liability , this reform is sometimes considered a pre -
cooperative concept . It must , however , be recalled that some 
of these features were more clearly applicable to the early 
cooperative movement . In the later period large sized societies 
with their limited liability were organized mainly to improve 
their financial viability by enlarging the scale of operations . 7 
But the concern to reduce costs of rural finance operations 
through group lending was also strongl y shared . This was con-
sidered necessary to overcome perceived barriers to financial 
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intermediation between the rural poor and the formal lenders . 
This perception is based on three inherent features whir.h 
characterize economic activities of the rural households . 
These are small size , riskier enterprises , and the mismatch 
between cash inflows and outflows . Even rural households per -
ceived these as barriers to an entry in the formal market . 8 
Thus , what is not explicitly considered for this refo rm, unlikP 
the cooperatives , is the motive to create a force to counter 
t-~·e village moneylenders . Similarly, state particif'ation i.n 
e~uity capital was not considered , though this reform has al s< 
state assistance in the form of extension , input supplies , an~ 
more importantly concessionary refinance . 
Ji''..:nctions of Group Lending 
From the preceding it is clear that the immedia'~ e "unctions 
wr.ich group lending reform aims to accomrlish are : 
1 . Reduction in the lender transaction c o sts; 
2. Similar scale economies in the provision of' 
related technical assistance and other serv~ces 
which promote productive use of additional 
liquidity resulting from a credit transacti on ; 
3. Reduction in loan default risks on account or 
peer pressure and joint responsibility; and 
4. Reduction in the borrower transaction costs . 
Have these functions been realized, and what ma y exf>lain 
the r esult s of this experiment may now be examined . Before we 
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attempt this we must clarify t~a~ these questions cannot be 
unlformly examined for different countries . This is because 
in some of the countries group loans have been provided to 
those who did not have any access to formal credit . Though 
most studies have relied on informed judgements about the 
changes in lender costs , some have quantified both borr ower 
costs and loan delinquencies . Some studies did not selec t n on-
group individual borrowers as a "control " to compar e with the 
group sample . Some others though , selecting such a sample , 
did not test the differences between the two samples to attri-
bute differences in their results to factors other than the 
borrowing status . 9 Despite these differences , the results of 
the group lending experiment are remarkably consistent across 
the countries . 
Results of Group Lending 
When the above mentioned functions are satisfied , con-
ceptually, there should result an expansion in this program . 
This expansion could be measured by the growth in the number 
of group accounts , and also in the average loan amount trans -
acted . 10 It can also be evaluated by quantifying the changes 
in the flow of credit in favor of the rural poor . Measuring 
performance in this manner would require time - series data on 
the implementation of this reform . Most country studies have 
utiJ1zed cross-section data for a year or two . Consequently, 
these indicators cannot be used . Alternatively , the resul ts 
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could be evaluated by directly study i ng what has happened to 
each of the four functions . To this we now turn . 
Lender Costs : All the country studies except the India 
study report that the financial institutions aimed at r educin~ 
their costs through this reform . The study on India rEveals 
that the concerned bank did not pursue this aim , though it· 
11 does report the bank ' s experience in this regard . Al : these 
studies except Ghana and the Philippines report inconclusive 
r<:sults about these costs . The Ghana study reveals lower cost s 
f o r grou p loans , while the Philippines study reportf; hiv,her 
costs . However , the lender costs could be higher for group 
l c,ans in most countries if the costs of forming gro ups and 
providing other services are also added to the conventi onal 
transaction costs of lenders . The se other costs a re i n1 ariabl y 
bcrne by a~encies other than the lenders . For example, in th " 
Dc~inican Republic both these costs are borne by the re fi nanc-
ing agency : the Dominican Development Foundation . In o ther 
c0untries costs of providing technical services are borne by 
the government and the society at large . The only exception 
is India where these costs are shared by the lender and the 
government . But in most countries costs of forming groups are 
shared by the lenders , borrowers and the government . 
Lenders in the Dominican Republic , Bolivia, India and Lh~ 
Philippines have enjoyed scale economies in making g roup loans , 
though a similar advantage is not experienced in the collectton 
of these loans . But the Malawi lenders seem to have experienc e d 
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this advantage . It is, however , not known whether the same 
holds for costs in making group loans . Such partial gains may 
not be ehough to induce lenders to undertake other services . 
Ironically , however , the implied lender behavior of shifting 
costs to the -government/society/borrowers does not prove 
beneficial to the lenders . This is because when these non-
conventional lending costs are borne by others they cannot 
possibly promote corresponding gains by way of better loan 
recoveries and larger turnover of loanable funds. Instead of 
relying on others to form groups which are homogenous and 
similar to non- group borrowers , lenders themselves could do 
this by using the existing village organizations or traditional 
informal groups to reduce the costs by forming groups. Such 
responses are not found in most countries except perhaps in 
Nepal and Turkey . The implied myopic view of the lenders 
might have originated from the inappropriate interest rate 
policies . The discouraging influence of such policies gets 
compounded in an environment of high inflation rate, stagnant 
rural productivity , and agricultural input/output price dis -
tortions . 
Scale Economies in Other Services: Most lenders have not 
seriously attempted to reap this particular benefit of gro up 
loans . Whatever such loans which have been administered by 
them have not resulted in "organizational good 11 12 for non-
credit services including savings mobilization. Indeed , these 
loans have been provided to give an access to credit alone. 
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~he c~ly exceptions being Nepal and Malawi where the lenders re-
-1,uire.:J. in lieu uf down payments , a deposit of 5 to 1 0 percent of 
the value of' group loans as "security fund." These deposits 
carr!ed interest earnings for the group. They were also used 
to cover shortfalls in the repayment of group loans . It i s 
claimed that such additional "organizational good" derived by 
the group members in Malawi and Nepal have resulted in oetter 
1.-.an repayments , besides the group solidarity and sus tainance. 
H~wever , th~ se countr~ studies do not provide any dGta to judge 
t!1e costs of administering deposits in the manner just des-
~~ibed. Similarly , the country studies do not give any clue as 
t J t he co~ts advantages to other agencies which provld~ non-
f ~nancial services . In the absence of experiences i 11 p1 oviding 
these services by the lenders it is not pos s i ble to 8 s~ess the 
~(ed for compensatory gain , besides the individual pay - arr , to 
dc7elop an "organizational good . " The multi - functional. role13 
implied i n providing other services including savings deposit 
c~llection may not have developed in most countries tec ause of 
- l f . t . t . t th f. . 1 . . { t . : if c. clc o appi·opr ia - 1~ incen ives o e inanc1a 1nsti"u. i011s. 
Defaclt Risks. What is described so far about tr E: t. w'J 
functions Jf group lend i ng holds for this particular functio~ 
..J. . so . The l ower delinquency rate experienced in the i r.lt ial 
years in the Dominican Republic did not sustain in the :utur~ . 
Even in Nepal and Malawi , if group loans were not tie d with 
the deposit requirements, the delinquencies would be higher . 
Similarly , higher default rate of t he g roup s ample a s compare·i 
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loan i·eform can be perceived differer:.tly by different members. 
To a relatively well-off farmer , a group loan may be a reward 
for patronage , while to a poor farmer it could represent an 
independence. When groups consisting of such farmers are formed 
they may not zu~ceed. Even a comparatively homogeneous group 
is unlikely to sustain if its maximum size is not controlled17 
as is the case in most LICs and if its members do not receive 
compensatory pay-offs, besides individual gains , from the col-
lective responsibility. Providing such pay-offs to the group 
members may not be possible without undertaking a multi-func-
tional role including savings deposit collection. And, to 
repeat, such roles cannot be performed when lender incentives 
are lacking . 
Concluding Remarks 
High transaction costs and high default risks are considered 
to be the twin problems of reaching small farmers in the RFMs. 
Both cooperati11es and group lending reforms ha're been experi-
mented with by many LICs to overcome these problems, though 
the former was also introduced to counter the force of the 
village money lenders. 
By examining the experiences of group lending in some 
LICs this paper has shown that the potentiality of this reform 
in reducing the delinquency rates, lender costs and borrower 
cost s do not seem to have been consistently realized in these 
countries. Partial gains either to the borrowers or lenders 
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wruld not sustain tnis reform . Such results could l e attri -
buted to policies which overemphasize concessionary and i n -
flexible interest rates and underemphasize the provision o f 
financial services other than credit . Li~' ;:> the cooperatives, 
a~ain , group lending would not be able to improve the rural 
p0or ' s access to the formal segment of the financia l marke t , 
u1 tless this policy imbalance is corrected. 
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NOTES 
l . Financial innovation is conceptually defined as that reform 
which facilitates providing and/or acquiring financial ser-
vices at lower transaction costs. In practice, as will be 
seen in this paper, such innovations for a product like 
"financial services" is difficult to achieve. This is be-
cause this product being fungible, divisible and homogenous 
in nature it can be used to shift the cost to any agent 
including government or society involved in the intermedia-
tion process. 
2 . To quote from a study on cooperation in developing countries, 
"A primary motive for establishing cooperatives in develop-
ing countries is the desire to end the exploitation of 
large parts of both the rural and urban population by 
usurious moneylenders" (Engelmann, 1968 , p. 86). Also, 
see Hough , 1966; Catanach, 1970; Carroll, 1969; Flores, 
1969; and RBI, 1954. 
3 . To quote from a study on Asia, " ... the farmer is backward 
and hostile to innovation and that therefore he should be 
stimulated to change, through various means like cooperatives , 
... , " (Etienne, 1969). Also, see Engelmann, 1968 and 
Catanach , 1970. 
4. For example , see Schiller , 1967 and Belshaw, 1959 . 
~ . For example, see Hough, 1966 ; Engelmann , 1968; and Singh, 
1970 . 
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6. Such difficulties can be of two broad types. One is related 
to the very size of the collateral , and the oth~r is related 
to the qu~lity of the collateral . The former h~s typically 
prev2ntE::d term loan transactions, since size of farm owned 
by a farmer makes him eligible to borrow amount::; sn.aller 
than r e quired to pu1·chase the farm assets like a well, a 
diesel engine or an electric motor . In some countr.Le s , 
under these conditions , full term loans are provLd~d by 
pooling collateral from more than one farmer . ~~uch loans 
are , hc~ever , not treated as group loans for the purpose of 
this ~aper . 
7. See, for example , RBI , 1954 . 
8. For an extensive treatment of how these barriers retard 
financial intermediation in both informal and for-m11.l '.U·'Ms, 
see Desai , 1980(a) . 
9 . These observations suggest a need for studies wh i c h are 
based on a firmer ccnceptual and methodological ~r~nework . 
For some illustrations on this for cross - sectional a nalysis, 
see Adarr:s et al. , 1979 ; Adams et al. , 1980 ; Matienzo, 1978 ; 
and Desai , l980(b). 
10. Such a measure would follow from cost advantages to both the 
lenders and borrowers , assuming other things rema.;.n u1g the 
same . It is also :Lmplied when financial innovation ts 
treated in the sense of causing "net " shifts in both loan 
demand and supply schedules . See Desai 1980(b) for this , 
and see Smith , 1971 for defining financial innovation in 
terms of shifters in the appropriate function s. 
-134-
11 . This study being a pilot study was restricted to only one 
branch of one of the 14 nationalized commercial banks 
which have experimented with group lending. 
12 . "Organizational good " is defined as that good which is 
not available unless the potential beneficiaries organize 
themselves to procure it. 
13 The need to provide services other than credit arises from 
the fact that delivering credit in isolation of such other 
requirements as extension , marketing , depositing excess 
liquidity , etc. is self-defeating to the objective of im-
proving incomes of the rural poor . It is also needed to 
effect ively compete with the informal credit agencies which 
frequently embody these services in their credit contracts. 
This i s not to suggest that formal agencies should undertake 
all kinds of other services . Basically , they should empha-
r ize provision of commercial services. Making available 
credit and savings deposit services is fairly straight -
forward. But providing marketing services would require 
some innovations like promoting supply of working capital 
credit to one of the g roup members or a local merchant(s) 
who may also form a part of the group . Such dealer credit 
could be g iven not only to stock and purchase commodities 
but also to promote sales . 
14 . This could very well be the reason for the failure of credit 
cooperatives in becoming multi- purpose societies. 
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l~ . The ~epay~ent record for the Ghana rrogram is reported to 
ha~e improved in the subsequent years . This may pLrtly be 
bec~~se of combining tangible collateral and peer ~ressure. 
16. Sue~ procedure implied obtaining signatures of a ll 
memters on every loan application since they we re ~uarantor f 
for each other . It also additionally implied exec11ting 
doc~ments separately for all the me~hers at the ti~e of 
lea~ sanction . Even though the bank did not purs u~ the 
lower Jender cost advantage through group lendi-1~ , such 
a p~ocedure is not justifiable since it increa s·~~ h1rrower 
costs too . 
l 'r . This is necessary to accomplish better distribut i on of 
coffipensatory gains for a successful group actio~. SPe 
Ols ~ n, 1973 . 
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with the non-group sample in India was more because the former 
cultivated low productivity crops and had distant proximity to 
the bank . Repayment record of group loans in most countries 
was poor even though the reform required the non-delinquent 
members to repay the loan of the delinquent members . 15 In 
practice , most lenders found it difficult to enforce this re-
quirement . This may be because of lack of legal sanction to 
the joint liability principle. More importantly , it could be 
because of lack of other "organizat ional good" for the group 
members . In the absence of such good the lenders cannot exer-
cise any leverage to promote peer pressure as a substitute for 
the conventional collateral. Poor and delayed lender services 
have also lead to higher delinquencies in Bolivia , the Philip-
pines and the Dominican Republic . Without appropriate lender 
incentives , neither the multi-functional role nor the better 
quality and timely services can be achieved. 
Borrower Costs: Group borrowers enjoy cost advantages by 
saving fees for registering a collateral, formal and informal 
expenses to obtain the certificates needed with the loan appli-
cation and by saving transportation and time costs of visiting 
the lenders . In the Dominican Republic and Bolivia, members 
of groups informally collected money to cover expenses for 
leaders who negotiated the loan. In some other cases these 
costs were shared by members by rotating the group leadership. 
Most country studies except India and the Philippines 
report borrower costs to be lower for group loans . In the case 
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of Jndia , the higher costs to group borrowers were, ho wever , 
jue to differences in the distance and technology factors rather 
than the differences in the borrowing status of the t wo samples. 
~ ·~n these differences were accounted for, the borrowe r costs 
~f re lower for group 10ans than for individual mortga~e loans. 
~P~ ~.s cost advantage wonld have been still larger had the bank 
n L t required separate loan application from each merrll:.c::· of tlie: 
16 group . Eve~ the lender would benefit from such c han ge tn the 
J i. .1.n execution process, 
In the Philippines the borrower costs were higher because 
(~: ·Lene;thy ond comp lex loan procedures which necess_:__tatsd th . 
~roup borrowers to temporarily borrow from moneylenders at very 
h :gh interest rates . \mile these borrowers in the Domiric.::i.n 
.R.-:;~"lblic could benefit from the lower transaction c osts , tl eir 
g .. ins would have been significantly larger had they ~eceived 
l t_ 2ns in ti.me to avoid temporary borrowings from the 1nor,ey-
lel"lders . But the complex and lengthy loan procedures would 
rArsist despite financial cost disadvantages to the lenuers , 
a gain , because suitable incentives to the financial agencies 
a _c: lacking . 
Such loan procedures partly explains group members disil-
1usion with this reform . This perception would al so exist, 
despite lower borrower costs , when members are refused future 
loans because of delinquency by some other members or whe n 
members are forced to attend meetings without rece i ving compen -
satory gain besides the credit . Borrower gains from a group 
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4th Session: Rapporteur's Report and Discussion 
~roup Lending Experience ~ Reaching Small Farmers 
The author B.M. Desai, emphasized in his presentation 
the objectives of group lending: (1) to reduce default 
risk; and (2) to reduce administrative costs for borrowers, 
for lenders and for other institutions who might work with 
these groups. He concluded that the evidence from different 
countries on the success of group lending was quite varied. 
In some countries lender costs were actually increased by 
the procedures used, while in other countries costs were 
simply shifted from the lender to other institutions. 
Reductions in borrower costs were sometimes achieved through 
reducing fees on mortgages, but borrowers often complained 
of less adequate service in other respects. Default was 
generally not reduced by group lending, but the experience 
tended to be better when group lending was combined with 
group savings mobilization. In conclusion, the author empha-
sized that lenders shift costs to others because of perverse 
incentives resulting from the forms on concessionary lending 
and the lack of attention to other aspects of financial 
service by lenders. 
The first discussant, James Trehy, a technical expert 
from the European Association for Co-operation working with 
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the Guyana Co-operative Agricultural and Industrial Develop-
ment Bank, asked if this diversity of experience was relevant 
to the Caribbean nations. He also wanted to know what an 
ideal group lending system would be l i ke. He then emphasized 
some of the advantages of group lending: (1) reaching 
borrowers not otherwise reached; (2) reducing lender costs; 
(3) reducing borrower costs and (4) avoidance of the problem 
of lack of collateral. He also emphasized the importance 
and difficulty of forming groups in the group lending process. 
The second discussant, Audley Coulton of the Jamaican 
Agricultural Credit Board, emphasized some of the disadvan-
tages of group lending: (1) costs to lender are often higher; 
(2) joint liability is often unequal and recovery is difficult 
because of the uncertain legal status of groups; (3) internal 
conflicts may cause groups to disintegrate and (4) groups 
reduce self-reliance and may also reduce incentives to 
obtain proper title to land. 
In the general discussion, R.A.J. Roberts of F.A.O. 
asked if group lending was relevant to the Caribbean, given 
the direct personal contact of lenders with their clientele. 
Douglas Graham of Ohio State University asked if the Partners 
Groups in Jamaica could be the basis of informal groups to be 
used by formal lenders. Ian Whittaker of the Jamaican 
Development Bank argued that they could not because there was 
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not a significant element of trust and co-operation. Headley 
Brown of the Jamaican Development Bank agreed with Mr. Whittaker 
and added that there had not been much favourable experience 
with co-operatives or groups in the Caribbean. 
John Yates of the Guyana Co-operative Agricultural and 
Industrial Development Bank said that group lending was 
often an institutional requirement forced on to the borrower. 
He said that his Bank is working on such programs ·using 
credit to bring farmers together into viable groups. He 
thought that it was particularly necessary for rice producers 
because of machinery costs, but added that there could be 
problems with groups if one individual becomes too dominant. 
Calvin De Grasse of the Development and Finance Corpor-
ation of St. Kitts thought that Caribbean nations had already 
passed the level of development where group lending would be 
useful and that banks were reasonably accessible to borrowers 
on an individual basis. He thought it was most important to 
carefully identify the target population and supply what 
they need without moulding them into a group. 
Ronald Baynes of Barclays Bank in Barbados, however, 
thought it might be better to allocate scarce resources to 
groups rather than individuals. 
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Dario B. Baez of the Agricultural Bank of the Domi nican 
Republic said that conditions in the Dominican Republic were 
quite favourable for group lending. Small farmers a r e eager 
to form groups for a variety of activities and services, and 
approximately 30 percent of credit to farmers goes through 
groups. 
B.M. Desai, the author of the paper, added some final 
comments. He mentioned the importance of the savings 
mobilization aspects of group lending and that implementation 
cannot be overlooked. He thought that lenders could devise 
ways to deal with the vague legal status of groups i n co l lecting 
loans. He also mentioned the importance and di fficulty 
of forming groups and the fact that cen tres to rent machinery 
services could be more attractive than group lending to deal 
with large investments. 
In conclusion, he emphasized the basic issue of seeking 
a way to deal with making credit available to potenti al 
borrowers who are high risks and costly to serve. That is 
more important than the pros and cons of group lendi ng per-se. 
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ISSUES OF EXTERNAL FUNDING AND THE VIABILITY 
OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS* 
Governments of many less developed countries have established 
rural financial agencies as important instruments for rapid agricultural 
development. This paper examines some "funding problems" experienced 
by these rural development banks. It is argued that the credit 
operations and long run viability of rural development banks are affected 
by the sources of loanable funds. The basic funding problem confronting 
these institutions is to secure that volume and composition of loanable 
funds consistent with efficient credit operations and sustained growth 
of the financial institutions. 
The rural finance literature, surveyed by Adams (1977), Lele 
(1974), and Lipton (1976), has devoted a great deal of attention to 
problems of credit disbursement, pricing and loan recovery. A consensus 
has emerged that distributional equity is not achieved by concessionally 
priced credit programs, that allocative inefficiencies result from 
interest rate subsidies, and that the financial viability of credit 
institutions is undermined by low nominal loan rates of interest, high 
lending costs, and by high rates of default, particularly among large 
farm borrowers. These conclusions have been derived from analyses of 
the assets of credit institutions. 
* This paper draws heavily on my paper, "Funding Viability of Rural 
Development Banks" co-authored with Douglas H. Graham, and on my 
study of Public Development Financial Enterprises: A Case Study of 
the Jamaica Development Bank. 
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It is doubtful, however, that the performance of rural credit 
institutions and their viability can be divorced from considerations 
of their funding. The study of the liabilities or the inflows can 
improve our understanding of the credit operations of rural development 
banks, as well as identify additional factors germane to the sustained 
growth of rural financial markets. Such an analysis is the subject 
matter of this paper which is divided into five sections. The first 
section describes the main sources of funding, while the second and 
third sections examine the short term implications of external funding. 
The fourth section deals with the effect of institutional malperformance 
on future public external funding. The fifth section examines three 
ways of optimizing funding arrangements. 
Empirical reference is made to the Jamaican Development Bank, a 
governmental credit institution established in 1969, largely at the 
initiative of the World Bank, for the purpose of extending development 
loans. Since development banks in other Commonwealth Caribbean countries 
have similar origins, funding patterns and operational features, more 
than a few of the conclusions derived here have wider applicability. 
Conventional Sources of Funds: The JDB Case 
Public sector rural development banks conventionally have two 
major sources of funds, namely foreign funds and dornesti.c budgetary 
contributions. Foreign funds are occasionally grants, but more 
usually loans by foreign governments and by multilateral agencies. 
The governments of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and 
West Germany have made important contributions to the financing of 
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agricultural development through the medium of rural development banks 
in low income countries. Multilateral development agencies, particularly 
the World Bank, and regional development banks such as the Inter-
American Development Bank have made sizeable loans to public and private 
development finance institutions serving rural communities in developing 
countries. 
Table 1 describes the composition of the total annual inflows of 
financial resources into the Jamaica Development Bank from 1970 to 1977. 
Foreign sources accounted for 24 percent of these flows. Three external 
agencies accounted for the bulk of these foreign funds. The Inter-
American Development Bank was the major single foreign source providing 
some 40 percent of foreign financial resources, followed by the World 
Bank with 25 percent, and the Caribbean Development Bank with 20 percent. 
Jamaica Government loans and capital subscriptions accounted for 
52 percent of total inflows. From 1974 onwards, most of these financial 
transfers were in the form of equity. Loans from local banks accounted 
for only six percent of total resource inflows. Repayments of loans by 
Jamaica Development Bank borrowers accounted for as little as four 
percent. It is evident, therefore, that for the period as a whole, 
external agencies and the Jamaican Government were the main sources from 
which the Jamaica Development Bank received its funds and that repayment 
inflows have been insignificant. The percentage contributions of the 
individual sources of financing varied over time. For all years, 
however, Jamaican Government contributions and foreign receipts were 






Major Sources of Funds for the Jamaica 










Local Conunercial Banks 11.1 6.0 
Repayments 6.6 3.6 
Miscellaneous* 19.9 10.8 
TOTAL 184.1 100.0 
Source: Compiled from sources and uses tables and balance sheet 
statements in annual reports of the Jamaica Development 
Bank. 
*NOTE: Decrease in bank balances and cash balances comprised 
19 percent in 1972 and 26 percent in 1973. Decreases in 
investment in subsidiaries comprised 16 percent in 1974. 
These sources account for the large percentage share of 
"miscellaneous" over the period. 
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Similarly detailed information is not available for the agricultural 
sector portfolio specifically. However, the data obtained from the 
Bank's Annual Reports reveal that foreign funds comprised between 
35 percent and 67 percent of the total agricultural loan portfoli o. 
The World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the 
Caribbean Development Bank have supported the agricultural loan 
portfolio. 
Implications of External Funding for Lender Behaviour 
The sources and terms of obtaining financial resources can have 
a strong influence on credit policies and operational efficiency of 
banks. Donors (and local governments for that matter) often try to 
influence the behaviour of credit institutions in ways that can affect 
their viability. Funds obtained from foreign private financial 
institutions can also have behavioral implications for rural banks. 
One important restriction by external donors is the 
specification of target groups and enterprises to be serviced by the 
banks. External funding agencies, while not generally stipulating the 
size and wealth characteristics of eligible farms, usually recommend 
types of enterprises that should receive favourable treatment. This 
kind of recommendation stems from their views about the catalytic 
roles of particular types of agricultural activity and about the 
suitability of these activities as instruments for technological 
progress, improved nutritional levels, and expanded rural employment. 
The rural credit agencies and their governments, generally incorporate 
these recommendations in their loan programs . This may be due to the 
fact that they share the developmental philosophy of donors or know 
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they can circumvent the restrictions, and for other reasons such as their 
own limited knowledge and experience in agricultu·ral development and 
financial planning, their anxiety to obtain funding, and their perception 
of little negotiating space. The identification of target groups , 
emphasizing the adoption of modern technology, frequently results in 
loan portfolios biased towards labor-displacing imported capital goods, 
and towards larger farmers. These biases negate the employment and 
equity objectives articulated by both local governments and donors . 
Following President McNamara's address to the Annual Meeting of 
the World Bank in Nairobi in 1973, official funding sources have sought 
to directly tackle the equity problem by devising small farm credit 
programs and preferential schemes. Potential political gains from 
small farm programs give governments another reason for promoting these 
types of programs. In practice, concessionary interest rate policies 
combined with the high unit costs of small farmer loan programs cause 
development banks to favour large farmers. Socio-political realities 
of rural conml.unities and bureaucratic inertia frequently reinforce 
this tendency (Lipton, Blair). However, the main point is that t he 
banks may be influenced by their funding agencies into servicing 
particular target groups which may not match their own loan management 
capabilities. 
Another type of restriction concerns short period product i on 
loans. It has not been unusual for external donors to prohibit t he 
financing of working capital requirements out of project funds. For 
instance, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank 
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contracts with the Jamaica Development Bank contain such provisions. 
Underlying this kind of stipulation may be the belief that investment 
capital ' requirements should be accorded priority, that the private 
financial system can or should satisfy demands for working capi tal loans, 
or that the credit agency should fund its working capital loans from 
other sources. There are signs that the position of external creditors 
on working capital loans has become less rigid, as the following 
excerpt makes clear: 
"In the initial stages of the transition to a more 
productive agriculture, access to short-term credit 
for purchasing fertilizer, improved seeds, pesticides, 
etc., is often of greater importance for small farmers 
than long-term credit. Accordingly, in the credit 
programs for small farmers, emphasis will be placed 
on short-term seasonal credit in the context of overall 
on-farm development planning. World Bank lending 
could provide a permanent working capital fund for 
this purpose which is rolled over and re-used from 
year to year. As the Bank loan or IDA credit is 
repaid, domestic sources of credit and capital can 
gradually replace external funds." 
(World Bank, p. 19). 
Following upon Adam's work (1971), the influence of external 
donors on interest rate policies has been more widely recognized. 
Recent events in Jamaica give support to findings in other count ries. 
Foreign agencies provide funds at concessionary rates of interest and 
require the Jamaica Development Bank to onlend at concessional nominal 
loan rates which in real terms are either subst antially negative, or 
close to zero when positive. Concessionary int erest rate polici es 
result in high loan administration costs and a bias towards large 
farmers. This worsens income distribution and urlderrnines institutional 
viability. There is no doubt that external donors are aware of the 
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limitations of concessionary rates of interest for the financial sector, 
the rural economy, and for general economic development. The World 
Bank (:975, pp. 12-13) has discussed factors such as resource 
misallocation, wealth gains by larger farmers, losses incurred by 
lenders, and political corruption and abuse. At the same time, local 
governments perceive certain advantages in concessionary loan rates, 
using them to partially correct for the adverse terms of trade between 
agriculture and the rest of the economy, as hidden subsidies, and as 
convenient means of political patronage and manipulation. Consequently, 
while piecemeal and gradual interest rate reform is occurring in a few 
countries, progress towards interest rate policies that reflect the 
scarcity value of capital and the costs of funds tends to be slow. 
Rest r ictions on lender behaviour are also associated with the 
foreign currency debts incurred by rural banks in their acquisition 
of foreign funds for onlending locally. The banks are usually required 
to repay their foreign debts in the currencies in which the debts 
are denominated. Since devaluation of the local currency will 
automatically increase the local currency value of debts denominated 
in foreign currency, foreign exchange risks are associated with t he 
foreign currency debts of rural banks. Local governments sometimes 
assume these foreign exchange risks. However, it is not uncommon for 
external donors to stipulate that the sub-borrowers (i.e., rural bank 
customers) bear the foreign exchange costs associated with their loans, 
i.e., incur the additional local currency costs growing out of any 
future devaluations. 
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A few other short run aspects of the type of funding arrangements 
described in the previous section also merit discussion. To the extent 
that commercial credits to rural banks tend to be of short maturi ties, 
rural development banks may be predisposed to lend for qui ck ges t ation 
projects. The fact that this tendency counterbalances the bias towards 
long term loans created by external funds emphasizes the importance of 
harmonizing the sources and uses of funds and the desired loan operations 
of rural banks. 
Further, unless there is a large rollover or debt reschedul ing, the 
short maturities of their debt places considerable demands on annual 
inflows of new funds. Debt service and amortization consume large 
proportions of new resources thereby reducing that which is available 
for new lending to farmers. Between 1971 and 1977, total debt service 
and amortization payments by the Jamaica Development Bank averaged 
20 percent of its annual available resources. 
Another aspect of external funding pertains to the negative 
influence of a too rapid disbursement of funds on the quality of the 
loan portfolio. Both local governments and foreign agencies inj ect large 
amounts of financial resources into rural banks in the early stages of their 
operations, usually before well-functioning loan appraisal and monitoring 
systems are organized and staffed. Rapid growth of loan approvals and 
disbursements seriously burden these weak loan management systems and 
result in poor loan quality and high arrears ratios. These problems are 
compounded when funding agencies measure the performance of rura l banks 
by the growth of their loan disbursements. Frequently, this is the only 
performance measure used in the early years when few loans fall due and 
-154-
incipient arrears problems go undetected. In these circumstances, the 
banks themselves may yield to the pressure to approve and disburse as 
many 102ns as possible, sacrificing efficiency and loan quality in the 
process. 
Implications for Loan Portfolio Performance 
I have argued that external funding agencies influence the credit 
operations of rural banks. By so doing, they contribute t o the loan 
repayment problems experienced by these banks. The analysis of the 
latter proposition will center on the possible implications of lender 
preferences for particular enterprises and inputs, the non-provision of 
working capital loans, and the policy on foreign exchange costs. 
Debt financed expansion of farm enterprises increases the borrower's 
financial risks. Furthermore, farm liquidity is reduced by the act of 
borrowing itself. Some degree of self-financing is generally associated 
with debt-financed capital formation. Counterpart requirements imposed 
by lenders usually ensure that some of the farmer's own resources 
complement loan funds. In this way, some or all of the farmer's actual 
liquidity might be absorbed. Also, depending on the degree to which farm 
enterprises utilize their existing assets as loan collateral, there is a 
corresponding reduction of unutilized borrowing capacity or potential 
liquidity. The seriousness of the loss of potential liquidity is of course 
moderated by the degree to which farm enterprises can obtain unsecured 
credit. They often manage to do so but only in small amounts and at high 
cost from the informal rural credit markets. Paradoxically, liquidity is 
often scarcest during the period of greater financial risk when more 
liquidity is needed. 
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Farmers traditionally attempt to reduce f i nancial risk by 
diversifying their output in order to stabilize gross income flows. The 
scope for stabilizing net income flows is greater to the degree t hat input 
use is sufficiently flexible to permit downward adjustment w~en warranted 
by product demand conditions and relative facto r prices. Lender 
restrictions and preferences reduce the scope for these forms of risk 
minimization. 
Lender preferences for particular types of enterprises will usually 
alter the optimal product mix of farm debtors (Hopkins, Barry, Baker, 
Ch. 8), by altering the effect i ve rates of return on output. The possible 
outcome of stipulations concerning specific product types and pure stand 
cultivation is a lower level of product divers i fication, particularly 
with respect to those short-term cash crops whi ch would not only 
create a greater degree of flexibility in product choice, but would 
also help to boost farm incomes in the early stages of the longer 
gestation projects which rural banks prefer. The technological bias 
implies that farmers adopting the lender-preferred techni que of production 
might be locked into a situation where reductions in the utilization of 
capital goods cannot be efficiently made, and i n which there is limited 
scope for substituting a cheaper factor, e.g., family labour, for more 
expensive capital services. Consequently there may be an increase in 
their vulnerability to falling product prices and to rising cost s of 
capital services (especially important under conditions of exchange rate 
depreciation). Any pressure on net farm income might well put pressure on 
debt-servicing capacity and result in loan delinquency. 
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A farm enterprise can attempt to moderate temporary debt service 
difficulties by reducing its average propensity to consume, or more likely 
by a tt2mpting to obtain short-term credit. However, as we have argued 
ea r l i er, rural development banks are not usually a source of short-term 
credit. Nor are such resources readily forthcoming from connnercial 
banks that are the predominant mobilizers of local financial savings and 
the principal short-term lenders. Commercial banks in lesser developed 
countries employ quite restrictive credit criteria and portfolio 
preferences. These exclude most potential agricultural borrowers. 
Selective loan guarantee and rediscount schemes have not been successful 
in encouraging a greater volume of commercial bank credit to agriculture, 
since attempts to collect on defaulted or delinquent loans that are guaranteed 
involve expensive and time consuming legal procedures. A case can be 
made, therefore, for rural development banks to directly provide production 
loans. Where external funding agencies preclude the use of their project 
funds for working capital loans, the rural banks can nonetheless attempt 
to fill this credit gap by mobilizing local resources either by borrowing 
from the private financial sector or by directly providing a deposit 
service. 
We turn now to the implications of the policy on foreign exchange 
costs. This centers around the question of who should bear the risk and the 
additional unpredictable rise in loan costs associated with fixed foreign 
currency obligations when there is a devaluation of the local currency. 
Raghavan (1980) has suggested several broad guidelines for allocating 
foreign exchange risk. He argues that the borrowing enterprise should be 
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required to bear the risk if it derives a scarcity value from imported 
producer goods or if interest rates are concessionary. However, s ince the 
foreign exchange proceeds of the loans confer a social benefit by adding 
to the import capacity of the economy as a whole, the foreign exchange 
cost should not be entirely allocated to the borrowing enterprise . 
Essentially, these costs if borne by the farmer can be incor porated 
into the interest rate variable. An increase in foreign exchange costs 
reduces farm capital growth by reducing the net rate of return. The 
foreign exchange costs implied by the stipulations on exchange risk are 
uncertain in nature but do assume serious proport ions in countries 
experiencing large and repetitive exchange rate devaluations. These costs 
are not easily absorbed by farmers under conditions of weak produc t markets. 
Donor agencies have argued that with devaluation-induced i ncreases 
in domestic farm product prices and with improved international price 
competitiveness, domestic sub-borrowers should be net gainers from 
repetitive devaluations and should therefore experience no great difficulty 
in repaying loans with the added devaluation costs. However, devaluation-
induced increases in factor costs and the continuing price control policies 
for farm products erode these potential gains. As a resul t, the conditions 
assumed to be operative by donors are not readily satisfied at l east in 
the short run. Severe debt repayment problems are more likely t o result 
because of the abruptness of the exchange rate adjustment which r aises 
debt costs immediately whereas the income affects of attempts to phase out 
price controls takes much longer. Some reconsideration of this policy seems 
warranted. It seems reasonable to assume that the rural banks, by virtue 
of the larger scale of their operations and by the adoption of l oan 
pri~ing policies which include a small premium for exchange risk, can 
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better hedge against foreign exchange risks associated with foreign currency 
debt. It can also be argued that since exchange devaluation is the outcome 
of g1:-ner:1lised economic disequilibria and is not attributable specifically 
to rural borrowers, that society as a whole should bear the costs. In 
such a case, government should accept the foreign exchange risks. 
Another consequence of the foreign exchange stipulation under conditions 
of currency depreciation is an increase in the rural bank's risk exposure. 
The upward readjustment of the current local currency value of a loan is 
unaccompanied by a similar revision of pledged collateral. This implies 
that the existing collateral covers a smaller proportion of current loan 
value than the bank regards as prudent. In effect, the banks' risk exposure 
increases. 
Feedback Effects on Public External Funding 
Paradoxically, the financial problems which ensue from donor influences 
on rural banking might create problems of future external funding. The 
flow of funds from the donors might decline in response to one or more 
factors. Funding agencies as a matter of policy may wish to prevent 
continued reliance on their resources. More importantly, the arrears 
problem, typically disguised in the earlier years by extensive grace 
periods, becomes clearer as more loans fall due. This may result in the 
suspension of disbursements on existing loan contracts and a refusal to 
replenish resources by new contracts unless institutional reforms occur. 
The prospects for reform, of course, are conditional upon debt recovery and, 
at the same time, by the overall economic environment affecting the 
prospects for economic recovery, the restructuring of interest rates and 
the political. environment influencing the prospects for foreclosures on 
collateral. Another possibility is that drastic shifts in the economic 
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position of governments of developing countries may induce a slowi ng down 
of disbursements and other financial sanctions by the donor agencies. In 
practice it is the first two which seem to be responsible for the decline 
in foreign resource flows to rural development banks in less developed 
countries. 
Possible Means of Resolving Funding Problems 
It has been contended that public external funding may seriously 
constrain the allocative and operational efficiency of rural development 
banks. One solution to this problem is to attempt to alter the operational 
criteria and loan preferences of the funding agencies themselves. Another 
solution is to develop new sources of funding that are not subject to the 
same limitations. The latter solution is analyzed in this section. Three 
methods of developing new sources of funds are examined, namely, deposits, 
bond issues, and earmarked taxes. 
Public sector development banks do not usually accept depos its from 
the public. Nonetheless, there are potentially important gains t o be 
derived from providing deposit facilities. The provision of thes e 
facilities removes a peculiar constricting feature of this type of 
financial institution, namely, that their credit operations and debt 
repayments do not themselves provide a steady return flow of funds to 
the banks as deposits. This is quite unlike the case of deposit-taking 
institutions, e.g., commercial banks, where expended credit balances and 
deposit withdrawals return partiall y at least to the financial i nstitutions 
in the form of new deposits thereby ensuring no full and permanent l eakage 
of loanable resources from the financial institutions . For rural 
development banks, which do not have deposit facilities, the leakage is both 
-160-
full and permanent. Furthermore, deposits constitute a more general and 
diversified source of loanable funds. There is accordingly a greater degree 
of free<lom from portfolio restrictions and control by funding entities. 
Add i tionally, the fact that the continued ability of a bank to attract 
deposits depends on potential depositors' confidence in the banks' 
financial management forces greater adherence to financial discipline. 
This can result in more efficient loan appraisal and more effective loan 
collections. Finally, where loan customers are also depositors, rural 
development banks have a potentially greater informational basis for 
monitoring the financial performance of their debtors. 
In retrospect, it would appear more promising to incorporate a 
development bank portfolio within a well established commercial banking 
institution rather than the other way around. This would ensure financial 
discipline and effective monitoring of the portfolio from the very 
beginning. This latter point illustrates one of the most promising 
opportunities lost by donors and LDC's in the 1970s, namely, the 
incorporation of a small but viable and slowly growing long run development 
portfolio within a nationalized commercial banking network. Instead, 
donors and LDCs moved headlong into promoting separate limited service 
development banks which were ill-prepared to design, evaluate, disburse and 
monitor their loan portfolio with the insight, discipline and caution that 
a well trained and experienced commercial banking staff could have 
brought to the task. 
Local and foreign bond issues are another mechanism for raising 
resources. Some external funding agencies such as the World Bank 
certainly see this option as a preferred one for national and regional 
development banks attempting to reduce their reliance on multilateral 
concessional funding. Both means of financing impose some degree of market 
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discipline on rural banks. The difficulties of international bond issues 
are well known. They include: (1) legal and other institutional barriers 
to entry into developed countries' capital markets; (2) the inability of 
lesser developed countries to satisfy the informational requirements 
for bond placements; (3) quantitative limits on foreign country issues in 
the domestic capital markets of the developed countries; and (4) discriminatory 
taxation of interest income derived for foreign bondholdings. Efforts at 
improving developing countries' access to capital markets in developed 
countries are currently being made at the international level (Development 
Committee, 1978). At the present time, however, one cannot hold out much 
hope for substantial foreign bond financing of national development 
banks. 
Domestic bond issues are also subject to difficulties, low levels of 
private wealth, rudimentary capital markets, and financial risk aversion 
among households and corporations are characteristic of underdeveloped 
financial structures. Each constitutes a major barrier to succes sful bond 
issues. Private financial institutions which command most domestic 
financial savings tend to confine their equity investment to short-term 
and long-term government securities. Therefore , greater access t o their 
resources can only arise through competition with central government 
financing or from policy measures that explicitly favour acquisition of 
development bank bonds. The Jamaican experience reveals that short-term 
budgetary requirements of the government may prevail over the financing 
requirements of public sector development banks. However, this need not 
be the case, and development banks may prove capable of bidding away 
financial resources from the recurrent budget. 
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Proposals are sometimes made to compel private financial 
institutions to acquire development bonds. Among the devices proposed 
are ea rmarking part of the proceeds of central bank legal requirements, 
and the imposition of legal requirements that private financial institutions 
i nvest directly a portion of their assets in development bank bonds. While 
providing for automatic growth of resources, these devices reduce financial 
discipline in rural credit institutions, and may reduce the overall 
efficiency of financial resource use. 
An issue of optimal timing arises with respect to both deposit 
mobilization and bond issues by rural development banks. The ability of 
the banks to attract funds through either mechanism depends on the state of 
their financial portfolios. The tendency of rural development banks to 
experience serious arrears and liquidity problems implies that public issues 
of bonds or deposit acceptance are not likely to be particularly successful 
if they are attempted after the institutions' public image is one of 
financial mismanagement and near bankruptcy. In effect, a case can be made 
for the early adoption of these two financial mechanisms given the difficulty 
of doing so later, and the role they can play in instilling financial 
discipline at a crucial early stage of the institutional life cycle. As 
mentioned earlier, the issue of optimal timing for creating a stronger 
liability base can also be tied in with the issue of the optimal 
institutional method of incorporating a development portfolio in the young 
and imperfectly developed capital markets of LDCs. Building this portfolio 
within the institutional setting of a nationalized commercial bank may 
prove to be a more viable and self-sustaining institutional vehicle for 
promoting the growth of development financing in many LDCs. 
-163-
At the level of governmental budgetary support, taxes can be 
earmarked for contribution to the rural development bank. This would 
essentially result in linking the growth of budgetary resources to the 
growth of fiscal revenues. However, like other forms of government 
budgetary support, it may result in political interference with credit 
allocation and loan collection operations, and in financial laxity. 
Conclusions 
Some important conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analysis. 
First, public sector rural development banks are heavily dependent on 
local governments and external agencies for their funding. Local private 
sector financial institutions and loan recoveries within the rural banks 
themselves are not significant sources of loanable funds. Second, the 
influence exerted by public external funding on the lending practices of 
rural banks may contribute to the weakening of loan portfolio performance 
and overall financial viability of these banks. Third, none of the 
resultant portfolio decisions are necessarily consistent with allocative 
efficiency, distributional equity, or higher levels of rural employment. 
Fourth, the possibility that public external funds may contract as a 
result of those financial problems themselves threatens the long-run 
viability and growth of these banks. 
These short and long period implications lead to the overriding 
conclusion that the sources of funding should be broadened to include less 
restrictive and more dynamic resource inflows. Three extensions, namely, 
deposit mobilization, bond issues, and earmarked taxes were examined 
briefly. Deposit mobilization and local bond issues are preferable and 
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are also potentially more successful methods of funding, provided they are 
initiated at a relatively early stage in a rural development bank's life-
cycle . 
H<,wever, once the banks have evolved into the classic resource 
crises discussed in this paper, the policy space for effective 
restructuring of resource inflows will have been severly reduced. In 
this case, no formula for reform and survival is easy to devise. 
Liability structures appropriately designed from the outset may prevent 
or moderate many of the short and long run problems typically 
experienced by rural development banks. 
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5th Session: Rapporteur's Report and Discussion 
The Issues of External Funding Sources 
and the Viability of Rural Development Banks 
The author stated that constraints imposed on loans 
from international funding agencies result in weak perfor-
mance of rural development banks; however, the connnentator 
pointed out that the local window of rural bank operations 
perform much worse than funds provided by external agencies 
even though the local window does not have as stringent 
restrictions on use of funds. In the rejoinder, the 
author stated that the local window of rural bank operations 
is also frequently subject to many cont-rols established 
by local governments which result in the same difficulties 
as funds from international lending agencies. 
The author identified major external funding restrictions 
as target groups of borrowers, working capital restrictions, 
concessionary interest rate policy, foreign exchange risk and type 
of farm enterprises which introduce biases in the loan portfolio 
of rural banks. The connnentator stated that target groups 
must be an integral consideration of development lending 
and that larger borrowers with easy access to commercial 
credit are usually excluded from concessionary loans by way 
of appropriate mechanisms (e.g. net worth criteria). Inter-
national lenders require that working capital needs be met 
from local counterpart funds. The commentator accepted the 
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author's observations regarding the undesirable effects 
of subsidized interest rates. 
The commentator pointed out the difficulties of con-
vincing governments of the need to increase interest rates. 
The commentator agreed with author's conclusion that govern-
ments should absorb the foreign exchange risk. Increased 
borrower involvement in the preparation and design of pro-
jects could influence the type of enterprise financing. 
The commentator pointed out that many of the difficulties 
which the author identified regarding the viability of rural 
banks are due to local institutional inefficiencies as well 
as inadequate assistance from international agencies which 
could strengthen institutions. 
Commentator questioned whether local institutions can 
raise funds through deposits or bonds on the basis of their 
poor financial track record in current activities. The 
author agreed that an important link exists between the finan-
cial performance or viability of rural banks and the local 
capacity to generate deposits. In other words the financial 
viability of the rural bank must be practically guaranteed 
from the outset if the rural bank is to attract substantial 
amounts of local funds. 
Other commentators generally agreed that more dialogue 
is needed between international lenders and rural banks to 
resolve issues such as procurement restrictions and inclusion 
of working capital as a legitimate component of the loans. 
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This is necessary because the rural bank which implements 
the international loan and experiences most of the diffi-
culties in that implementation is generally not the agency 
or borrower which negotiates the loan. 
It was noted that many rural banks have failed to 
serve the clientele which their charters required them to 
serve and that the rural banks need to re-structure their 
operations to the changing conditions they now face. Some 
international lending agencies are now providing technical 
assistance support to streamline and improve the capability 
of some rural development banks. 
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The Potential for Rural Savings Mobilization: 
Some Evidence from Latin America 
Robert C. Vogel* 
Introduction 
The view is widely held that the primary role of financial 
institutions which serve the rural sector in developing countries 
is to provide abundant credit at subsidized low rates o f interest 
in order to promote agricultural output and to redistribute 
income toward the rural poor. However, there is increasing 
evidence that subsidized low interest rates on agricultural 
loans have failed to achieve these two objectives. Bec ause 
credit is fungible, it is difficult and costly, if not impossible, 
to tie subsidized credit to specific agricultural activities )J 
In addition, recent studies focusing on the recipients of sub-
sidized agricultural credit indicate that the main beneficiaries 
are not the rural poor, as credit is highly concentrate d in 
large loans to relatively wealthy farmers.~/ The purpo se of 
the present paper is not to pursue these arguments fur t her, but 
rather to examine the issue of the abundance of credit, that 
is, whether some alternative to the current approach mi ght not 
* Professor of Econom:L cs, Syracuse University, and Vis iting 
Professor of Agricultural Economics, Ohio State University. 
1/ See J.D. Von Pischke and Dale W Adams, "Fungibility and the 
Design and Evaluation of Agricultural Cre dit Projec t s," 
American Journal of Agricultur·a1 Economics, November 1980. 
2/ See Robert C. Vogel, "The Effect of Subsidized Credit on the 
Distribution of Income in Costa Rica," paper presented at the 
Rocky Mountain Council for Latin American Studies, Tucson, 
Arizona, April 1977. 
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facilitate a larger volume of credit for the rural sector in 
developing countries and thereby do more to promote agricultural 
output and redistribute income toward the rural poor. 
Because the current approach emphasizes the provision of 
credit to the rural sector at subsidized low rates of interest, 
it must necessarily rely on some external donor or some internal 
source of tax revenues to obtain resources for the subsidy. 
In fact, the failure of industrialized countries to provide 
more subsidized resources, either directly or through interna-
tional lending agencies such as the World Bank or the Inter-
American Development Bank, has been widely deplored in recent 
years. In spite of urging the industrialized countries to do 
more, the governments of most developing countries have them-
selves been unwilling to expand greatly the portion of tax 
revenues going to support subsidized credit for the rural 
sector. It is not the purpose of this paper to argue that the 
industrialized countries should be implored to give more, or 
the developing countries to allocate more of their scarce tax 
revenues to subsidizing credit for the rural sector, neither 
of which is likely to happen in any case. Rather, the present 
paper argues that substantial resources exist in the rural 
sectors of most developing countries which are largely unutilized 
and that these resources are unutilized in part because of the 
current approach which emphasizes the continuing dependence of 
the rural financial system on foreign grants or taxation of 
other sectors of the domestic economy . 
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The perceived necessity of relying on foreign grants or do-
mestic taxation comes from the widely-held view that savings 
cannot be mobilized in rural areas of developing countries because 
most of the rural population has no margin for saving over con-
sumption needs. In addition, urban-based financial institutions 
are said to be uninterested in the small sums that might be 
mobilized in rural areas, while rural institutions are thought 
to lack the administrative and technical skills necessary for 
the successful mobilization of savings. Based on the experience 
of credit unions in Peru and Costa Rica, and especially on the 
experience of the Banco Nacional para las Cooperativas of Peru 
(BANCOOP), the present paper argues that these views are not 
correct and that large amounts of voluntary savings can be 
mobilized in rural areas of developing countries if the proper 
incentives are present.3/ 
The current approach of relying on foreign grants and do-
mestic tax revenues to provide subsidized low interest rate 
credit to the rural sector creates strong incentives aga inst 
mobilizing domestic savings. Financial institutions are certain 
to prefer obtaining low-cost resources from foreign donors or 
from agencies of their own government to the alternative of 
obtaining resources from domestic savers who must be paid 
See Dale W Adams, "Mobilizing Household Savings Through Rural 
Financial Markets," Economic Development and GuTtu·ral Change, 
April 1978, and F.J.A. Bouman, "Indigenous Savings and Credit 
Societies in the ThLrd World: A Message," Saving and 
Development, 1977, #4 , for additional evidence. 
-173-
interest rates high enough to compensate them for the use of 
these resources. If, in addition, financial institutions are 
required to make loans at subsidized low interest rates to 
support certain agricultural activities, they will be faced 
with two unattractive alternatives: (1) make loans at the 
same low interest rates with resources mobilized from domestic 
savers and thereby incur losses on these loans; or (2) charge 
higher interest rates on loans which are based on higher-cost 
resources and then attempt to explain to the borrowers paying 
the higher rates why they were discriminated against. Given 
such incentives , it is not difficult to understand why financial 
institutions in developing countries have not focused on mobil-
izing domestic savings.~/ 
A project sponsored by the Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID), which was initiated in Peru in 1979, is the basis 
for much of the evidence presented below in support of the 
possibility of successful savings mobilization in rural areas 
of developing countries. This AID project has several segments, 
but here only the aspects relating to savings mobilization will 
be discussed in any detail . The project includes technical 
assistance to help BANCOOP with its savings mobilization efforts 
4/ See Thomas E. Weisskopf, "The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow 
on Domestic Saving in Underdeveloped Countries,'' Journal of 
International Economics, February 1972, for traditional argu-
ments and evidence based on 44 developing countries for the 
negative impact of foreign capital on domestic saving. 
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in two target areas in rural Peru and, in addition, technical 
assistance through BANCOOP to help the credit unions in these 
two target areas with their savings mobilization activities. 
Savings mobilization by the credit unions will be discussed 
first because in this way the environment in which Bancoop 
initiated its savings mobilization activities can better be 
understood. After the discussion of Bancoop's substantial suc-
cess with savings mobilization in rural Peru, savings mobiliza-
tion by credit unions in Costa Rica will be examined briefly to 
show that the Peruvian experience is not, and need not be , 
unique. 
Peruvian Credit Unions 
After years of strong growth, Peruvian credit unions began 
to experience serious difficulties in the mid-1970s , due largely 
to a dramatic upsurge of inflation and the failure of the credit 
unions to adjust their traditional low interest rate policies 
in the face of this inflation. From the early 1950s through 
1973 the rate of inflation in Peru averaged less than 10 percent 
per year, but accelerated to over 30 percent per year in 1976 
and 1977 and over 50 percent per year in 1978 and 1979. 
Until mid-1976, interest rates were rigidly controlled by the 
Peruvian Central Bank at 5 percent on savings deposits, 7 per-
cent on time deposits, and 12 percent on short-term loans. 
These interest rate ce ~ lings were raised beginning in mid-1976 
and significantly in mi d-1978. During 1979 and 1980 , the ceiling 
rate on savings deposits was 30.5 percent, while time deposits 
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earned up to 35.5 percent on deposits of one year duration. The 
nominal ceiling rate for loana was 32.5 percent duri~g 1972 and 
1980 ~ but effective interest rates could easily he 60 perc~nt 
or higher through the use of commis.si.ons, compensating balances 
and other devices. 
When the AID-BANCOOP project was initiated in 127~, none 
of the five major credit unions in the two target areas had 
taken advantage of the opportunity to raise interest rates. 
Rather, these credit unions continued to follow the tradition 
of charging 1 percent per month on loans. With such low inter-
est rates on loans, the credit unions were unable to pay high 
enough interest rates on savings and time deposits to compete 
with other financial institutions, especially the commercial 
banks, which had quickly taken advantage of the increases in 
interest rate ceilings. Thus, the credit unions were forced 
to rely for their resources almost entirely on the capital con-
tributions of their members, on which dividends are limited to 
6 percent per year by the regulations of the Peruvian Central 
Bank. 
These interest rate policies have created serious perverse 
incentives and substantial problems for the credit unions. 
On one hand, members have an incentive to borrow as much as 
possible because interest rates on loans far below the rate of 
inflation mean that borrowers have to pay back in real terms 
much less than the amount borrowed. On the other hand, members 
have little or no incentive to make time and savings deposits 
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with their credit unions hecause the purchasing power of these 
deposits is rapidly eroded hy inflation when adequate interest 
rates are not paid. Members who make capital contributions to 
their credit unions do so primarily for the purpose of getting 
access to loans, and such loans can be as much as three times 
the amount of a member's capital contribution under the regula-
tions of most Peruvian credit unions. 
The results of these interest rate policies can readily be 
seen in the substantial problems experienced by the five major 
credit unions in the two target areas of the AID-BANCOOP project. 
There have been increasing complaints of severe shortages of 
loanable funds, as the demand for low interest rate loans far 
exceeds members' capital contributions and meagre time and 
savings deposits. Disgruntled members who are told that their 
approved loans cannot be disbursed because of a lack of funds, 
or that there is no point in even applying for a loan, often 
cease making capital contributions to their credit unions and 
become inactive. For some credit unions the loss of active 
members has spread to serious repayments problems as members 
see no point in repaying old loans when the prospects of ob-
taining new loans are bleak. 5/ In addition, many credit unions 
are experiencing substantial operating deficits as stagnant 
See Robert C. Vogel, "Rural Financial Market Performance: 
Implications of Low Delinquency Rates," American Journal of 
Agricultural Econonics, forthcoming, for a discussion of the 
importance of good service on new loans in maintaining good 
repayment rates on outstanding loans. 
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interest income fails to keep pace with the operating costs which 
increase with inflation. Even those credit unions which have 
managed to continue to grow in nominal· terms have seen the pur-
chasing power of their capital more than halved since the 
mid-1970s. 
In spite of the important role in the AID-BANCOOP project 
of technical assistance through BANCOOP to help the credit 
unions with savings mobilization, the credit unions in the two 
target areas have been slow to accept the higher interest rate 
policies which are a prerequisite to successful savings mobili-
zation. As of the end of 1979, only two of the five credit 
unions had raised their interest rates. One of these changed 
its interest rate policies only after it had reached the verge 
of collapse and had received an inordinate proportion of the 
project's technical assistance in the form of detailed analysis 
and persistent explanation of the consequences of its low inter-
est rate policies. The other > however> had quickly raised its 
interest rates to the maximum permitted by the Central Bank 's 
regulations and has subsequently had significant success in 
mobilizing additional time and savings deposits. 
As of mid-1980> two of the other credit unions in the tar-
get areas had also raised their interest rates. One of these 
became convinced of the need to raise interest rates on loans 
i n early 1980 because of operating losses, but the need to 
raise interest rates on time and savings deposits sufficiently 
to compete with other financial institutions in mobilizing 
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savings was not recognized. The other credit union raised inter-
est rates to the maximum permitted on time and savings deposits, 
but gave so little publicity to these changes that several em-
ployees of the credit union were unaware of the new interest 
rates. As of mid-1980, one credit union still had made no change 
in its interest rates, although increases have been proposed 
by members of the credit union's board and discussed at the 
annual meeting. Because of the slowness to change interest 
rates, in the case of only one credit union is it possible at 
this point to see significant success with savings mobi l ization. 
Before proceeding to analyze BANCOOP's success with savings 
mobilization in the same two areas of rural Peru, it is inter-
esting to speculate why the credit unions have been so reluc -
tant to change th~ir interest rate policies.~/ There are at 
least four hypotheses worth noting, which are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. The first is that credit unions are simply 
confused by the rhetoric of cooperativism, and members genuinely 
believe that raising interest rates on loans would be usurious 
and that problems can best be dealt with by appeals to altruism 
against the economic rationality of individual members. The 
second is that members who are on the boards of directors or 
key policymaking committees have much better access to credit 
union loans than most other members and use the rhetoric of 
See Robert C. Vogel, "Barriers to Financial Reform," Interna-
tional Conference on Rural Finance, Calgary, Canada, August 
1979, for a discussion of the difficul ties of implementing 
interest rate reform in a somewhat different context. 
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cooperativism to keep interest rates low on loans for their per-
sonal benefit. The third is that most credit union decision 
makers, including even management itself, have little profes-
sional knowledge of economics or finance and thus view as very 
risky any departure from traditional policies. The fourth is 
that credit unions continually hope for some source of low cost 
resources (if not the capital contributions of their members 
then donations or subsidized credit from some external source) 
through which they can avoid raising interest rates to compete 
for savings. Some evidence for each of these four hypotheses 
can be found in the technical assistance work with the credit 
unions in the two target areas, but perhaps most noticeable 
was the extreme disappointment of the credit unions on finding 
that the technical assistance with savings mobilization did not 
include any low cost resources for lending to members. 
BAN COOP 
In spite of its name, BANCOOP is not in fact a bank under 
Peruvian law , but it does carry out most functions of a bank 
such as receiving deposits and making loans. BANCOOP is rather 
a second level cooperative , that is, a cooperative of coopera-
tives with its directors elected by the cooperatives which have 
become members by making capital contributions to BANCOOP. 
Nevertheless , BANCOOP deals not only with its member coopera-
tives , but also with non-member cooperatives, individual members 
of cooperatives , and the general public. BANCOOP was selected 
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by AID to be the primary institution in the project for two main 
reasons: (1) BANCOOP was already following a policy of rela-
tively high interest rates on loans and deposits within the 
limits of Peruvian regulations, and (2} BANCOOP had been reason-
ably successful as an urban-based operation and was interested 
in expanding its operations to serve a rural clientele. 
BANCOOP initiated its savings mobilization activitie s in 
the two target areas of rural Peru during 1979 in the face of 
adverse economic conditions. In addition to the rapid inflation 
mentioned above, the Peruvian economy had shown no real growth 
in several years. Moreover, BANCOOP faced potentially formi -
dable competition from established financial institutions in-
cluding several commercial banks. Yet, by mid-1980, in the 
two target areas BANCOOP had already mobilized in Peruvian soles 
time and savings deposits equal to approximately one mi llion 
U.S . dollars, in contrast to a goal of only $150,000 to be met 
by the end of the project in mid-1981. This success can be 
put more clearly in perspective when it is noted that commercial 
banks and other financial institutions in the two target areas 
have indicated in preliminary figures much lower rates of saving 
mobilization during 1979 and early 1980. Offices of BANCOOP 
outside the two target areas also reported mu6h lower rates of 
savings mobilization through mid-1980 . 
The success of BANCOOP in mobilizing savings in the two 
target areas should not obscure the fact that some significant 
problems. have been encJuntered. In the early stages of the 
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project, BANCOOP officials that it was preferable to con-
centrate on mobilizing resources through capital contributions 
c1 f member cooperatives and demand deposits and to de - emphasize 
time and savings deposits because the latter two required ap-
preciable interest payments in contrast to the former two . 
However, the hope of mobilizing low- cost resources through 
capital contributions and demand deposits proved to be illusory . 
As in the case of the credit unions, members made capital con-
tributions in order to request loans , so BANCOOP found that 
c apital contributions from member cooperatives increased the 
demand for loans more than they increased the supply of resources 
available for lending . The inflows and outflows of demand de -
posits proved to be quite large relative to balances , so that 
demand deposits have not provided a stable source of funds for 
lending, nor have they been particularly low cost because of 
the clerical expenses involved in maintaining these accounts. 
The subsequent shift toward emphasizing time and savings deposits 
has provided far more resources for lending in the two target 
areas, and the interest and other costs associated with these 
accounts have easily been covered by the interest earned on 
the loans made with these resources . 
Another problem encountered during the first year of the 
project was the much slower rate of savings mobilization in 
o ne of the two target areas , in spite of the fact that the 
less successful BANCOOP office had opened several months earlier 
and serves a more heavily populated area. It was found that 
-182-
attempts by the member of BANCOOP's board of directors from the 
less successful target area to intervene in the day-to-day oper-
ations of that office had led to a high rate of turnover in 
managers and other key personnel during much of 1979. This, 
in turn, had harmed employee morale and had reduced pub l ic con-
f idence in the ability of the BANCOOP office in that target area 
to survive and prosper. However, the durabi l ity of the current 
manager of that BANCOOP office has led to improved emp l oyee 
morale and depositor confidence, so that the rate of savings 
mobilization during 1980 has been approximately the same in 
the two target areas. A final puzzle worth noting was t he 
slowness of BANCOOP to extend the successful savi ngs mobiliza-
tion techniques developed in the two target areas to offi ces 
in other areas. Perhaps the explanation, as suggested i n the 
case of the Peruvian credit unions, is the difficulty of con-
vincing individuals to deviate from traditional a pproaches when 
they do not have enough professional knowledge to be confident 
in the success of a new approach. In any case, several BANCOOP 
of fices along the northern coast of Peru successfully a dop t ed 
new savings mobi~ization techniques beginning in mid-1 980. 
One of the principal reasons for BANCOOP's , success in sav-
1 
ings mobilization has been the payment of high rates o f interest 
on time and savings deposits, the maximum permitt ed unde r Peruvian 
regulations. There are, however, other factors which may be 
equally important. The experience, discussed above, o f the 
BANCOOP office with hi gh turnover of key p e rsonne l indica t es t he 
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importance of depositor confidence and employee morale. Employee 
performance is an important factor in successful savings mobili-
zation which is often overlooked. It is generally recognized 
that good service in the form of convenient location of offices 
and convenient hours of operation is important in attracting 
potential depositors, and in this respect BANCOOP compares quite 
favorably with other financial institutions in the two target 
areas, especially with the commercial banks. However , it is 
seldom recognized that rapid service with a minimum of paper-
work and other formalities is at least as important, and in 
this respect the advantage of BANCOOP over the other financial 
institutions appears to be even greater. A principal reason 
for good employee performance, which results in good service 
for depositors, is incentives for BANCOOP employees which are 
tied to the amount of time and savings deposits mobilized. 
Otherwise , more clients and more deposits simply mean more work 
for employees . 
Savings mobilization campaigns, which include substantial 
incentives for employee performance, are the other important 
element in BANCOOP's success in mobilizing savings in the two 
target areas and, more recently, along the northern coast of 
Peru . So far during 1980, BANCOOP has run three very effective 
savings campaigns. The first , which actually began in December 
of 1979 and ran through the middle of January , involved free 
instant photographs for those who deposited small amounts, a 
raffle of cameras , and free cameras for those who made large 
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time deposits. The second, which ran from early February until 
April, involved free school supplies for small deposits, a 
raffle of school supplies and bicycles, and free bicycles for 
large time deposits. The third savings mobilization campaign, 
which began in July and ran until September, featured raffles 
of color television sets and other electrical appliances and 
immediate prizes of these same articles for large time deposits. 
This campaign departed from the earlier campaigns in some im-
portant aspects. First, as noted above, it was adopted by 
BANCOOP offices outside the two target areas. Second, the 
emphasis shifted toward time deposits and toward prizes which 
would have major appeal to more affluent and more urban groups 
within the target areas. The earlier campaigns not only empha-
sized a much larger number of smaller prizes but also emphasized 
1.mmediate prizes in order to spread confidence in the newly-
opened BANCOOP offices among a potentially large rural clientele.11 
The current phase of the AID-BANCOOP project involves a 
detailed analysis of BANCOOP's successful savings mobilization 
efforts. In particular, the thousands of savings accounts which 
have been opened at the BANCOOP offices i n the two target areas 
are being studied with respect to the characteristics of the 
depositors and the behavior of the accounts over time. A fear 
v 
, 
See Augusto Chaname, "Pautas a Considerar en la Planificacion 
de una Campana de Promocion," Seminario sobre El Proceso 
Inflacionario y su Incidencia en las Cooperativas de Ahorro 
y Credito, San Jose, Costa Rica, September 1980, for a 
detailed disc~ssio 1 1 of the BANCOOP savings mobilization 
campaigns. 
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expressed early in the project was that savings would be deposited 
during campaigns in order to secure prizes and would then be 
quickly withdrawn . This fear has proven unfounded as savings 
accounts opened during campaigns and those opened at other times 
do not show significantly different behavior , and both groups 
of savings accounts have on the average maintained balances 
over time which tend toward the amount of the initial deposit . 
The main difference between campaign and non- campaign periods 
is that substantially more new accounts are opened during sav-
i ngs mobilization campaigns . However, the analysis has not 
yet progressed to the point where it is possible to evaluate 
tne appropriateness of the recent emphasis on time deposits 
rather than savings accounts, nor has the importance of the 
different elements in each of the campaigns yet been analyzed . 
Interviews a re currently being carried out in one of the 
target areas with a random sample of 100 BANCOOP depositors 
and 100 other jndividuals who are not BANCOOP depositors , but 
who are similar to these depositors in other respects . The 
purpose of these interviews is not only to discover what aspects 
of BANCOOP 1 s savings mobilization efforts are most appealing to 
potential depositors , but also to discover what are the prin-
cipal sources of these deposits . Knowing the source of these 
deposits may be useful for BANCOOP ' s promotional activities , but 
ror macroeconomic analysis it is particularly important whether 
they a re coming from reduced consumption , reduced holdings of 
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unproductive physical assets, or reduced holdings of other finan -
cial assets. In addition, the relationship between time and 
savings deposits and other BANCOOP services is being studied, 
that is, whether individuals tend to make time and savings de-
posits first and then are drawn to other BANCOOP services, such 
as loans and checking accounts, or vice versa. The daily inflows 
and outflows from BANCOOP's checking and savings accounts are 
also being analyzed in order to make recommendations about the 
appropriate level of reserves for these accounts. 
Before turning to the discussion of savings mob ilization 
by credit unions in Costa Rica, it is worthwhile to mention 
briefly the impact of BANCOOP's savings mobilization efforts 
on its financial viability and on its lending behavior. Under 
the impact of inflation BANCOOP had drastically shortened the 
maturity of its loans and consequently had shifted its loan 
portfolio away from cooperatives, both member and non-member, 
and towards individuals. Higher interest rates and the greater 
availability of resources due to successful savings mobilization 
have permitted some lengthening of maturities and some shift 
of the loan portfolio back toward cooperatives. Throughout the 
period there has been no lack of demand for BANCOOP loans , even 
at effective interest rates of more than 60 percent per year, 
and many borrowers have stated that rapid service is more impor-
tant than low interest rates. BANCOOP ' s financial viability 
also appears to have improved during the period of successful 
savings mobilization efforts . Inadequate accounting procedures, 
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especially with respect to delinquent loans , make BANCOOP ' s stated 
profits somewhat dubious, but in any case both the delinquency 
situation and profits appear to have improved during the pas t 
year . ~ 
Costa Rican Credit Unions 
A study of savings mobilization by Costa Rican credit unions 
which served as the main background paper for a recent seminar 
in Costa Rica shows that the Peruvian experience with savings 
mobilization is not different from what can be observed in 
other countries of Latin America . ~/ In l a te 1978 , Costa Ric a 
11nderwent a major financial reform in which many interest rates 
were totally freed from control b y the Central Bank while 
others were increased and allowed to float with international 
interest rates . In addition , increasing rates of inflation 
during the past two years have tended to push interest rates 
higher since the beginning of the reform . Many credit unions 
in Costa Rica , as in Peru , have failed to raise intere s t rates 
and have thus been unable to mobilize additional resources 
through time and savings deposits . These credit unions have 
also experienced a loss of active members and an increase in 
81 See George Wohanka , " The Impact of Successful Savings Mobili -
zation on BANCOOP ' s Financial Viability and Lending Behavior ," 
paper presented to AID , Department of State , Washington , D. C., 
December 1980 . 
2/ See John F . Gadway and Robert C. Vogel , " La Inflacion y la 
Tasa de Interes ," Seminario sabre El Proceso Inflacionario y 
su Incidencia en las Cooperativas de Ahorro y Credito , 
San Jose , Costa Rica , September 1980 . 
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delinquant loans as members discover ~hat these credit unions 
cannot mobilize adequate resources to provide new loans. 
However, in Costa Rica several credit unions have been willing 
to raise interest rates on loans and deposits as high as neces-
sary to compete vigorously with other financial institutions 
including commercial banks . These credit unions have con-
tinued to grow, not just in nominal terms , but in the r eal 
volume of deposits and loans and in the number o f new a ctive 
members . 
In the discussion at the Costa Rican seminar , many credit 
unions lamented the lack of an altruistic cooperative s pir i t 
among their members , but almost all recognized that individual 
economic rationality r equires realistically high intere st rates 
for credit unions to be able to mobilize the resources neces -
sary to provide good serv ice to their members and, h e n ce, to 
surv ive . There was , just as within BANCOOP in Peru, d i sagree-
ment as to whether it was better to emphasize saving s dep o sits 
or time deposits in savings mobilization strategies , a n d the 
prefer red strategy often seemed to depend on the characteris-
tics of the members of the particular credit union. Th e ide a 
of savings mobilization campaigns did not meet with universal 
acclaim from Costa Rican credit unions , in part because of 
apparent confusion among the necessity of l e cturing membe rs on 
the importance of an altruistic c ooperative spiri t , i mp r ov i n g 
public relations in g e neral , and designing and i mp lementing a 
savings campaign with specific objectives. There was a lso 
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considerable debate about the possibility or desirability of 
careful supervision of the use by members of credit union loans 
as a complement to savings mobilization. 
Conclusion 
It is possible to mobilize substantial amounts of savings 
in the rural areas of developing countries if the proper incen-
tives are present. Proper incentives include not only ade-
quately high interest rates for depositors, but also financial 
institutions in which depositors can have confidence and which 
provide good service for depositors, and this in turn requires 
adequate rewards to promote good performance by the employees 
of financial institutions. In addition, the success of BANCOOP's 
savings mobilization campaigns indicates that special promo-
tional efforts for savings can also be very effective. 
International lending institutions might consider adjust-
ing their policies and attempting to inject resources into the 
rural financial markets of developing countries in a way that 
encourages proper incentives for savings mobilization. Orte 
possible approach would be grants or subsidies in the form of 
low interest rate loans to rural financial institutions to 
match in some proportion the savings newly mobilized by these 
institutions . Through the generation of additional savings 
such an approach would make credit more abundant for the ulti-
mate recipients of loans in the target group. This could be 
far more effective in promoting agricultural output and 
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redistributing income toward the rural poor than the traditional 
policies of subsidized low interest rate loans for small farmers 
and other agricultural producers. 
-1.91-
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6th Session: Rapporteur's Report and Discussion 
The Potential for Rural Savings Mobilization: 
Some Evidence from Latin America 
Robert C. Vogel, the author of the paper, emphasized 
the need to complement other sources of funds with domestic 
savings to improve agricultural production and income 
distribution in rural areas. He also emphasized that this 
need can be fulfilled by providing appropriate savings 
incentives like attractive real interest rates and better 
services to the depositors. In addition, promoting confi-
dence of the depositors and providing incentives to the bank 
staff are especially necessary for mobilizing rural savings. 
The experiences of pilot projects in Peru and Costa Rica 
provide support for these observations. He emphasized that 
these experiences are also relevant for other developing 
countries. 
The discussant, John Yates thought that rural savings 
potential in the Caribbean may not be high. He also thought 
that there is a need to reform the banking laws in the 
region so that savings mobilization can be promoted more 
effectively. He expressed a concern that the costs of 
mobilizing rural savings could be high since the availability 
of trained staff and bank offices are very limited in the 
region. The strategy of mobilizing rural savings should also 
take into account the scope for matching term-structure of 
-194-
ftinds mobilized with that of the loan portfolio. In Guyana 
deposits mobilized by the commercial banks may be shared with 
the DFCs to plough back funds in the rural areas. Finally 
he raised a question: Whether or not savings mobilized by 
the BANCOOP in Peru were utilized for improving agricultural 
production and rural income distribution. 
Kenrick Hunte thought that providing a higher interest 
rate though necessary is not a sufficient condition to 
promoting rural savings. In this context, he referred to 
the poor response of savings to higher interest rates in 
Barbados. He also thought that there is a need to study 
savings elasticity of rural households in the Caribbean. 
Compton Bourne thought that in light of the successful 
saving activities of the formal and informal associations 
in the Caribbean the Peruvian expereinces are relevant. 
Furthermore, surveys have consistently shown that the rural 
poor are much more inclined to have savings accounts than 
they are lines of credit from formal credit programs. Hence 
any program designed to help attract more savings with higher 
interest rates will be helping the rural poor more t han 
programs designed to promote cheap credit at the expense of 
savings through negative real rates of interest. He further 
thought that there is scope to rationalize the different 
instruments used for savings mobilization in the region. 
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Neville Grainger wanted to know whether smaller farmers in 
Peru had benefited from high rates of interest offered for 
savings. Darwin Clarke shared this concern since cooperative 
funds were often utilized for unprd.ductive purposes. 
Douglas Graham however thought that the smaller farmers could 
still benefit from earning higher interest rates on savings 
which were hitherto not available. This in and of itself 
represented a net improvement. B.M. Desai thought that 
rural savings capacity should be judged on the basis of 
expected rate of return and time profile of cash flows, 
besides income. 
Richard Roberts expressed a concern about relying on 
rural savings to meet investment needs of the rural areas. 
He also shared the concerns expressed by John Yates. 
C. De Grasse thought that rural savings can complement 
other resources without being subjected to more constraining 
terms of foreign capital. He also thought that rural savings 
can be mobilizied by rationalizing existing financial insti-
tutional structure rather than by creating new institutions 
in the Caribbean. 
Darwin Clarke, Headley Brown, and Dario Bencosme Baez 
agreed with the idea of mobilzing rural savings to complement 
other resources. In this context, Clarke referred to the 
projects sponsored by USAID and CIDA, and wondered whether 
DFCs can be successful in rural savings mobilization. 
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Headley Brown thought that the commercial banks could be 
required by law or other mechanisms to share their savings 
with the public sector credit agencies. This was necessary 
because mobilizing rural savings could be very costly . 
Baez thought that the new strategy of mobilizing rural 
savings has a potential to change the savings compos i tion 
from unproductive to productive forms. 
In his reply, Robert C. Vogel, stressed that the 
Peruvian and Costa Rican experiences were relevant for the 
Caribbean because of similar economic conditions. He also 
stressed the importance of a new strategy to derive better 
complementarity between savings and credit operations. 
He agreed that higher interest rate on savings is not a 
sufficient condition, but it certainly is a very important 
condition for promoting rural savings. He stressed t he 
need for better services to the depositors and for be tter 
staff incentives. Funds mobilized by the BANCOOP in Peru 
were utilized for agricultural product i on and market i ng 
co-ops and the smaller farmers had benefited from the new 
program. He also reported that the costs of special savings 
campaigns in Peru were fairly small considering the amount 
of savings mobilized. He once again stressed the importance 
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Dominicana 
Grenada Development Bank 
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Kingston, Jamaica 
Caribbean Food Corporation - Trinidad 
Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries 
Nassau, Bahamas 
Development Board - Turks & Caicos 
Islands 
Jamaica Development Bank 
University of Guyana (Economics Dept.) 
Gaibank - Guyana Agricultural & Indus-
trial Development Bank 
Barbados National Bank (Agricultural 
Division) 
Guyana Sugar Corporation Ltd. (Guysuco) 
United States Agency for International 
Development (Regional Development Office)-
Barbados 
Bureau De Credit Agricole - Haiti 
Barbados National Bank (Agricultural 
Division) 
Agricultural Credit Board - Jamaica 
Ohio State University/Indian Institution 
of Management 
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Joy Fevrier 
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Cary Fraser 
Douglas H. Graham 
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Errol Hand.man 
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Royal Bank of Canada - Georgetown, 
Guyana 
Development & Finance Corporation -
St. Kitts 
Cardats, St. Georges, Grenada 
St. Lucia Agricultural & Industrial 
Bank 
U.S.A.I.D. - Washington 
C.A.D.E.C. (Christian Action for 
Development in the Caribbean) Guyana 
Ohio State University - U.S.A. 
Caribbean Development Bank, Barbados 
Guyana Sugar Corporation Ltd. (Guysuco: 
Guyana Sugar Corporation Lt d. (Guysuco: 
Gaibank - Guyana Agricultural & 
Industrial Development Bank 
Agricultural & Co-operative Bank -
St. Vincent 
Antigua and Barbuda Development Bank 
Gaibank - Guyana Agricultural & 
Industrial Development Bank 
Barbados National Bank (Legal Departmet 
Gaibank - Guyana Agricultural & 
Industrial Development Bank 
Inter-American Development Bank 
Ohio State University - U.S.A. 
University of the West Indies - Barbadc 
United States Agency for International 






Everett A. O'Neal 
Philomena Persaud 
Peter Ramsammy 
Daniel A. Roberts 
R.A.J. Roberts 
Carlos G. Santos 
Dr. Compton Saul 
Desmond Segre' 
Keith Van Sertima 




Robert C. Vogel 
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John C. Yates 
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Institutions 
Cardi - Tinidad 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Gaibank - Guyana Agricultural & 
Industrial Development Bank 
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural 
Sciences - Barbados 
Development Bank of the British 
Virgin Islands 
Ministry of Agriculture - Guyana 
(Planning Dept.) 
Ministry of Agriculture (Ext. & Educ. 
Div.) Guyana 
Grenada Development Bank 
Food & Agricultural Organisat ion of 
the U.N. Rome 
Development Finance Corporation - Belize 
State Planning Secretariat - Guyana 
Agricultural Credit Board - J amaica 
Gaibank - Guyana Agricultural & 
Industrial Development Bank 
Agriculture & Industrial Development 
Board Cayman Islands 
Gaibank - Guyana Agricultural & 
Industrial Development Bank 
Gaibank - Guyana Agricultural & 
Industrial Development Bank 
Gaibank - Guyana Agricultural & 
Industrial Development Bank 
Syracuse University & Oh~o State University 
Jamaica Development Bank 
Gaibank - Guyana Agricultural & 
Industrial Development Bank 
